26 The defendants complain that it is improper to plead a denial in the statement of claim. The plaintiffs say that the denial is merely intended as a reinforcement of the alternative character of plea and adds nothing to the word "alternatively". I think the trouble with par 60 is that it introduces a substantive plea to the effect that the various agreements referred to may be "void or ... unenforceable for any reason". It has the hallmarks of an anticipatory plea. Perhaps the fourth plaintiff is only trying to say that, alternatively to its claims pursuant to the collection of agreements referred to, it is entitled to recover the sums advanced as money paid to its use, or by mistake, or for consideration which has totally failed. Money paid by a plaintiff for a consideration that has totally failed may be recovered as money had and received to his use. There is no reason why a plaintiff cannot sue on an alleged contract for the consideration due to him under the contract, alternatively, for his money back as money had and received to his use. This pleading has got into difficulty because it seeks to plead as material facts (voidness and/or unenforceability) the matters which would, if they exist, deny the right to relief under the contract. That is quite unnecessary. See Bullen and Leake (supra) at p 672 et seq. Paragraph 60 cannot stand in its present form. There is an application to amend it, but the amendments do not cure the defect. In fact, they exacerbate it. It is sufficient to say that par 60 should be struck out because, in its terms, it is based on a denial and is therefore anticipatory and, on that ground, embarrassing. There is one other small problem. The particulars to par 60(a) and (b) contain matters that are not particulars, but evidence. An allegation of an acknowledgment of payment is not a particular of payment.