//
© 2026 Zoe. All rights reserved.
Zoe is a legal information platform. Always consult the Federal Register of Legislation for authoritative text.
[2012] NSWSC 1604
procedural. The plaintiff was to withdraw caveat AH9831 in exchange for the specified settlement cheques and payment arrangements. The $1.7 million was to be deposited into a controlled money account and...
The Court allowed the defendants to proceed towards selling their home without the caveat remaining on the title, but only in exchange for security for the law firm's claimed interest. The parties accepted that the charge and mortgage could support a caveatable interest if valid, and that the sale should proceed if appropriate security was provided. The Court ordered $1.7 million to be held in a controlled money account, plus specified settlement cheques for counsel invoices. The money was not to be paid out without consent or another court order. Because the arrangement was expected to last only until the near-term final hearing, the Court did not require a general undertaking as to damages, but recorded a specific undertaking concerning failure to provide the caveat withdrawal at completion.
AI-generated legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Check the cited source, and for advice about your situation consult a qualified Australian lawyer.
3 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
2,143 words · generated 29/09/2026
This was an interlocutory dispute about a caveat over the Rahmes' home at 1 William Street, Double Bay. Phoenician Holdings Pty Ltd, trading as Cadmus Lawyers, had provided legal services to George and Nouha Rahme. On 12 June 2012, the parties executed a deed of charge and mortgage over the property to secure legal fees for services already provided and to be provided (paras 2–3).
Cadmus lodged caveat AH9831 on 9 July 2012, claiming an interest said to arise under that deed (para 4). The Rahmes challenged the caveat. Cadmus commenced substantive proceedings seeking to maintain its caveat and remove another caveat, while the Rahmes later filed a cross-summons seeking relief under the Contracts Review Act 1980 and/or the Australian Consumer Law in relation to the deed. Those substantive proceedings were listed for a three-day hearing commencing 27 February 2013 (paras 5–6).
Meanwhile, the Rahmes contracted to sell the property on 27 October 2012. The contract provided for completion within 90 days, with a further period available following a notice to complete. Completion was calculated to fall on 25 January 2013, subject to that process (para 7). The caveat therefore affected the vendors' ability to complete the sale with good title.
The Court recorded several matters as undisputed for the interlocutory hearing. Legal services had been provided, counsel had been briefed and were owed payment, and the deed was executed to secure legal fees, recovery costs and interest. The parties also accepted that the charge and mortgage, if valid, gave rise to a caveatable interest. They further accepted that the sale should proceed if appropriate security was provided (paras 10–11).
Rothman J made conditional orders. The caveat was to be withdrawn in exchange for the specified payments. The $1.7 million was to be placed into a controlled money account and retained there unless the parties consented to its release or the Court ordered otherwise. Additional settlement cheques were to be provided for listed counsel invoices and delivered to the payees (orders 1–3, 9). The motion was otherwise dismissed (order 12).
The Court framed the inquiry as one about the caveat, the balance of convenience and the form of substitute security. It said the caveator had the onus of establishing that the caveat should continue. Ordinarily, a caveat would be maintained if the claim had substance, or might have substance, and the balance of convenience favoured maintaining it. The Court described the test as the same or similar to the test for an interlocutory injunction (para 16).
On the arguability of the interest, the defendants did not dispute that they had executed the charge and mortgage or that the instrument, if valid, created a caveatable interest (paras 10, 17). Their cross-summons sought statutory relief, but they did not seek to establish an arguable case for such relief in the interlocutory proceedings (para 18). The deed therefore remained extant for the purposes of the immediate application. The Court did not determine the ultimate validity of the deed or the statutory claims.
The balance of convenience pointed in two directions. The Court accepted that the sale should be allowed to proceed, and that the defendants had urgency arising from the sale contract (paras 11, 15). At the same time, the Court considered that the plaintiff's interest required substantial protection. It identified the short period before the final hearing, the limited challenge to the efficacy of the charge and mortgage at the interlocutory stage, the accepted provision of legal services, the fees owed to senior counsel, and the existing security as relevant considerations (para 20).
The Court used a principle stated in Liberty Funding Pty Limited v Steele-Smith. That case was quoted for the proposition that a mortgagee's security for a contingent liability may be replaced by payment of the liability, or a reasonable estimate if the amount cannot be fixed with certainty (para 21). Rothman J accepted that approach for present purposes, with possible qualifications, but considered that the Rahmes misunderstood what counted as the contingent liability. The Court treated their agreement to liability up to $2 million, plus costs and interest, as the relevant contingent liability (para 22).
The Court did not simply order payment of that maximum amount. It noted that the plaintiff's estimate of fees, said to be $1.35 million, was not adequately supported by evidence (para 23). Instead, it set $1.7 million as security for estimated fees to the plaintiff and junior counsel, including a $350,000 buffer for recovery costs and interest. It also ordered payment of specifically identified invoices to senior counsel (para 24). The reasons explain the calculation as an interlocutory security arrangement, not a final assessment of the fees owed.
The Court declined to require a general undertaking as to damages. It expected the substitute-security orders to operate only until the February hearing, approximately one month or slightly more later. Requiring an undertaking in those circumstances, the Court said, would put the plaintiff in a worse position than if the caveat had remained (para 25). A narrower undertaking was recorded for the situation in which the plaintiff was notified of the proposed completion appointment but the sale failed because the plaintiff did not provide the caveat withdrawal (order 7).
The judgment did not announce a change in the law. It applied existing principles to an interlocutory dispute and recorded the practical terms on which the sale could proceed.
Before this decision, as described in the reasons, a caveat operated under the Real Property Act 1900 as a statutory restraint on registration of dealings without notice to the caveator. It did not itself create the proprietary interest. Rather, it protected an interest that may already have arisen, and could give notice of the claimed interest to persons dealing with the land (para 14). Rothman J cited J & H Just (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Bank of NSW for the protective function and Black v Garnock for the notice function.
The judgment also stated the usual interlocutory approach: the caveator must establish why the caveat should continue, with attention to whether the claim has substance or may have substance and whether the balance of convenience favours continuation (para 16). Buchanan v Crown & Gleeson Business Finance Pty Ltd was cited for the caveator's onus, and Eng Mee Yong v Letchumanan was cited alongside the comparison to interlocutory injunction principles.
The case's practical contribution lies in its application of replacement security where sale and protection of the claimed interest could be accommodated together. The Court accepted an approach based on the secured contingent liability or a reasonable estimate where the amount is uncertain, referring to Liberty Funding Pty Limited v Steele-Smith (paras 21–22). Here, the result was a controlled money deposit and payment of specified counsel invoices, rather than continued restraint of the sale by the caveat.
The judgment's limits matter. It was interlocutory, based on concessions and the issues argued on that motion. It did not decide the statutory challenge to the deed, finally determine the fees payable, or set a general formula for security in other disputes. Its treatment of the $1.7 million and the absence of a general damages undertaking was tied to the evidence and expected short duration of these particular orders.
At paragraph 14, Rothman J said: “The Caveat does not create an interest in property. It protects an interest in property that may otherwise have been created.” In plain English, lodging a caveat does not itself make the caveator an owner, mortgagee or charge-holder. The caveator must rely on an underlying interest, here said to arise from the deed of charge and mortgage.
Paragraph 16 states that the Court will ordinarily extend a caveat if the claim has substance, or may have substance, and the balance of convenience favours maintaining it. The Court also says the test is the same or similar to that for an interlocutory injunction. In plain English, the caveat inquiry considers both the apparent basis for the claimed interest and the practical consequences of keeping or removing the caveat while the case is unresolved.
At paragraph 19, the Court says the balance of convenience “overwhelmingly favours the protection of the respondent by appropriate security.” This does not mean the sale had to be stopped. The preceding sentence says the parties and the Court accepted that the sale should proceed. The point is that sale and protection of the plaintiff's claimed security could be reconciled by replacing the caveat with other security.
Paragraphs 22–24 explain how the Court approached the amount. It treated the agreed maximum liability, together with costs and interest, as the contingent liability for this purpose, then ordered $1.7 million plus the listed counsel payments. In plain English, the Court made a temporary security assessment rather than a final ruling that the defendants owed the whole sum.
At paragraph 25, the Court declined to require a general undertaking as to damages because the substitute-security arrangement was expected to last only a short time and the caveat would otherwise have remained. The specific undertaking recorded in order 7 addressed a narrower risk: failure to complete because the plaintiff did not provide the withdrawal at the notified completion appointment.
The reasoning is most directly relevant to an interlocutory caveat dispute where the claimed interest is supported by an underlying instrument and the parties accept, at least for the immediate application, that the instrument may support a caveatable interest. In this case, the deed of charge and mortgage and the parties' concessions made the arguable-interest issue relatively straightforward (paras 10, 17–18).
It is also relevant where a sale is imminent and the caveat prevents the vendors from providing good title, but the competing interests can potentially be protected by substitute security. The Court relied on the contract timetable and the parties' acceptance that the sale should proceed subject to appropriate security (paras 7, 11, 15).
A further relevant feature is a liability that is disputed or not finally assessed but can be estimated for temporary security purposes. The Court had an estimate of the plaintiff's fees, identified specific counsel invoices, and adopted a buffer for recovery costs and interest (paras 23–24). It also made the money subject to controlled-account restrictions, preserving the position pending further determination (orders 2–3).
The judgment is less directly informative where the claimed interest is genuinely disputed on the interlocutory evidence, where the sale is not accepted as necessary or appropriate, where no workable alternative security is available, or where the interim orders will operate for a substantially different period. It does not decide the merits of the statutory challenge to the deed or establish how a court should resolve a final dispute about the amount of legal fees.
The judgment text provided contains no later judicial decisions discussing or applying Phoenician Holdings Pty Ltd t/as Cadmus Lawyers v Rahme. It therefore does not establish how subsequent courts have treated this decision, and no later treatment can be verified from the source material supplied.
Within the judgment itself, Rothman J referred to authorities for particular propositions. Buchanan was cited for the caveator's onus, Eng Mee Yong for the interlocutory-injunction comparison, Liberty Funding for the approach to substitute security for contingent liabilities, J & H Just for the function of a caveat, and Black v Garnock for its notice function (paras 14, 16, 21). Those are the authorities the judgment relied on; they are not subsequent treatment of Phoenician Holdings.
The substantive proceedings were still pending. The judgment did not decide whether the deed of charge and mortgage was ultimately valid or whether relief under the Contracts Review Act 1980 or Australian Consumer Law should be granted (paras 6, 18). It also did not finally determine the total fees, costs of recovery or interest payable.
The Court noted that the plaintiff's estimate was not adequately supported by evidence, but made an interim estimate for security purposes (para 23). The reasons do not specify how the final hearing would assess each component of that amount or resolve any disagreement about the invoices. Order 10 expressly left the parties at liberty to address an alternative form of security.
The judgment also leaves open how far its approach to undertaking as to damages would apply outside the short interlocutory period described at paragraph 25. The Court's decision was tied to its expectation that the orders would operate only until shortly after the February hearing date. It did not state that a general undertaking is unnecessary whenever a caveat is replaced by security.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on this, relying on it, or using any draft, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.
Withdrawal of Caveat A validly executed withdrawal of Caveat in the approved form for lodgement with the Registrar General
(9) (a) Further to the amount of $1.7 M paid to the solicitor for the plaintiff, the defendants shall provide settlement cheques for the following amounts of invoice payable to each issuer of invoice: Date Title Issuer of Invoice Amount of Invoice 20 May 2011 Spincast v G&N Rahme Appeal to Full Court D.D. Feller SC $19,293.75 2 June 2011 Cavalock v Spincast D.D. Feller SC $5,344.38 22 November 2011 Webuildem P/L v Arab Bank of Australia D.D. Feller SC $962.50 8 March 2012 Webuildem ats Weston David Murr SC $36,256.00 26 June 2012 Webuildem Pty ltd & Ors ats Arab Bank of Australia Limited & Ors Bernard Coles QC $10,405.00 10 September 2012 Webuildem Pty Ltd & Ors ats Arab Bank of Australia Limited & Ors Bernard Coles QC $11,412.50
(b) The solicitor for the plaintiff shall deliver the Settlement Cheques specified in (a) above to each respective payee. (10) The parties have liberty to address on an alternative form of security. (11) Costs shall be costs in the cause. (12) Otherwise, the motion is dismissed. Catchwords: REAL PROPERTY - Torrens title - Caveat against dealings - application for removal of valid Caveat to permit sale of subject land - significant agreement between parties - indisputable Caveatable interest - balance of convenience - replacement security - very limited undertaking as to damages Legislation Cited: Banking Act 1959 (Cth) Cheques Act 1986 (Cth) Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Contracts Review Act 1980 Real Property Act 1900 Cases Cited: Buchanan v Crown & Gleeson Business Finance Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1465 Eng Mee Yong v Letchumanan [1980] AC 331 J & H Just (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Bank of NSW [1971] HCA 57; (1971) 125 CLR 546 Liberty Funding Pty Limited v Steele-Smith [2004] NSWSC 1100 Category: Interlocutory applications Parties: Phoenician Holdings Pty Ltd T/as Cadmus Lawyers (Plaintiff/Respondent) George Maroun Rahme (First Defendant/First Applicant) Nouha Rahme (Second Defendant/Second Applicant) Representation: Counsel: D E Baran (Plaintiff/Respondent) G A Elliott (Defendants/Applicants) Solicitors: Cadmus Lawyers (Plaintiff/Respondent) Elias Gates & Associates (Defendants/Applicants) File Number(s): 2012/273084 Publication restriction: None
ex tempore Judgment 1HIS HONOUR: These interlocutory proceedings concern an application that a Caveat be removed in order to allow the sale of property.
Short History 2On 12 June 2012 the plaintiff, Phoenician Holdings Pty Ltd t/as Cadmus Lawyers (hereinafter "the respondent"), and the defendants, George and Nouha Rahme (hereinafter "the applicants"), executed a deed of charge and mortgage in relation to property (hereinafter "the property") owned by the applicants and used as their home. 3Following certain financial difficulties suffered by the applicants, the deed of charge and mortgage was executed to secure legal fees for services rendered and to be rendered by the respondent to the applicants purportedly pursuant to cost agreements of 7 April 2010 and 12 September 2011 (Exhibits 3 and 4 respectively). 4On 9 July 2012 the respondent lodged a Caveat over the property relating to its interest purportedly created by the charge and mortgage. On 10 July 2012, the respondent gave notice of the lodging of the Caveat to the applicants. Later that month a series of e-mails were sent by the respondent to the applicants relating to outstanding fees owed to the respondent and to counsel briefed by them. 5On 2 August 2012, the applicants lodged an application for the Caveat to lapse. On 31 August 2012, the respondent filed a summons, commencing the substantive proceedings herein, seeking orders the effect of which would be, if successful, to allow the Caveat to remain in place and to remove another Caveat lodged to support a purported interest in the property by the applicants' son. 6On 5 November 2012, the applicants filed a cross-summons seeking relief, under either or both of the Contracts Review Act 1980 and the Australian Consumer Law, being Schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), the effect of which was to avoid the deed of charge and mortgage, but not the legal fees which they purport to secure. The summons and cross-summons are listed for hearing, for three days, commencing 27 February 2013. 7On 27 October 2012, the property was the subject of a contract of sale. The contract provides for a completion date of 90 days, in default of which either party to the contract can serve a notice to complete, which would require completion within a further 14 days. The completion date calculates to 25 January 2013, but after notice, no later than early February. 8As a consequence of the need to provide good title to the purchaser of the property, the applicants move by motion filed 12 December 2012 for a withdrawal or removal of the Caveat.
The Issues 9Notwithstanding that on this interlocutory hearing the parties have tendered four volumes of documents, various affidavits and other exhibits, the issues between the parties are within very short compass. It may be appropriate first to state some of the matters that are not in dispute, at least for these interlocutory purposes. 10There is no dispute that legal services were provided by the respondent to the applicants. There is also no dispute that counsel were briefed and provided services for which payment is due. There is no dispute that the charge and mortgage were executed in order to secure legal fees (including costs of recovery thereof and interest) and that the Caveat was lodged to protect the interests created or purportedly created by that charge and mortgage. The parties also accept that the charge and mortgage, if valid, give rise to a "Caveatable" interest. 11Further, there is no dispute between the parties that, as a matter of the proper exercise of the discretion of the Court, and, subject to appropriate security being provided, orders should be made the effect of which would be to allow the above-mentioned sale to proceed. 12The issues between the parties are, as a consequence of the foregoing, confined to the form that any security should take, the method by which the security should be effected, the amount of any such security and whether, in obtaining that security, the respondent should give the usual undertaking as to damages.
Consideration 13Much that was the subject of submissions does not, given the foregoing lack of dispute, seem particularly relevant. Nevertheless the Court will deal with some of the matters, albeit extremely briefly. 14For reasons that may be clear to them, if not others, the applicants sought to submit that the Caveat created an interest in property. I am unclear as to the purpose of this submission. A Caveat operates, by virtue of the Real Property Act 1900, as a statutory injunction preventing the registration of dealings in property to which it applies without notice to the Caveator. The Caveat does not create an interest in property. It protects an interest in property that may otherwise have been created: see J & H Just (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Bank of NSW [1971] HCA 57; (1971) 125 CLR 546, per Barwick CJ. Further, and with great respect to Barwick CJ, it also gives notice of the claimed interest to those seeking to deal with the property: see Black v Garnock (2007) 230 CLR 438 at [76], per Callinan J. 15Further, to the extent that it is in dispute, I accept that the applicants have the required degree of urgency in seeking the removal of the Caveat, which urgency is brought about by the contracts of sale. No issue is taken in these proceedings that, in part due to the financial issues with which the applicants are faced, the sale was necessary. 16The Court accepts that the respondent has the onus of establishing that the Caveat should continue or not be removed: Buchanan v Crown & Gleeson Business Finance Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1465 at [6], per Brereton J. Ordinarily, where the Court is required to consider whether a Caveat should remain on the register, the court will extend the Caveat if satisfied that the Caveator's claim has substance, or may have substance, and that the balance of convenience is in favour of the maintenance of the Caveat. In that respect, while recognising that the Court is exercising a statutory jurisdiction, the test is the same or similar to that for an interlocutory injunction: see Buchanan, supra; Eng Mee Yong v Letchumanan [1980] AC 331. 17Given that there is no dispute that the applicants executed the charge and mortgage, it is difficult to see how the applicants could submit that the respondent does not have a sufficiently arguable case for a Caveatable interest. 18The applicants do not, in these interlocutory proceedings, seek to establish their claim for relief under the Contracts Review Act or Australian Consumer Law. Nor do the applicants seek to establish an arguable case for relief under any such provisions. As a consequence, the charge and mortgage are extant and create an interest in the property that may be protected by the lodging of a Caveat. 19I turn to the balance of convenience. It is accepted by all of the parties, and the Court, that the balance of convenience favours a course that would allow the applicants to complete the contract for sale. However, the balance of convenience overwhelmingly favours the protection of the respondent by appropriate security. 20Some of the factors that have brought the Court to that view are that the final hearing will occur within a month or so of any substituted security; the lack of any real challenge in these interlocutory proceedings to the efficaciousness of the charge and mortgage; the acceptance that legal services have been rendered and that moneys are owed to senior counsel and should be paid out; and the existence of current security in the form of the charge and mortgage, which is sought to be replaced. 21The applicants rely upon the application of the principle adumbrated by Palmer J in Liberty Funding Pty Limited v Steele-Smith [2004] NSWSC 1100 at [25]: "The usual way in which a mortgagor can obtain a discharge where a contingent liability remains secured under the mortgage is to pay into Court the amount of the contingent liability or a reasonable estimation thereof if the amount cannot be fixed with certainty. So, for example, where a mortgage or threatens proceedings for the taking of an account, the mortgagee is entitled to retain the security to recover the anticipated reasonable costs of such proceedings and the mortgage or may obtain a discharge either by providing alternative security for such costs or by paying into Court an amount equal to the probable reasonable costs of the proceedings". (References omitted.) 22I accept, with some possible qualifications, at least for present purposes only, that the foregoing approach should be applied as the test in determining the amount of security that should be ordered. However, it seems to me that the applicants misunderstand the foregoing reference by Palmer J to "the amount of the contingent liability". In this case, the applicants have agreed to a liability of up to $2 M, plus costs and interest. That is the amount of the contingent liability. 23Nevertheless, the amounts suggested by the respondent as being owed to it, leaving aside fees to senior counsel, have not been appropriately supported by evidence. During the course of directions hearing before the Chief Judge in Equity, the respondent suggested that the amount owing was $1.35 M. It seems, from a proper analysis of the discussion with the Chief Judge, that $1.35 M was an estimate of fees, not including fees to senior counsel. To that amount must be added the costs of recovery and possible interest. 24I do not intend to be precise. In accordance with the agreement between the parties, the Court will order that payment be made to senior counsel. Further, the Court will order security of a further amount to cover the estimated fees to the respondent and the fees to junior counsel, plus a buffer of $350,000 to cover the costs of recovery and interest. In other words, the Court will order security in the sum of $1.7 M together with the payments to senior counsel. 25The trial judge will have the capacity, at the conclusion of the hearing in February, to alter significantly the terms of any interlocutory order. As a consequence, these interlocutory orders will be in place for approximately one month or slightly more. At the moment, there is no undertaking by the respondent as to damages. In my view, for the short period for which these orders are likely to operate, there should be no requirement on the respondent to give any such undertaking and, in so doing, put themselves in a worse position than would be the case if the Caveat continued. In those circumstances, I will not order or require that the respondent give an undertaking as to damages, except in the unlikely event that the respondent causes the contract for sale not to complete by reason of its non-attendance at the notified completion appointment. 26The Court makes the following orders: (1)The plaintiff withdraw the Caveat on payment of the Specified Amounts by settlement cheques (as defined in these orders) to be held in trust jointly by the solicitor for the plaintiff (as defined in these orders) and the solicitor for the defendants. (2)The amount of $1.7 M so paid to the solicitor for the plaintiff as defined in these orders and the solicitor for the defendants be paid by those solicitors into a controlled money account. (3)The amount so paid into a controlled money account and any interest on that amount not be paid out of that account other than with the consent of the parties or by further order of the Court. (4)It shall be sufficient compliance with the requirement in order 1 that the payment be in cleared funds that the payment be by settlement cheque as defined in order 8. (5)It shall be sufficient compliance with the requirement in order 1 that the plaintiff withdraw the Caveat that the plaintiff provide the defendants with a withdrawal of Caveat in exchange for cheques for the Specified Amounts. (6)On the defendants giving the plaintiff no less than 48 hours' notice (excluding Saturday, Sunday and any public holiday) of the proposed place and time for completion of the Contract, the plaintiff or the solicitor for the plaintiff shall attend at that time and place for the purpose of exchange of the Caveat for the Payment. (7)The Court notes the plaintiff's undertaking to pay damages to the defendants in the event that the plaintiff has been notified under order 6 of the proposed completion of the contract and the contract is not completed by reason of the failure of the plaintiff to provide a withdrawal of Caveat at completion. (8)In these orders these terms (in any form) mean: Bank A bank as defined in the Banking Act 1959 (Cth), the Reserve Bank or a State bank The Caveat Caveat number AH9831 affecting the Property Cheque A cheque that is not postdated or stale The Contract The contract for the sale of the Property dated 27 October 2012 between the defendants as vendors and Sharon Tia Cooper as purchaser The Payment The payment to the solicitor for the plaintiff and the solicitors referred to in order 1 The Property The property Folio Identifier 1/78239 known as 1 William Street Double Bay Settlement Cheques Unendorsed cheques made payable to the person to be paid and drawn on its own funds by: - A bank; or - A building society, credit union or other FCA Institution as defined in Cheques Act 1986 (Cth) That carries on business in Australia Solicitor for the plaintiff A solicitor other than Georges Elias or the plaintiff itself, such solicitor to have been appointed, for the sole purpose of acting on behalf of the plaintiff in performing any functions under these orders, and to have confirmed acceptance of that appointment by notice in writing to the defendants no later than 16 January 2013 The Specified Amounts $1.7 M, plus the amounts prescribed in order 9 Withdrawal of Caveat A validly executed withdrawal of Caveat in the approved form for lodgement with the Registrar General
(9)(a) Further to the amount of $1.7 M paid to the solicitor for the plaintiff, the defendants shall provide settlement cheques for the following amounts of invoice payable to each issuer of invoice: Date Title Issuer of Invoice Amount of Invoice 20 May 2011 Spincast v G&N Rahme Appeal to Full Court D.D. Feller SC $19,293.75 2 June 2011 Cavalock v Spincast D.D. Feller SC $5,344.38 22 November 2011 Webuildem P/L v Arab Bank of Australia D.D. Feller SC $962.50 8 March 2012 Webuildem ats Weston David Murr SC $36,256.00 26 June 2012 Webuildem Pty ltd & Ors ats Arab Bank of Australia Limited & Ors Bernard Coles QC $10,405.00 10 September 2012 Webuildem Pty Ltd & Ors ats Arab Bank of Australia Limited & Ors Bernard Coles QC $11,412.50
(b) The solicitor for the plaintiff shall deliver the Settlement Cheques specified in (a) above to each respective payee. (10)The parties have liberty to address on an alternative form of security. (11)Costs shall be costs in the cause. (12)Otherwise, the motion is dismissed.
DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 21 December 2012
Phoenician Holdings Pty Ltd t/as Cadmus Lawyers
Rahme
The plaintiff was to withdraw caveat AH9831 in exchange for the specified settlement cheques and payment arrangements. The $1.7 million was to be deposited into a controlled money account and could not be paid out without the parties' consent or further order. The defendants were also to provide settlement cheques for the listed counsel invoices, and the plaintiff's solicitor was to deliver those cheques to the payees. The parties had liberty to address an alternative form of security; costs were costs in the cause. Otherwise, the motion was dismissed.