Pham v R

[The applicant] acknowledges his offending and appears to be remorseful for his actions." 16 Ms Santos wrote: "38 … [The applicant] indicated that he considered his behaviour as naïve as he did not consider the consequences of his actions as part of the drug trade, on society, or with respect to his wife and family. In discussing this, he expressed seemingly appropriate regret and remorse for his offending behaviour and he also demonstrated an understanding of the social reasons why being involved in the drug trade is both inappropriate and illegal.

44 [The applicant] expressed seemingly appropriate remorse for his offending, and he acknowledged the naivety of his behaviour with respect to this incident. Further, he reports to have taken steps to address his criminogenic needs through allegedly severing ties with his antisocial associates, and maintaining a positive personal routine consisting of consistent, and now, satisfying employment."

The remarks on sentence 17 Frearson DCJ recounted the facts of the offence, and the applicant's personal circumstances. He outlined the role played by the applicant as follows: "… what he did was to travel between Queensland and New South Wales and engaged in meetings and negotiations with other participants and he negotiated the terms of the transaction in Sydney. He had a level of autonomy. There were coded conversations and there was a considerable sophistication of co-operation and the negotiations took place over some substantial period … It is clear he had interstate contacts and could secure a large quantity of drugs from those who trusted him and he displayed a detailed understanding of price and quality and his role in the negotiations is demonstrated from a mere reading of the facts. He was a negotiator, organiser, coordinator, quality controller and financial arranger … There was an extremely high level of planning and organisation." 18 His Honour allowed, in accordance with the principles stated in R v Thomson; R v Houlton [2000] NSWCCA 309; 49 NSWLR 383, a reduction in sentence of 25 percent for the utilitarian value of the plea of guilty. However, he did not regard the plea of guilty as a "manifestation of contrition", and added: "I do not find there is any evidence of real contrition that I can accept and the plea itself I find to be not much more than acceptance of the inevitable. I do not punish the offender for this, but he does not name his co-offenders and he is not prepared to and he is not even prepared to agree on the facts that the co-offenders are particular identities. I do not think it particularly matters in terms of objective gravity but it does demonstrate to me a lack of co-operation and it underlines what I think is my conclusion that he is not truly remorseful for his conduct." (italics added) 19 He found the offence to be of a mid-range level of objective gravity, but, nevertheless, departed from the standard non-parole period because of the plea of guilty (R v Way [2004] NSWCCA 131; 60 NSWLR 168) and because, pursuant to s 44(2) of the Sentencing Procedure Act, he found special circumstances justifying a variation from the ratio between the non-parole period and the head sentence there specified. He proceeded to impose the sentence I have mentioned.

The application for leave to appeal 20 Two grounds of appeal were pleaded. They are: "(1) The sentencing Judge erred in concluding that there was no evidence of real contrition and in finding the applicant is not truly remorseful for his conduct … on the basis that the applicant failed to acknowledge the identity of his co-offenders.

(2) The sentencing Judge erred in his assessment of the objective criminality and in particular (i) failed to take into account the nature of the drug as a precursor and (ii) failed to expose his reasons for determining that the matter fell into the middle range of objective seriousness for the purpose of the application of the standard non-parole period."

Ground 1 21 I have extracted above the passage in the Remarks on Sentence from which this ground is drawn. 22 On behalf of the applicant, it was submitted that two separate findings of fact can be isolated in the first passage quoted above ([18]). The first is that there was no evidence of remorse or contrition; the second, an affirmative finding that the applicant was not "truly remorseful". 23 The first, as stated on behalf of the applicant, is incorrect. Although the applicant did not give evidence, there was evidence, in the Pre-Sentence Report and the psychologist's report, of some level of remorse. It was not, of course, evidence that the sentencing judge was obliged to accept. It is not, however, strictly correct to say that he found there was "no evidence of remorse and contrition"; what his Honour said was that there was no evidence of real contrition "that I can accept". 24 It is true that this is somewhat cryptic, but it may be taken as a rejection of the opinions offered by the authors of the reports. Those opinions were not supported by any evidence given by or on behalf of the applicant. 25 Moreover, close examination of the reports provides a possible explanation for his Honour's approach. The observations, particularly in Ms Bennett's report, are far from unequivocal. Ms Bennett noted that the applicant admitted "some involvement" but gave an account inconsistent with that contained in the Police Facts (which were agreed). She said that he described his offence as "minor" - contrary to the picture painted in the agreed facts. She said that he "simplified" his involvement as being "invited" to transport drugs. The agreed facts demonstrate that the applicant's role was significantly greater than that of "transporter". Ms Bennett's report was prepared for sentencing in November 2008, almost 18 months after the offence and the applicant's arrest, and therefore when he had had ample opportunity to reflect upon his conduct. 26 The same cannot be said of Ms Santos' report, which is dated June 2009. There is nothing in that report that expressly casts doubt on the assessment of "seemingly appropriate remorse" (unless the word "seemingly" is taken to convey some doubt). Nevertheless, his Honour was not obliged to accept that assessment: see R v Butters [2010] NSWCCA 1, at [18]-[19]. 27 I do accept that it was erroneous to treat the applicant's reluctance to identify his co-offenders as relevant to, and indicative of the absence of, remorse and contrition. As was pointed out on his behalf, there are good and well-known reasons why participants in drug offences might display that reluctance: see R v Baleisuva [2004] NSWCCA 344. 28 While it was open to his Honour to be sceptical about the applicant's remorse, it was not open to his Honour to find, affirmatively, that the applicant was not "truly remorseful". The two propositions are different. Apart from the evidence in the reports, there was simply no basis on which to make a finding one way or another. 29 Remorse and contrition are matters traditionally taken into account in sentencing. They are taken into account because they are thought to be indicative of prospects of rehabilitation. However, it is rare that an offender who has been apprehended and who faces punishment is not remorseful and contrite. But remorse and contrition of themselves are not necessarily indicative of any attitude towards the offence, as distinct from apprehension and the prospect of punishment. Remorse and contrition referable to the likelihood (or inevitability) of punishment are not indicative of rehabilitation prospects. 30 In 2007, the Sentencing Procedure Act was amended (with effect from 1 January 2008, and, this Court was told by both counsel, operating retrospectively) so that remorse is to be taken into account as a mitigating factor in sentencing only if: "( i ) the offender has provided evidence that he or she accepted responsibility for his or her actions, and

( ii ) the offender has acknowledged any injury, loss or damage caused by his or her actions or made reparation for such injury, loss or damage (or both)" (s 21A(3)(i))

Because the drug was apprehended before it found its way onto the streets, there is no scope for the application of the second limb of s 21A(3)(i). No injury, loss or damage (except by way of costs incurred by law enforcement authorities and the criminal justice system) have been incurred, and there is no basis for reparation. 31 But the applicant did provide in the two reports some evidence that he had accepted responsibility for his actions. As I have said, the sentencing judge was not obliged to accept that evidence, and, in the light of the contrary indications in Ms Bennett's report, there were valid reasons for scepticism. 32 It would, in my opinion, have been preferable if his Honour had given clear reasons for rejecting that evidence (if that is what he did). That would have avoided an inference, which is also available, that he simply overlooked it. 33 Despite the often ritual incantation of remorse and contrition as relevant to sentencing, it is seldom that they have any real bearing upon the sentencing outcome, except, as I have suggested, where they can be taken to indicate good prospects of rehabilitation. 34 In this case, it does not appear to me that the applicant was in any way penalised by the erroneous reasoning. His Honour found that the applicant had a "low to moderate risk of re-offending in this particular way" and that he had "fair to good prospects" of rehabilitation. Even leaving aside the failure to take into account what was contained in the reports, these findings were as favourable to the applicant as could have been expected. 35 I am satisfied that this reasoning did not adversely affect the sentencing decision.

Ground 2 36 For the purposes of Pt 4 Div 1A of the Sentencing Procedure Act, the sentencing judge assessed the objective gravity of the offence as "mid-range". He nevertheless departed very significantly from the standard non-parole period specified in the Table to that Division. He stated his intention of reducing the sentence by 25 percent in recognition of the plea of guilty. 37 As I have indicated above, the standard non-parole period is 15 years. Reduction of that period by 25 percent would yield a non-parole period of 11 years and 3 months. The starting point of the sentence imposed, after the 25 percent reduction is factored in, was a head sentence of 13 years and 4 months (ie 1 year and 8 months less than the standard non-parole period), with a non-parole period of 8 years (ie 7 years less than the standard non-parole period). In other words, the departure from the standard non-parole period contained, in addition to the plea of guilty reduction, a further reduction of 5 years and 3 months, or 35 percent, from the standard non-parole period. That is, as I have said, a very significant reduction, and one that is hardly explained. 38 Nevertheless, on behalf of the applicant it was contended that the sentence was excessive because the assessment of objective gravity as mid-range was erroneous. 39 The basis for this was a contention that the sentencing judge failed to take into account: "… the fact that the substance … was a pre-cursor, i.e. a substance which would be used to produce another drug (methylamphetamine) and that there was nothing to suggest that the applicant had any role to play in the conversion of the drug into a form that could be sold into the illicit drug markeg."

It was submitted that the applicant's role was "very much preliminary" to any actual supply of methylamphetamine. 40 In my opinion the argument is misconceived. Schedule 1 of the DMT Act prescribes 5 kilograms of pseudoephedrine as the large commercial quantity. 41 The argument put on behalf of the applicant had at its foundation the proposition that pseudoephedrine, as a precursor, is less harmful than other drugs, for example, methylamphetamine, for which it is a precursor. As a proposition of fact, that may be accepted - at least, it may be accepted that the legislature so perceives. That conclusion emerges from the structure of the DMT Act, and, in particular, Sch 1 thereto. 42 Schedule 1 catalogues the drugs prohibited by the DMT Act, and prescribes the quantities of each named drug that constitute traffickable, small, indictable, commercial, and large commercial quantities. What amounts to each of those quantity levels varies widely, according to the perceived harmfulness of the drug. 43 Where 5.0 kilograms constitutes a large commercial quantity of pseudoephedrine, as little as 0.5 kilograms of methylamphetamine constitutes the large commercial quantity of that drug. Thus, supply of 0.5 kilograms or more of methylamphetamine exposes an offender to a penalty of life imprisonment; with respect to pseudoephedrine, an offender does not face that penalty unless and until he or she has dealt in 5 kilograms. 44 The point I am making is that the relative harmfulness of the drug has already been taken into account by the legislature in the determination of what constitutes the large commercial quantity of any drug, and is built into the penalties provided. 45 Having so differentiated by reference to harmfulness, the legislature has determined that the penalty for supply of the relevant quantities shall not vary according to the nature of the drug. This was the effect of the decision of the High Court in Adams v The Queen [2008] HCA 15; 234 CLR 143. 46 There is, accordingly, no substance to this complaint. It was clear that the offence with which the applicant was charged involved a specified drug, which was, indeed, an ingredient of another drug. However, pseudoephedrine is, itself, a prohibited drug and it was this with which the applicant was charged. 47 As to the second part of this ground, the asserted failure to expose reasons for determining that the offence was one of mid-range, I do not think the complaint can be sustained. The finding comes at the end of a lengthy passage in which the sentencing judge gave close attention to the applicant's involvement, and the level of planning involved in the offence. 48 I would reject this ground of the application. 49 In my opinion neither ground of appeal ought to be upheld. I am satisfied that the sentence was appropriate, and I am not satisfied that any other sentence ought to have been imposed. 50 I would grant leave to appeal but dismiss the appeal. 51 HALL J: I agree with Simpson J. **********

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