What the Commissioner is authorized to award is "costs." The term "costs" was first introduced in a Statute of Edw. I., and it clearly means the expenses to which a party is put in litigation. What it means in the section under consideration is some expense to which the party is put. It is contended that the costs must be limited to such costs as could be recovered in an action in a Court of law. Why? In a Court of law no doubt the term "costs" is used often in a limited sense, and no doubt in connection with an action in a Court of law, in which a party can only be represented by a solicitor, the meaning is to a certain extent limited. But in a Court of law the term "costs" includes not only payments for proceedings in Court, and other matters which can only be done by a solicitor, but also payments out-of-pocket, such as for Court fees, and for securing the attendance of witnesses. All these are "costs." The term also includes the expenses of commissions to foreign countries to take evidence. It includes all the necessary expenses of a party in establishing his case. When we speak of costs between solicitor and client, another distinction comes in between profit costs and out-of-pocket costs. As far as the client is concerned they are all out-of-pocket costs, but he will only be allowed to recover from the other party the proper charges incurred in establishing his case. The question cannot arise in the Supreme Court in respect of any other person than a solicitor, because it is not lawful for any other person to act as an agent in legal proceedings. The principle is that there are many things in connection with an action which the party cannot do himself, and therefore he must employ an agent, and necessary payments to that agent are allowed. In proceedings in Courts of law only one kind of agent is allowed to act, and, if payments are made to any other person for acting as agent, they cannot be recovered from the other party. But if several classes of agents might be employed, payments made to any of them might be recovered. Thus at one time solicitors, attorneys and proctors were each employed for a different class of business. Payments made to a member of any one of these classes of persons, for work which might properly be done by a member of one of the other classes only, could not be recovered from the other party. Afterwards, when all three classes might do any kind of legal work, payments to them could be recovered because it was money properly expended in establishing the party's case. If that be the principle, why should it not extend to a patent agent, who may be lawfully employed in conducting proceedings before the Commissioner. There is a great deal of work to be done in preparing the case for hearing, and the applicant cannot be expected to know all about it, and therefore he is entitled to employ an agent and to pay him remuneration for the work done. The expenses so incurred are costs, and the amount of those costs may be fixed by the Commissioner. Objection was taken in this instance to a sum of about £200 paid for qualifying fees to witnesses. Most of the persons to whom those fees were paid made affidavits. It is clear that, in an action in the Supreme Court in which those facts had to be proved, those fees might be allowed on taxation. Order LXV., r. 27 (9) of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1884 expressly provides that such fees may be allowed in all cases, whether under the higher or lower scale of costs. The rules authorized to be made under the Patents Act 1890 adopt the lower scale of costs. I have no doubt that these fees were properly allowed in respect of preparing the affidavits, or that in the Supreme Court they would have been allowed.