(a) the rights of individuals to privacy;
(b) the protection of individuals from the publication of material which would not otherwise have entered the public domain;
(c) the rights of third parties to privacy."
62 In my opinion, this ground is misconceived. There is no doubt that the general rule was that the Coroner's record and file were to be open to public access. It is incumbent upon any person seeking an order to the contrary, to place material before the Deputy State Coroner and persuade him that in the exercise of his discretion he ought not to open to public access the items in question. The question of privacy was a matter for consideration. It was raised by counsel for the relatives. In my view, it is clear that the Coroner took that matter into account. It was a question for him to balance the competing interests, which he did. He made the decision. There was a basis for his decision. This Court is not concerned with whether the decision was reasonable. There is no evidence of jurisdictional error.
63 Grounds 4(a) and (b) assert that the Coroner failed to give reasons, or adequate reasons, specifying what, if any, public interest was served by the publication and, secondly, what, if any, element of the proper administration of justice was served by the publication of the evidence. In my view, his reasons were adequate. Reasons have to be considered in context. It is clear, when reference is made to the evidence called and the submissions made, that the Deputy State Coroner did identify what was in the public interest. That is found in the prima facie rule established by the regulations. Further, these grounds seem to proceed on the basis that there would be publication of the evidence. The regulation allows the record and file to be open to public access. Publication is another matter. That is dealt with by s.58. Accordingly, these grounds fail.
64 Ground 6 complains that the Coroner authorised the release of the entire coronial record and file "without distinguishing the irrelevant, remote, personal and private matters or parts which would be contrary to the public interest to release or publish." Again, this ground seems to be misconceived. The prima facie rule required under the regulation is that the Coroner's record and file are to be open to public access. It was not a question of considering each item. The prima facie rule applies unless the Coroner orders otherwise. Application was made that he should exclude public access to items 15, 16 and 17. He carefully considered the competing interests. This ground also fails.
65 Ground 7 also, in my opinion, misconceives the Coroner's position. It was stated that the Coroner in "adopting a rule of open justice inherited from common law courts, described by him as the competing public interest and the proper administration of justice, applied a rule imposing a duty upon himself which had ceased by virtue of s.4 of the Act." Section 4 excludes a rule of the common law that confers a power and imposes a duty on a coroner. But the Coroner was dealing with the application of Regulation 24(2)(a) and was not exercising any power or duty excluded by s.4. The reason for the prima facie rule is obvious. That is, to enable the public to have access to the file in order to see that the Deputy State Coroner has properly carried out his jurisdiction under the Act, and to enable the public to fully understand the exercise of that jurisdiction. This ground also fails.
66 Ground 8 asserts that the Coroner gave no reasons, or no proper reasons, for his failure to reasonably believe that withholding publication would be contrary to the public interest. If one analyses what the Coroner said, again in the context of the evidence given and the submissions made, he first of all pointed out that the applications are difficult for the Bench and he appreciated that refusing the application could cause hurt in having material publicly aired. He also stated that he is sympathetic to the family in that respect. He, in my view, properly considered the competing arguments, namely, the question of what he said was "family sensitivity", which would embrace questions of privacy and confidentiality and possible hurt to family members, as against the clear object of the sub-regulation. It was a balancing exercise. In my view, it is clear from what he said in context that he carefully considered the competing interests. His reasons were adequate when considered in context. It cannot be overlooked that the Deputy State Coroner is a very experienced coroner in this State.
67 In ground 9 it is asserted that "if there is a public interest in open justice at a coronial inquest that does not necessarily extend to", and then reference is made to all evidence, parts of all evidence, irrelevant evidence, personal matters and the like. It is said that the Coroner failed to direct his attention adequately at all to those matters and those parts of the record and file containing them. This ground is far too wide and is misconceived. What the Deputy State Coroner was dealing with was the application to exclude from public access items 15, 16 and 17. Evidence was given in relation to those items. Submissions were made in relation to those items. It is not a question of considering all evidence or parts thereof. He was obliged to consider the terms of the sub-regulation, the fact that the sub-regulation provided the prima facie rule, and he then had to consider whether there were grounds excluding the application of the prima facie rule. In my opinion, it was not a question of him directing his attention to all evidence or parts of evidence, or to what was irrelevant or what was not irrelevant, or to particular personal matters. What he was obliged to do was to balance the interests of the public, as recognised in the regulation itself, and the evidence and the competing submissions as to why that rule should not apply. This ground also fails.
68 Finally, the real thrust of Mr Marshall's submission was that when one looks at the reasons given, one could not conclude that the Deputy State Coroner took into account all relevant matters. Mr Marshall submitted that he did not refer to all the matters that had been raised in the course of the evidence and submissions. However, in my opinion, when the Coroner described the grounds of opposition as being "on the grounds of family sensitivity", he was, in my view, in a shorthand way summarising the matters that had already been raised before him in the submissions which preceded his decision. It cannot be said that he did not take into account all relevant matters that were placed before him. In my opinion, there is no basis for saying that he erred in the exercise of his jurisdiction. His decision followed immediately after hearing the evidence and submissions. All matters would have been present in his mind when balancing the interests of the public and the relatives.
69 No jurisdictional error has been established. It follows that the originating motion must be dismissed.
70 Subject to submissions by counsel, I propose to make the following order: