Petitioner v Respondent

2 The practice of the Prothonotary is to treat all documents on a divorce file as material which ought to remain confidential unless the information they contain is already publicly available. If it is, then different considerations apply.

3 The present practice was considered by Whelan J in the matter of proceeding No. 291 of 1944.[1] After comparing the position taken by the Prothonotary with that adopted by other courts, and having expressed his opinion that the procedure of this Court should be cognisant of the confidential nature of certain information on divorce files, and should be consistent with the approach taken in Federal courts, his Honour said that, in his opinion, the Prothonotary is correct in adopting the general practice of treating documents on divorce files as confidential. Any other course would produce a marked disconformity between this Court and current law and practice in other courts having jurisdiction in such matters. Accordingly, where a non-party applicant wishes to inspect such documents, an application should be made for leave to do so pursuant to rule 28.05(2)(b). His Honour expressed the view that an affidavit should ordinarily be filed identifying the applicant and his or her association (if any) with the parties, the purpose for which access is sought, how the applicant perceives that access will further that purpose, the use the applicant intends to make of the information if access is provided, and who, if anyone, may have an interest in the file or in the application. If there is any such person, his Honour indicated that the affidavit should specify whether he or she has been notified of the application.

4 Ms Bear has filed an affidavit in which she identifies herself as a distant relative of the respondent (wife) to the divorce proceedings, and gives her reason for requesting the information as "historical research project regarding World War 1". The link here is that the marriage in question was celebrated in 1916.

5 Ms Bear does not say who else may have an interest in the file, but it appears from her affidavit that not only are husband and wife now both dead, but that there are no living members of the immediate family. The court file indicates that the marriage was childless, and that the decree nisi for dissolution of that marriage became absolute on 12 August 1925. Almost 84 years have thus elapsed since that date.

6 It is perhaps pertinent in this context to observe that cabinet documents are released after 30 years. It seems to me that so much time has elapsed since the divorce that the need to protect the privacy of those then intimately involved is removed.

7 Another observation is I think pertinent. In my opinion, the general policy adopted by the Prothonotary should be subject to some time limitation. I do not know whether other courts adopt a similar position, but it seems to me that the relatives of divorced couples should after 80 or more years (the period that has elapsed in this case) be entitled to know something about the circumstances of that divorce. Of course, the information may not be pleasing to them, save for such satisfaction as may come from having the relevant knowledge where before there was mere speculation. But it is for them to decide whether they wish to take the risk that what they discover may disappoint.

8 I do not seek to limit the Prothonotary's general discretion in deciding whether or not to allow inspection of documents filed in a proceeding. I also agree with Whelan J that the Prothonotary has been correct in adopting the general practice of treating material in divorce files as confidential. In my opinion, however, where the parties to a divorce are or may be presumed to be dead, and where in any event the passage of considerable time would blunt possible public embarrassment, there should be a presumption that the materials be released to family members.

9 There is nothing in this case to rebut the presumption. Indeed, another file should also be included in the order. The husband (applicant) lodged his original application on 3 December 1924 in the Divorce and Matrimonial Causes jurisdiction. The proceeding was designated No. 492 of that year. The ground was desertion. The application failed because the judge was not satisfied that the statutory period had elapsed. A fresh application (No. 65 of 1925) was therefore made the following year, at a time when any doubt on that score had been resolved.

10 I accordingly order pursuant to r.28.05(2)(b) that the applicant have leave to inspect, and obtain copies of documents on the file of, proceedings No. 493 of 1924 and No. 65 of 1925, both in the Supreme Court.

[1] [2005] VSC 50.