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[2011] VSC 352
Supreme Court of Victoria
2011-09-16
J FORREST J
Original judgment source is linked above.
The application for Special Leave to Appeal dismissed on 20/10/2005
The application for Special Leave to Appeal dismissed on 20/10/2005
Moorfields Community, Bodalla Aged Care Services & United Church of Australia
The application for Special Leave to Appeal dismissed on 16/06/2007
Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, Minister for Education of the State of Victoria & Victorian Institute of Teaching
The application for Special Leave to Appeal dismissed on 06/09/2007
Moorfields Community, Bodalla Aged Care Services & United Church of Australia
The application for Special Leave to Appeal dismissed on 24/04/2008
Nurses Board of Victoria & Minister for Health/Bronwyn Pike
The application for Special Leave to Appeal dismissed on15/11/2007
Kosta Sterjov, Susanna Sterjov, Lisa Miller & La Kosta Child Care Centre & Kindergarten Pty Ltd
The application for Special Leave to Appeal dismissed on 15/11/2007
In the matter of an application by Stanislawa Bahonko for leave to issue a proceeding (no respondents)
The application for leave to issue a proceeding refused and the application dismissed on 04/10/2007
The application for Special Leave to Appeal dismissed on 20/06/2008
Kosta Sterjov, Susanna Sterjov, Lisa Miller & La Kosta Child Care Centre & Kindergarten Pty Ltd
The application for Special Leave to Appeal dismissed on 31/07/2008
Nurses Board of Victoria & Former Minister for Health/Current Minister for Education Bronwyn Pike
The application for Special Leave to Appeal dismissed on 20/06/2008
Moorfields Community, Bodalla Aged Care Services, United Church of Australia & Victorian WorkCover Authority
Moorfields Community, Bodalla Aged Care Services, United Church of Australia & Victorian WorkCover Authority
Moorfields Community, Bodalla Aged Care Services, United Church of Australia Property Trust (Victoria) & Victorian WorkCover Authority
74 Ms Bahonko has issued multiple proceedings in the Federal Court.
75 The history of Ms Bahonko's litigation in relation to her four days of trial employment at Lakosta Child Care Centre is set out by Gordon J in Bahonko v Sterjov & Ors in Her Honour's decision of 8 October 2007:[42]
"Ms Bahonko in her affidavit of 3 September 2007, and during the course of her oral submissions, made allegations which are properly described as scandalous. They include allegations of criminal conduct and conduct constituting abuse of office. Those allegations are unsupported and insupportable. Ms Bahonko submitted that she required access to the transcript of the hearing before Goldberg J to make good her allegations. That access is refused on a number of bases. First, access to transcript has never been regarded as an indisputable requirement of a fair trial: see Young v Secretary for Department of Family and Community Services [2003] FCA 937; (2003) 76 ALD 118 at [30]. Secondly, the hearing before Goldberg J did not involve viva voce evidence. Both parties were present at the hearing and made submissions. Moreover, by reason of the nature of the application before me (an application for leave to appeal from the orders of Goldberg J), it was necessary for me to consider the correctness of the decision of Goldberg J. As stated above, that decision is not attended with any doubt. Access to the transcript of proceedings before Goldberg J would be futile. For those reasons, access is refused".[43]
76 In Bahonko v Sterjov & Ors,[44] Lander J on 14 November 2007 dealt with further applications by Ms Bahonko in that litigation in which Ms Bahonko sought the following orders:
77 His Honour then set out the "evidence" which allegedly supported Ms Bahonko's application:
The notice of motion was supported by three affidavits. The first, sworn on 15 October 2007, merely exhibited Gordon J's reasons and a proposed notice of appeal. The affidavit sought a copy of the transcript of the hearing before Gordon J. The second, sworn on 18 October 2007, exhibited a corrected draft notice of appeal. The third affidavit, sworn on 30 October 2007, again makes very serious allegations against the respondents' legal representatives and judges of this Court. Again, the allegations are not supported by any evidence. On this occasion, the applicant has accused the judges of this Court of giving "corrupt support" to the respondents' legal representatives. She accuses Gordon J of a wilful criminal act in the publication and content of her reasons. She says Gordon J is in contempt of court and guilty of abuse of office, defamation, intimidation and blackmail. She says that Gordon J's description of the applicant's affidavit as scandalous and vexatious "serves as intentional blackmail & intimidation of me and retaliation on behalf of Mr McKenney & the Federal Court of Australia & a deceit of the public in order to be able to issue costs against me when under the WRA such costs are not to be made." The applicant concludes:
...
His Honour then went on to make a number of observations of aspects of Ms Bahonko's application, parts of which I have extracted below:
Before Gordon J the applicant asserted that Jessup J's orders contravened the WRA and that "[t]here were and are not any costs due against me." She claimed in her affidavit that the "manner of the orders given by Justice Jessup on 31 August 2007 further demonstrate that those orders are unreasonable & if remain would constitute abuse of the process and continuation of a fraud." She also alleged that his reasons constituted "multiple wilful misrepresentations, defamations and vilification of me ...". She criticised other aspects of Jessup J's reasons. Putting aside the inappropriate language, the reasons advanced may have been relevant as to whether the order for costs should have remained or were to be reviewed on appeal. However, Gordon J was not hearing an appeal but an interlocutory application for a stay. No ground was advanced why it was appropriate that the orders be stayed.
Justice Gordon described the additional matters relied on by the applicant as "scandalous and vexatious", being allegations of criminal conduct and conduct constituting abuse of office which were "unsupported and insupportable".
I agree with the observations.
Order 2 of her Honour's order on this notice of motion also had the effect of dismissing the applicant's application that the respondents' legal representatives step down. Her Honour dismissed that application on the ground that the allegations made in support of the notice of motion were without foundation and scandalous. I have studied the allegations contained in the applicant's affidavit sworn on 20 September 2007 which was the affidavit relied upon by the applicant before Gordon J and the affidavit sworn on 30 October 2007 in support of this notice of motion before me. I agree with her Honour in both respects. The allegations are without foundation and scandalous. I make these comments notwithstanding the vitriolic comments made by the applicant in respect of Gordon J's comments to the same effect.
Paragraphs 7 and 10 of the notice of motion seem to assume that a judge of the Court has some sort of supervisory jurisdiction over another judge of the Court or at least the reasons published by another judge of the Court. Nothing could be further from the fact. The notion of the independence of the judiciary is fundamental to the system of justice in this country. It is not only that judges are independent of the Executive but each judge of the Court is independent of each other. It is important that judges are not subject to influences or pressures from their fellow judges so that each judge can give their judgment and their reasons freely. A judge's judgment and reasons are subject to scrutiny but only on appeal.
Each judge, when exercising the jurisdiction of the Court, is sitting as "the Court". In those circumstances, no one judge sitting as the Court can direct another judge, also sitting as the Court, to do or not to do something and, in particular, to review the judge's reasons or in any way alter those reasons: Bird v Free (1994) 126 ALR 475. It goes without saying, of course, that no judge could direct another judge to apologise to a litigant or to pay damages
The applicant should understand that the kinds of complaints she makes about the judges of this Court must be viewed in the light of the immunity which attaches to judicial proceedings. A judge, a jury, the parties, their representatives and witnesses enjoy an absolute privilege in respect of their statements in judicial proceedings: Cabassi v Villa [1940] HCA 41; (1940) 64 CLR 130 at 140; Mann v O'Neill [1997] HCA 28; (1997) 191 CLR 204 at 211. The rationale for the rule is that it is indispensable for the performance of the function: Mann v O'Neill 191 CLR at 213. It exists for the protection of judicial independence: Fingleton v R [2005] HCA 34; (2005) 216 ALR 474 at 486. No action lies against a judge in defamation for the matters published in the judge's reasons.
In Fingleton 216 ALR at 485-6, Gleeson CJ cited with approval Lord Denning's dicta in Sirros v Moore [1975] QB 118 at 132:
Ever since the year 1613, if not before, it has been accepted in our law that no action is maintainable against a judge for anything said or done by him in the exercise of a jurisdiction which belongs to him. The words which he speaks are protected by an absolute privilege. The orders which he gives, and the sentences which he imposes, cannot be made the subject of civil proceedings against him. No matter that the judge was under some gross error of ignorance, or was actuated by envy, hatred and malice, and all uncharitableness, he is not liable to an action.
This application contains no evidence to support the laying of any charge of contempt against the respondents' legal advisers. The applicant's affidavit of 30 October 2007 charges the respondents' legal advisers with misrepresentation, defamation and contempt by reason of their failure to inform the Federal Court of the misrepresentation and defamation contained within the reasons for judgment of 8 October 2007. Whilst not in any way accepting that the reasons for judgment possess the failings complained of, the failure, if there be one, of the legal representatives to inform the Federal Court of the errors contained in those reasons could never amount to a contempt. Not only is there no basis in fact for the application, but the applicant has failed to conform with O 40 of the Rules and to provide a statement of the charge. Any legal practitioner charged with such a serious matter is entitled to have the party laying the charge conform with the Rules in all regards and, in particular, to provide a statement of the charge.
The proposed notice of appeal that the applicant would file if leave had been granted is, like the applicant's affidavits, scandalous and vexatious. The grounds of appeal relating to Gordon J's conduct and reasons are outrageous and unsupported by the reasons about which the complaints are made.
The applicant has filed applications before Finkelstein J, Goldberg J, Gordon J and now me in which she has successively made complaints about the conduct of judges of this Court and of the legal practitioners representing the respondents. Latitude is given to unrepresented parties because sometimes they may have difficulty in understanding the Court's processes. Sometimes unrepresented parties become very involved in the processes and express themselves infelicitously. However, there comes a time when the Court must, for the purpose of maintaining the dignity of the Court and the public's confidence in the Court, say enough is enough. That stage has been reached. The applicant must understand that, if she continues to make unsubstantiated allegations of the kind in the application, affidavits and draft notices of appeal which scandalise the Court, action may need to be taken for the protection of the Court. I have considered whether it might be appropriate to take action in this proceeding. However, the applicant has not previously been warned that her conduct may be considered to be a contempt of the Court. I have therefore determined that on this application she should be given this warning.[47]
78 Section 21 of the Supreme Court Act 1986 relevantly provides:
"(1) The Attorney-General may apply to the Court for an order declaring a person to be a vexatious litigant.
(2) The Court may, after hearing or giving the person an opportunity to be heard, make an order declaring the person to be a vexatious litigant if it is satisfied that the person has--
(a) habitually; and
(b) persistently; and
(c) without any reasonable ground--
instituted vexatious legal proceedings (whether civil or criminal) in the Court, an inferior court or a tribunal against the same person or different persons.
. . . "
79 In Attorney-General for the State of Victoria v Weston,[48] Whelan J analysed the authorities and then summarised the principles relevant to an application under s 21, parts of which I will refer to in the course of this judgment. It suffices now to set out his Honour's summary of the relevant principles.
It seems to me that the applicable legal principles may be summarised as follows:
(1) The application seeks a remedy of a most serious nature and a clear and compelling case must be shown to warrant it.
(2) The requirements of the section are that the person must have
* and to have done so habitually and persistently and without reasonable cause.
If the requirements are met, the Court must then consider whether an order ought to be made.
(3) A proceeding is "instituted" where originating process is filed, and also where a person counterclaims, appeals against an otherwise final determination of the substantive matter, or applies to have an otherwise final determination set aside. Interlocutory applications and appeals on interlocutory applications do not ordinarily constitute the institution of proceedings.
(4) Vexatious proceedings are proceedings which have either been brought for an improper purpose, or which have been revealed to be hopeless. Hopelessness ought to be apparent from the ultimate disposition. A genuine claim, or element of a claim, may exist within a vexatious proceeding, where it is deeply buried in untenable claims and bizarre allegations.
(5) Vexatious proceedings are instituted "habitually" where they appear to be commenced as a matter of course. "Persistence" suggests determination and an element of stubbornness. An absence of reasonable grounds will necessarily be the position where the proceedings have been revealed to be hopeless.
(6) If the requirements of the section are met, the person's conduct as a whole must be then assessed to determine if, in all the circumstances, an order ought to be made.
It is one thing to know what the word "vexatious" means. It is another thing to apply s. 21(2) to the circumstances of a particular case. In the latter task the following matters are, according to the authorities, relevant: first, where an order has been made dismissing an action as frivolous or vexatious, or striking a pleading out, it is not for a court considering a s. 21 application to go behind the order and go into the merits of the argument as a court of appeal would do. Second, findings which are required do not depend on viva voce evidence or credibility of witnesses. The critical evidence is to be found in court files - documents, judgments, orders and reasons. For that reason, any hearsay material contained in an affidavit in support of an application, even though objectionable, should be treated simply as a distraction, and ignored. Third, the question is not whether the manner in which a proceeding is conducted is vexatious; it is whether, having regard to its nature and substance, it should be so characterised. Fourth, and this is a more general proposition with respect to s. 21, in determining whether the Attorney-General has made out a case, the court is not concerned with a minute individual examination of each proceeding. It must consider the overall impression created by the number of proceedings, their general character and their results.[50]
Has Ms Bahonko instituted vexatious legal proceedings?
81 In Weston Whelan J said of the institution of proceedings:
One of the section's requirements is that the person has "instituted . . . proceedings" of the specified character in the Court, defined as the Supreme Court, an inferior court, or a tribunal. Proceedings instituted in Federal Courts and in other States do not fall with the ambit of s 21.
Clearly the filing of an originating process constitutes the institution of a proceeding, but how much wider is the concept? A commonly cited discussion of what constitutes the institution of a proceeding is that of Yeldham J where he said:
"While it is probably correct to say that interlocutory proceedings taken in the course of an action instituted by another person which is still current are not within the section, I think, without endeavouring to supply an exhaustive definition, that, where a final decision has been given, any attempt, whether by way of appeal or application to set it aside, or to set aside proceedings taken to enforce such decision, which is in substance an attempt to re-litigate what has already been decided, is the institution of legal proceedings. It is to the substance of the matter that regard must be had and not to its form."
The Attorney-General relied upon this passage. The Attorney-General also submitted that a counterclaim constituted the institution of legal proceedings, citing Attorney-General v Jones and Attorney-General for the State of Victoria v Horvath, senior; as did the institution of an appeal, citing (in addition to the Yeldham J dicta) Mephistopheles Debt Collection Services v Lotay and Attorney-General for the State of Victoria v Horvath, senior. Mr Weston made no submission on this issue.
I have also had regard to Chernov JA's observations in Kay v Attorney-General in relation to appeals, to Kellam J's approach to interlocutory applications in Attorney-General v Lindsey, and to the treatment of interlocutory applications by the Full Court of the High Court of New Zealand in Attorney-General v Collier.
The conclusions that I draw from these authorities are that a person institutes a proceeding for the purposes of s 21 when he or she files an originating process, and also where he or she:
(1) makes a counterclaim in a proceeding,
(2) appeals from a final determination in a proceeding, or
(3) seeks to set aside a determination in a manner which is in substance an attempt to appeal or re-litigate a matter otherwise finally determined.
Interlocutory applications, and appeals on such applications, do not, in the ordinary case, constitute the institution of a proceeding. Where interlocutory applications are in substance an attempt to appeal or re-litigate a matter otherwise finally determined, they fall within the third category above and are to be considered the institution of proceedings. [51]
82 His Honour then went on to collect a number of authorities on the question of vexatious proceedings:
Whether a proceeding is vexatious is to be objectively determined as a question of fact. The test is whether the proceedings themselves are vexatious, not whether they were instituted vexatiously. With one qualification, I adopt the categorisation of Roden J in Attorney-General v Wentworth, where he described proceedings as vexatious if:
(1) they are instituted with the intention of annoying or embarrassing the person against whom they are brought; or
(2) they are brought for collateral purposes, and not for the purpose of having the court adjudicate on the issues to which they give rise; or
(3) irrespective of the motive of the litigant, they are so obviously untenable or manifestly groundless as to be utterly hopeless.
The category of proceedings that are vexatious because they are hopeless was discussed by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia in Attorney-General v Michael. Anderson J, in the leading judgment, said that proceedings brought without bad faith need not be plainly devoid of any merit whatsoever in order to be considered vexatious. He said:
"The litigant who sees dark conspiracies and the threat of great harm to himself or herself in the trivial wrongs of another may provide an example. The commencement of an action by such a person, containing outlandish allegations and seeking forms of relief that the courts do not grant, may be vexatious, notwithstanding that it may be possible for the court to identify for the litigant a cause of action for which, arguably, there may be some form of remedy. In this case ... [w]hilst it is not possible to say that the claim ... is `utterly hopeless', the allegations as to that, and the relief sought in respect of it, are so deeply buried in bizarre allegations and untenable claims for relief that the court ought to be able to say, as a matter of judgment, that it is a vexatious proceeding within the meaning of the section."
I agree with this qualification to, or amplification of, Roden J's formulation. I am also mindful of the fact that meritorious claims can be hidden in verbiage, particularly where a claimant is unrepresented. As will be seen, however, the question of whether the amplification or qualification referred to in Attorney-General v Michael should apply does not arise in considering the proceedings that are the subject of this application.
In Kay v Attorney-General, the Court of Appeal made it clear that in considering the character of relevant proceedings it is not necessary for the Court to re-examine the circumstances of each proceeding relied upon. The character of the proceeding should be apparent upon a reading of the reasons and orders.
The Full Court of the High Court of New Zealand said in Attorney General v Collier:
"The fact that a plaintiff fails in litigation does not demonstrate that the proceedings are vexatious, it is necessary to examine the reasons given in the judgment to determine whether the proceedings are properly to be characterised in that way. Although in many cases it may not be possible to decide whether litigation is wholly without merit until it is determined, a successful strike-out application by the defendant, at least where not based upon technical points . . . may be reliable evidence in the circumstances of vexatiousness."
In the absence of bad faith or improper purpose, the proper approach is to assess whether the proceeding was utterly hopeless. The reasons given and other observations made by a court upon the substantive determination of the proceeding may reveal vexatiousness in this sense, as may a successful strike-out application.
The fact that a proceeding is utterly hopeless may not be apparent until a trial of the issues. The complete absence of any evidential basis for allegations pleaded, for example, will not be apparent on a strike-out application. A proceeding may be vexatious even if it was not or would not be struck out.[52]
83 I am mindful of the fact that Ms Bahonko did not attend this hearing and so there has been no contradictor to the submissions put on behalf of the Attorney-General. I have, accordingly, examined the relevant court processes, rulings and judgments referred to with some care.
85 However it is also clear from the record and those parts of the reasons that I have set out that a number of the other proceedings instituted by Ms Bahonko in this Court and at VCAT can be properly described as vexatious, disclosing no reasonable cause of action or hopeless. I identify in particular:
(a) the proceeding against the Nurses Board dismissed by Cummins J and the subsequent appeal to the Court of Appeal;[55]
(b) the application to VCAT in February 2006 in relation to the Freedom of Information Act;[56]
(c) the appeal to this Court against the Magistrate's refusal to permit a rehearing of the City of Casey judgment and the subsequent application to the Court of Appeal for leave to file an appeal..[57]
(d) the summons issued in the Court of Appeal in February 2009 in relation to a grand jury application.[58]
86 The findings and the reasons provided by the relevant judicial officers demonstrate that each case was either hopeless or could not have any reasonable basis for being successfully prosecuted.
87 In summary, I am satisfied that Ms Bahonko has instituted multiple proceedings which are properly categorised as vexatious.
In Attorney-General v Wentworth, Roden J interpreted these requirements as follows:
"`Habitually' suggests that the institution of such proceedings occurs as a matter of course, or almost automatically, when the appropriate conditions (whatever they may be) exist; `persistently' suggests determination, and continuing in the face of difficulty or opposition, with a degree of stubbornness."
This approach was adopted by Kellam J in Attorney-General v Lindsey, and by Eames J in Attorney-General for the State of Victoria v Kay. I also adopt it, again with one qualification or amplification.
The qualification or amplification is that set out in Brogden v Attorney-General, a decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal, in relation to the term "persistently". The Court said:
"A litigant may be said to be persisting in litigating though the number of separate proceedings he or she brings is quite small if those proceedings clearly represent an attempt to re-litigate an issue already conclusively determined against that person, particularly if this is accompanied by extravagant or scandalous allegations which the litigant has no prospect of substantiating or justifying. The Court may also take into account the development of a pattern of behaviour involving a failure to accept an inability in law to further challenge decisions in respect of which the appeal process has been exhausted, or attacking a range of defendants drawn into the widening circle of litigation solely because of an association with a defendant against whom a prior proceeding has failed."[59]
89 I am satisfied that Ms Bahonko has both habitually and persistently instituted vexatious proceedings. Her pattern of conduct over the years demonstrates the institution of proceedings in respect of any matter that aggrieves her being undertaken as a matter of course. The length of time over which such proceedings have been instituted and their regularity satisfies me that such conduct is also persistent.
The requirement that proceedings also be instituted without any reasonable ground is necessarily satisfied if the proceedings are utterly hopeless. It seems to me that Toohey J was correct in identifying an element of tautology in the provisions. This requirement will have an independent operation if the proceedings are considered vexatious on a basis other than their hopelessness. In that instance, the fact that the plaintiff followed independent legal advice in bringing a claim may be relevant. [60]
91 I have already noted that a number of the applications and appeals have been treated as either hopeless or bound to fail.
92 Each of the elements contained in s 21(2) have been made out by the Attorney-General.
93 Perram J in Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Gargan (No 2),[61] set out a series of principles relevant to determining whether a person is a vexatious litigant under s 84 of the Supreme Court Act (NSW). Of particular relevance is what His Honour said in relation to the exercise of the discretion if the Court's power is engaged:
Finally, once it is concluded that the Court's power to prevent a litigant from commencing or pursuing proceedings has been enlivened, the considerations germane to the exercise of that power are unconfined. However, the factors which will be relevant are informed by the protective purpose which the order serves. Where a litigant displays insight into their previous litigious history this will, no doubt, be relevant for it will suggest - although not determine - a diminution in the risk posed to the public. On the other hand, the manner in which a litigant conducts herself in her affairs generally is also capable of throwing light on whether the commencement of further vexatious proceedings is likely. Those general affairs include the litigant's defence to the proceedings by which the order restraining him is sought. Because of the protective nature of the jurisdiction it is also relevant to know the extent of the damage and inconvenience the litigant's forays into the courts have caused, pecuniary or otherwise. [62]
94 In determining whether an order ought to be made I am not confined to an examination of the proceedings which engage the application of this provision. It is appropriate to look at Ms Bahonko's conduct generally, including that in other jurisdictions. In my view, it is appropriate to make an order declaring Ms Bahonko a vexatious litigant. The following matters are compelling in this regard:
(a) Mrs Bahonko's recourse to what appears to be a never ending number of applications (both in relation to interlocutory determinations and final determinations) against a wide range of persons;
(b) the constant prosecution of cases which are hopeless or have no reasonable foundation;
(c) the extraordinary disruption of court business caused by Ms Bahonko's behaviour not only in this Court, but in the County Court, VCAT, Federal Court and the High Court;
(d) the constant barrage of appeals or applications for leave to appeal upon every order made adverse to her interest - extending to costs orders, adjournments, applications for transcript;
(e) the ever widening net Mrs Bahonko casts - to the point of "unknown unknown" being a respondent to an application.
(f) the making of unsubstantiated and scurrilous allegations against politicians, judicial officers, legal practitioners and public servants - with apparent impunity and regardless of the hurt that such allegations may cause;
(g) Ms Bahonko has, in the past, been warned that her conduct may constitute a contempt of court. As Lander J observed, there is a point at which an unrepresented litigant must obey a court's rules and processes. To permit constant and significant transgressions undermines public confidence in the court and the standing of judicial officers.
95 An order should be made pursuant to s21(1) of the Supreme Court Act (1986) declaring Mrs Bahonko to be a vexatious litigant. However I propose to exclude from the effect of the order two current proceedings namely:
(b) Ms Bahonko's appeal to the Court of Appeal against the orders of Davies J of 21 September 2009 in relation to the taxation of costs in the Casey City Council litigation.
Each was instituted prior to this application being issued and should be permitted to be argued, without seeking leave of the relevant Court.
96 Given the effect of this order I will also discharge the orders I made on 6 June 2011 and 26 August 2011 restraining Mrs Bahonko from instituting proceedings.
[1] The Attorney-General for the State of Victoria v Bahonko [2011] VSC 244.
[3] Bahonko v Attorney-General for the State of Victoria [2011] VSCA 208.
[4] See Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1151; (1999) 95 FCR 292, 297; Re Finlayson, ex parte Finlayson (1997) 72 ALJR 73; Green v Jones [1979] 2 NSWLR 812.
[5] A copy affidavit apparently sworn before a Justice of the Peace was received at 12.34pm on 27 July 2011.
[6] [2001] VSC 269, [28].
[7] Bahonko v Attorney-General for the State of Victoria [2011] VSCA 208.
[10] Bahonko v Nurses Board of Victoria [2004] VCAT 1663; Exhibit EB-1 to the affidavit of Mr Stephen Lee sworn 8 September 2010 - references to "EB" subsequently relate to exhibits to this affidavit.
[22] Bahonko v Moorfields Community [2006] VSCA 206.
[24] Maxwell P and Buchanan JA, Reasons 17 November 2006.
[25] Ibid [10], [15], [23] and [24].
[26] Bahonko v Moorfields Community, Bodalla Aged Care Services, Uniting Church of Australia [2008] VSCA 6 [2].
[28] Bahonko v Moorfields Community & Ors [2008] VCC 829.
[30] Bahonko v Moorfields Community & Ors [2008] VSC 571 [1].
[36] Bahonko v Casey City Council [2008] VSC 571 [14].
[41] Bahonko v City of Casey (General) (2010) VCAT 241 [8].
[47] Ibid [37], [39], [42], [60], [61], [63], [64], [69], [73], [74], [75].
[48] [2004] VSC 314 (Weston). See also Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Gargan (No 2) [2009] FCA 398 [2] - [12].
Attorney-General for the State of Victoria
Bahonko [2011] VSC 352
(1994) 126 ALR 475
(1940) 64 CLR 130
(1997) 191 CLR 204
(2005) 216 ALR 474
(1999) 95 FCR 292
(1997) 72 ALJR 73