The rules
10 Rule 5.22 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 ("the Rules") provides:
A party is in default if the party fails to:
(a) do an act required to be done, or to do an act in the time required, by these Rules, or;
(b) comply with an order of the Court; or
(c) attend a hearing in the proceeding; or
(d) prosecute or defend the proceeding with due diligence.
11 Rule 5.23(2) relevantly provides:
If a respondent is in default, an applicant may apply to the Court for:
…
(c) if the proceeding was started by an originating application supported by a statement of claim, or if the Court has ordered that the proceeding continue on pleadings - an order giving judgment against the respondent for the relief claimed in the statement of claim to which the Court is satisfied that the applicant is entitled; or
(d) an order giving judgment against the respondent for damages to be assessed, or any other order…
Note 1 The Court may make any order that the Court considers appropriate in the interests of justice - see rule 1.32.
12 In Speedo Holdings BV v Evans (No 2) [2011] FCA 1227 ("Speedo v Evans") at [19]-[25] Flick J summarised some of the principles in respect of default judgment applications under r 5.23(2)(c), and its predecessor the former Order 35A r 3(2)(c). I adopt his Honour's summary. These principles are well established and it is unnecessary to now reiterate them.
13 The applicants have filed affidavit material which shows that Mr Andreotta has been served with copies of the Fast Track Application, the Fast Track Statement, the Orders of 2 May 2014 and 23 May 2014, the interlocutory application seeking default judgment, and the affidavit by Ms Hayer in support of the application.
14 As the applicants contend, Mr Andreotta is in default pursuant to r 5.22(b) of the Rules for having failed to comply with the Order of 23 May 2014 which required him to file and serve a Notice of Address for Service and a Fast Track Response by 30 May 2014. He is also in default pursuant to r 5.22(c)for having failed to attend the scheduling conference on 23 May 2014, and pursuant to r 5.22(d) for having failed to defend the proceeding with due diligence.
15 I am satisfied that each element of the civil wrongs alleged, namely:
(a) trade mark infringement under s 120(1) and (2) of the TMA,
(b) misleading or deceptive conduct under s 18 of the ACL and false or misleading representations under s 29(1)(g) and (h) of the ACL; and
(c) passing off;
are properly and discretely pleaded in the Fast Track Application and Fast Track Statement.
16 I am also satisfied on the face of the pleadings, treating the facts pleaded as admitted, that the elements of the causes of actions pleaded are made out. In particular the pleadings establish that the applicants own the Jim's Trade Marks and establish their infringement by Mr Andreotta. The pleadings also make out the elements of misleading or deceptive conduct and false and misleading representations in contravention of the ACL, and the tort of passing off. Finally, I am satisfied on the pleadings that the applicants are entitled to the relief claimed in the interlocutory application in respect of each of the pleaded causes of action.
17 I consider that the discretion to enter default judgment should be exercised in the applicants' favour.
18 The applicants seek an order that judgment be given for the applicants with damages to be assessed, pursuant to r 5.23(2) of the Rules. In my view such an order is appropriate: see CNIP Pty Ltd v Chan & Naylor Norwest Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 1170 per Perram J, and Speedo v Evans at [34] per Flick J.
19 The applicants also seek an order that Mr Andreotta either remove the Jim's Trade Marks from anything in his possession, power or control which bears the marks, or alternatively, deliver up to the applicants anything in his possession, power or control which bears the Jim's Trade Marks. The applicants do not wish to take delivery of Mr Andreotta's trailer which is alleged to be emblazoned with Jim's Trade Marks but, in the circumstances, seek to compel Mr Andreotta to take positive steps to remove the marks from the trailer.
20 In my view such an order is appropriate. The Court has inherent jurisdiction to order delivery up of the instruments of a respondent's misleading or deceptive conduct. Such an order is in the nature of a mandatory injunction, and may operate in aid of injunctions to restrain the infringing conduct: see Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Purple Harmony Plates Pty Ltd (No 3) (2002) 196 ALR 576 at [43] per Goldberg J; Macquarie Bank Ltd v Seagle [2008] FCA 1417 at [23] per Jagot J.
21 Injunctions to restrain Mr Andreotta from continuing to infringe the applicants' trade marks, and from continuing misleading or deceptive conduct, false or misleading representations and passing off are also appropriate: see Microsoft Corporation v Short [2011] FCA 247 per Stone J; Deckers Outdoor Corp Inc v Farley (No 5) (2009) 262 ALR 53 per Tracey J.
22 I have made the orders sought in the interlocutory application.
I certify that the preceding twenty-two (22) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Murphy.