6 As noted above, the claim was dismissed ultimately on the ground that the tribunal was not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the plaintiff had not been paid the amount the tribunal held was payable under the service agreement - namely $550.
7 The issue of payment was obviously a major issue in itself. If the plaintiff was able to prove that no monies had been paid into his Commonwealth Bank accounts it would have supported his evidence of non-payment. In addition, such evidence would have been relevant to the assessment of the credibility of the defendants and may have had an impact on the Tribunal's assessment of the evidence of the parties relating to the terms of the contract of service. Thus, it seems to me, the rejection of the request for an adjournment denied Mr Beling the opportunity to lead significant evidence. That significance was confirmed by production before me of the relevant bank statements for two accounts and a letter from the Bank identifying the two accounts as the only ones operated by Mr Beling at the Bank.
8 By section 98 (1) (a) VCAT Act 1998, the tribunal is bound by the rules of natural justice. By section 102 (1) (a), the tribunal "must allow a party a reasonable opportunity.... to call... evidence".
9 The circumstances in which the issue arose are not, in my view, accurately recalled by the plaintiff. At no time did he state to the tribunal that he was taken by surprise by the allegation of payment. In addition, the transcript does not record him making the point to the tribunal that the "fulcrum" of the defence had shifted. Rather, the impression given by what he said at the hearing was that he had not anticipated that he might need to do more than simply state that he had not been paid. The tribunal expressed the view that it was "incumbent upon you to bring to that hearing all the evidence that is required to support your claim and to have it ready for the day." In addition, the transcript reveals that when Mr Beling applied for the adjournment, he did so initially on the basis that the defendants should pay the costs of the adjournment, but on being told - "No costs in the Civil Claims Tribunal" -- sought the adjournment on the basis that each bore their own costs .
10 Accepting those points, was there a denial of natural justice and a denial of a reasonable opportunity to call evidence resulting from the refusal to grant an adjournment to Mr Beling to collect the evidence required?
11 I have come to the conclusion that there were such denials. As noted above, the evidence was significant in respect of two key issues. Even if it be assumed that the issue arose because of sloppy preparation by Mr Beling, he sought an opportunity to lead the necessary evidence and that opportunity could have been given without detriment to the defendants by an appropriate costs order (section 109(3) (a) VCAT Act 1998). I suggest that what arose before the tribunal is the sort of problem that arises in jurisdictions intended to be simple and speedy. Such an approach is necessary to enable small claims to be dealt with at a minimum of cost. But the lack of formality carries with it the danger that parties, on occasions, will not have anticipated what may be an issue or the evidentiary weaknesses in their cases. Natural justice and a reasonable opportunity to call evidence require that adjournments be given in appropriate cases on appropriate terms. This was such a case.
12 The appeal should be allowed. The decision of VCAT on 3 June 2005 should be set aside. The proceeding should be remitted to VCAT for re-hearing and determination according to law.