DECISION
29 I accept Mr. Henskens' submission that normally pure questions of law (including questions of construction) should be decided if they can determine interlocutory applications. However, this is not universally required, particularly if, as suggested by Young, J. in Hortico, time does not permit of proper consideration of the questions of law, or if a more complete factual matrix is required than can be provided at the interlocutory hearing.
30 In this case, I do not think there is any relevant dispute affecting the factual matrix necessary for construction of the contract. There are disputes concerning the basis of Planet Build's claim for the amount by which its Progress Claim No.51 exceeded the amount certified in relation to Progress Claim No.50, and also concerning Lassgol's claim to be entitled to deduct $267,000.00 for non-complying work; and these disputes plainly involve factual questions. It seems clear that there are serious questions to be tried concerning these matters.
31 However, it is submitted for Lassgol that, even if I decided these questions in favour of Planet Build, Lassgol would still be entitled to call on the Performance Bond, because it is entitled to over $200,000.00 in liquidated damages, cl.2.5 of the Deed does not affect Lassgol's rights to call on the Bond, and the Bond has not yet expired in that practical completion has not been achieved and no Certificate of Practical Completion has issued. As I understand it, Lassgol also submits that Planet Build is not entitled to $259,107.00, or even to $114,421.00, because of the failure to provided a statutory declaration; and that anyway, even if it was, it cannot claim to have these amounts set off against Lassgol's entitlement to liquidated damages.
32 I will deal in turn with these matters, giving in the first instance my prima facie views; and then I will state my opinion on whether I should proceed to finally determine these questions.
33 I think it is correct to say that Lassgol is entitled to over $200,000.00 in liquidated damages. My present view is that its entitlement to liquidated damages ceased when Marrickville Council issued its certificate on 20th July 2000; but even on that basis, on my calculation, Lassgol is entitled to liquidated damages of $215,000.00.
34 At present, I am inclined to think that cl.2.5 of the Deed does not detract from Lassgol's right to call on the Performance Bond in respect of liquidated damages. On its true construction, I think it means that what is to be deducted from the $425,000.00 is so much of liquidated damages as then should be owing.
35 I think also that the Bond has not yet expired. Although the Deed made a different provision for the calculation of liquidated damages, substituting for practical completion in that regard a date referable to the grant of a Certificate by Marrickville Council, I do not think it took all references to practical completion out of the contract: for example, I do not think it affected the provision that practical completion was the date for handing over possession. In those circumstances, I do not think it affected the provision in the Performance Bond to the effect that expiry of that Bond would take place when the Superintendent gave the Certificate of Practical Completion.
36 At present, I think Planet Build is entitled to payment of $259,107.00, notwithstanding the late provision of the statutory declaration and notwithstanding the Superintendent's Certificate given on 19th July 2000. The Superintendent's Certificate was required to be given within two days, and otherwise, in my tentative opinion, the Principal was required to pay the amount of the claim. Clause 43.2 of the contract provided for a statutory declaration to be given "not earlier than 14 days after" each claim for payment, and before actual payment; and yet the Deed of Release required payment within two days of the making of a claim. The two provisions therefore cannot stand together, and that in the Deed of Release must prevail. In my opinion, it prevails by removing the requirement that the statutory declaration must be given before payment, and removing the entitlement of the Principal to withhold payment until the statutory declaration was given. (Indeed, it may be that this was the effect of the original contract, because it provided for payment within 11 days.) Furthermore, in my opinion, the certificate issued on 19th July 2000 was of no effect, because there had already crystallised a liability for $259,107.00. I would note however that these matters were not adequately argued; and in those circumstances I would not, without further argument, make a final decision on them.
37 Turning to the question of whether a set-off would be available to the Contractor, my present view is that it would be. Again, this was a matter not adequately argued before me, and I would not make a final decision without further argument. However, I would note the following matters.
38 Lassgol's right to call on the Performance Bond is governed by cl.42.9 of the contract; and having regard to the terms of cl.5.6, in my opinion it has no wider right: cf. Barclay Bowlem. Clause 42.9 requires recourse first to retention moneys, and then to security (including a performance bond) only if those moneys are insufficient. The retention moneys are security for both parties; so that, just as Lassgol could have recourse to them for its liquidated damages, Planet Build could have recourse to them for its unpaid progress claims. Access to retention moneys requires participation of both parties: see cl.5.10, first alternative. I do not think it could have been intended that, if for example there was $100,000.00 in the retention moneys, the Contractor owed the Principal $100,000.00 in liquidated damages for late completion, and the Principal owed the Contractor $100,000.00 for unpaid progress claims, the one that gave the first notice under cl.5.6(b) would become entitled to the whole of the retention moneys; and accordingly, I think the contract implies that there should be a set-off when recourse is sought to retention moneys. Because the Principal must have recourse first to retention moneys before having recourse to security, I think there must also be an implied set-off in relation to the Principal's claim on the Performance Bond.
39 If there is no set-off, it would seem that Planet Build is immediately entitled to summary judgment for $259,107.00: see Algons. If Planet Build claimed and obtained such a judgment, and claimed to have Lassgol's entitlement to the moneys from the Performance Bond applied in part-satisfaction of that summary judgment, prima facie it would be entitled to do so. Again, this is a matter on which I have not heard adequate argument.
40 In my opinion, if I am to finally decide the questions that Lassgol wishes me to finally decide, I should also finally decide the other questions I have mentioned, on which I have not yet heard adequate argument. It would be necessary to fix a further time for that argument. I believe I would also give Planet Build an opportunity at the same time to apply for summary judgment in respect of the $259,107.00.
41 On the other hand, if Lassgol does not press for a final determination of these matters, and if I proceed on the basis of a serious question to be tried, in my opinion the balance of convenience plainly favours Planet Build. My prima facie view is that Lassgol owes Planet Build over $259,000.00, whereas Planet Build owes Lassgol around $215,000.00. Lassgol has a further sum of $425,000.00 against which it can satisfy any additional damages to which it may be entitled. Lassgol appears to have defaulted in relation to its payments into the retention moneys, to an extent in excess of $30,000.00. I would also note that, in all these circumstances, it seems to me there would be a very real question as to whether the claim against the Performance Bond proposed by Lassgol is justified in terms of cl.5.1: there seems to be a serious question to be tried as to whether it is pursuing 'due and proper performance of the Contract'.
42 For those reasons, I would propose to continue the existing injunction until further order. I would give leave to Lassgol to have the matter re-listed before me for further argument of the interlocutory application, on the basis outlined above.
43 Finally, I note that it is not satisfactory that there be a summons claiming only interlocutory relief. Planet Build should amend the summons to claim final relief, which could be for declarations as to the construction of the contract, and possibly also for judgment for the amounts of the progress claims.
ON DELIVERY OF JUDGMENT