Optus's response and conclusions
18 Optus disputes the existence of a prima facie case against it. First, Optus makes a relatively formal submission that Pivotel is a member of a group of entities with a common holding company (Pivotel Group Pty Limited) in circumstances where it is not clear from the evidence which company has the telephone subscribers. Consequently, according to Optus even if Pivotel made out its causes of action it is not clear that the named applicant is the relevant entity which will suffer loss or damage.
19 It seems to me that this submission can be put to one side relatively easily, given Mr Sakker's evidence. It appears that at least one relevant applicant is the moving party in these proceedings. While it may be that there are other potential applicants, I do not need to resolve that issue now. Accordingly, I am not persuaded that this submission should be accepted.
20 Optus also contends that Pivotel has not identified any legal basis upon which it could be said that Optus must have Pivotel's business foisted upon it in circumstances where Optus has made a commercial decision that it does not wish to carry calls to Pivotel. As noted, there is no contractual relationship between Pivotel and Optus. According to Optus, Pivotel has not identified any regulatory provision, contractual entitlement or other legal basis which would require Optus to carry calls to the Pivotel network.
21 This submission, however, cannot be assessed separately from the potential causes of action upon which Pivotel has commenced these proceedings, being the provisions of the Trade Practices Act to which I have referred.
22 In terms of s 151AJ of the Trade Practices Act, Optus's primary submissions and my conclusions are as follows:
(1) First, by reference to evidence of Lawrence Clarke in the Mediatel proceedings, Optus submits that the relevant market is not the mobile telephone market. According to Mr Clarke no mobile handset is required to utilise the services in issue. The services may be accessed from a fixed network service. Further, the service is a one-way, incoming-call only service.
The difficulty with this proposition is that Mr Clarke's evidence addresses the Mediatel numbers. The evidence in the present case (as it currently stands) is sufficient to show that Pivotel has some 15,000 numbers allocated to it of which 8000 are satellite users. It is not possible to ascertain from the evidence what proportion of those numbers might be Mediatel numbers. Accordingly, there is evidence to support the submissions made on behalf of Pivotel that there are two relevant markets, the satellite mobile market and ordinary mobile market.
(2) Secondly, Optus submits that there is no evidence which allows an inference to be drawn that Optus has taken advantage of any market power. Rather, the evidence shows that Optus would have acted in precisely the same way and on a genuine commercial basis even if it did not have the market power that it was alleged to have. Accordingly, on this submission, competitive conditions are entirely irrelevant. The reason Optus blocked access is because it made a business decision that it is commercially disadvantageous for it to allow access by its customers to the Pivotel network. The decision had nothing whatsoever to do with Optus's competitive position. This is supported by evidence from Ms Murray that Optus does not consider Pivotel to be its commercial competitor.
Nevertheless, as Pivotel submitted, the requirement that there be a taking advantage of power in a market, according to Miller's Annotated Trade Practices Act. 30th ed. Thomson Reuters. Sydney (2009) at [1.151AJ.15], does not involve anything more than the use of the market power involved; predatory intent is not required (Queensland Wire Industries Proprietary Limited v Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited (1989) 167 CLR 177). On this basis there is evidence capable of supporting an inference that there has been a taking advantage of market power as proscribed by the statute. There is also evidence capable of supporting a conclusion that Optus has a substantial degree of power in the two identified markets. Further, there is evidence capable of supporting a conclusion that the effect of Optus's actions, irrespective of its intention, has or is likely to have been a substantial lessening of competition.
On this basis, I am satisfied that Pivotel has established that there is a serious question to be tried in respect of the alleged breach of s 151AJ of the Trade Practices Act.
23 I accept Optus's submission that it is more difficult from the evidence to draw any inference capable of supporting a potential contravention of s 46 of the Trade Practices Act (which requires proof of the proscribed purpose). On balance, I am not satisfied that the evidence has established a prima facie case in respect of a breach of s 46. Similarly, Pivotel's submissions about contraventions of ss 51AB and 51AC, relating to unconscionable conduct, as well as s 52, were by no means as persuasive as its submissions about the existence of a serious question to be tried in respect of s 151AJ. On the evidence, I am not satisfied that there is a serious question to be tried in relation to any of those statutory provisions.
24 However, as I have said, I am satisfied that Pivotel has established a serious question to be tried in respect of anti-competitive conduct proscribed by Pt XIB of the Trade Practices Act (the so-called "competition rule") regulating the telecommunications industry (specifically, ss 151CA, 151AJ and 151AK). Insofar as relevant, s 151CA(1) vests power in the Court to grant to any person an injunction in the event of any breach of the competition rule. More relevantly, s 151CA(3) provides that "[i]f, in the opinion of the Court it is desirable to do so, the Court may grant an interim injunction pending determination of an application under subsection (1)". I thus have power to grant the relief requested but must now consider where the balance of convenience lies.