The relevant authorities, which have considerably increased in number since the lament of Brooking J in Nichols v Stamer, are as one in stressing that, in exercising the responsibilities vested in him or her, the special referee is not conducting a mere prelude to further litigation. Although the courts have declined to catalogue the grounds upon which they may refuse to adopt a special referee's report, their discretion to adopt or reject it, in whole or in part, is confined only by the interests of justice. This will depend upon the particular circumstances attending particular cases. While r.50.04 includes no guidance to those who must exercise the discretion that it confers upon them, no judicial discretion may be exercised wilfully. This means that, in deciding whether or not to adopt or decline to adopt the report of a special referee, the court must exercise its discretion "in a manner consistent with the object and purpose of the rules and the place they play in the administration of justice according to law." If the dissatisfied party has identified an error in the law, then because there can be no implied authority to make such errors, the report may be set aside or remitted. A like result would normally - if not inevitably - follow if the referee has acted perversely or unreasonably (as he or she would if his or her decision was against the weight of the evidence). But a court cannot interfere simply because a number of alternative factual findings are open, and the special referee has chosen one or more of them rather than another or others.[11]