common law a writ of habere facias after judgment for the
plaintiff in ejectment can be obtained without any special order.
The position, therefore, was this: In the Supreme Court there
are two practices with respect to the enforcement of judgments
of practically the same substance and effect - that is to say, judg-
ments to recover possession in common law actions of ejectment
and judgments to deliver possession in equity. Under one prac-
tice a special order is required, and under the other it is not. The
objection, therefore, resolves itself into the following of the com-
mon law practice instead of the equity practice. Rule 200 of the
Bankrwptcy Rules provides that "Non-compliance with any of
these Rules, save rule 176" (which does not relate to this matter),
"or with any rule of practice for the time being in force, shall
not render any proceeding void unless the Judge shall so direct ;
but such proceeding may be set aside, either wholly or in part,as
irregular," &. In my opinion, following the common law prac-
tice instead of the equity practice is at most an irregularity, and
does not constitute the proceeding a nullity. It is a settled rule
that a party assisting in the execution of an irregular writ can
justify under the writ if it has not been set aside. The plea of
justification was therefore established, subject to another objec-
tion which was taken by Mr. Cohen. He contended that only
persons bound by the judgment were bound by the writ. The
plaintiff, who was in possession, claimed under a contract of pur-
chase from Margaret Plowman of 6th June 1911. The writ com-
manded the sheriff to deliver possession of the land, and he was
bound to obey that writ and enforce it against anyone who
might be in possession of the land. Everyone was bound to
submit to the authority of the law. If, however, the appellant
had had a title he would have been entitled to relief against the
writ. The position of a person whose land is taken from him