Conclusion
51While it is not in dispute that the Respondent used the staff statements for the purposes of its investigation into the Hospital complaint, it appears that the Respondent also provided the statements to the HCCC as part of its response to the HCCC in regard to its review of the determination of the HCCC complaint.
52The staff statements were provided to the HCCC on 20 September 2012. This appears to have been in regard to HCCC File # 12/02729. The HCCC requested material from the Respondent as part of that review and its investigation was not concluded until 13 November 2012.
53That being the case, it is apparent that the HCCC review was being undertaken at the time the staff statements were provided to the HCCC on 20 September 2012.
54The scope of section 99A(1) of the HCC Act is wide. With limited exceptions, the section prohibits disclosure of information obtained in exercising a function under that Act. On the basis of the material before me I am satisfied that the HCCC obtained the staff statements in exercising a function under the HCC Act i.e. its review of HCCC File # 12/02729. This would remain the case notwithstanding that the statements were prepared for the purposes of the Respondent's investigation into the Hospital complaint.
55The only exceptions to the section 99A of the HCC Act prohibition against disclosure is that found in subsection 99A(1). That is, if the disclosure is:
"(a) with the consent of the person to whom the information relates, or
(b) in connection with the execution and administration of this Act, or
(c) for the purposes of any legal proceedings arising out of this Act or of any report of any such proceedings, or
(d) with other lawful excuse"
56Section 99B of the HCC Act provides that the HCCC may disclose information to courts, police, authorities regulating health practitioners and others where the public interest in disclosing the information outweighs the public interest in protecting the privacy of any person to whom the information relates. The Respondent consulted with the HCCC in order to ascertain whether or not the HCCC consented to the release of the staff statements to the Applicant. The Commissioner did not consent.
57The object and principle of the HCC Act are set out in section 3 and included at in section 3(1)(b) is:
(b) investigating and assessing whether any such complaint is serious and if so, whether it should be prosecuted
58Section 3(2) provides that the protection of the health and safety of the public must be the paramount consideration.
59Pursuant to subsection 99A(1)(a) of the HCC Act, disclosure of information obtained in exercising a function under the Act is not prohibited if the disclosure is with the consent of 'the person to whom the information relates'. In this matter, the withheld information relates to the Applicant. It must be implied that she consents to the release of the statements. However, in my view the expression "the person to whom the information relates" in subsection 99A(1)(a) must be read more broadly than as only being a reference to the Applicant. I agree that the expression is to be construed with the "widest import".
60In order for the HCCC to fulfil its investigative obligation under in section 3(1)(b) of the HCC Act, it is essential that those providing information as part of an investigation are encouraged to give frank and honest responses to the items in issue. Some people would not be prepared to speak frankly to investigators or they might not give accurate information unless they can be assured of confidentiality.
61As was noted in NZ v Health Care Complaints Commission [2006] NSWADT 111
The Commission is very conscious of the need to maintain confidentiality of complaint and other information it receives and the privacy and confidentiality of people. It is appreciated that to disclose such information can cause harm, affect their information privacy and breach duties of confidentiality owed to them. This is the reason the Commission has developed policies and guidelines to deal with the confidentiality of information that it receives or obtains as part of its business.
62In Gliksman v The Commissioner, Health Care Complaints Commission [2001] NSWADT 47 Judicial Member Robinson considered an application under the FOI Act. He considered the provisions of the now repealed section 37 of the HCC Act which was in similar terms to that found in section 99A. The Judicial Member stated at paragraph [29] and following:
"29 The Division to which the section refers, Division 5, relates to the investigation of complaints against health practitioners in NSW. I am satisfied from my inspection of the documents that they contain information obtained by the respondent in exercising a function under the HCC Act.
30 It was submitted that this section constituted a statutory "guard" against disclosure of the subject documents and it was a relevant matter for the Tribunal to take into account.
31 No submission was made that section 37 constituted a secrecy provision within the meaning of clause 12 of Schedule 1 of the FOI Act and the documents were therefore exempt (see generally, for example, the discussion of clause 12 in Anne Cossins, Annotated Freedom of Information Act New South Wales, 1997, LBC Information Services, Sydney, at pp 390-394). As no reliance was placed on clause 12 by the respondent, I shall not consider it here.
32 In my view, while section 37 of the HCC Act does not constitute a complete prohibition on the release of the respondent's documents, as it provides for disclosure with "lawful excuse", I consider that it is a relevant factor for me to take into account. However, I do not consider it a significant factor in the context of this particular case. Of much more significance is the general nature of the powers and functions of the respondent under Division 5 of the HCC Act and that Act to receive and act on complaints regarding health practitioners. These are plainly functions which would often involve the collection of a significant amount of confidential and personal information about persons. Some of that information would be made public at appropriate times, for example, in the course of some investigations and when prosecutions are commenced by the respondent.
33 As to the submission that there was no public interest to be served by the release of the documents to the applicant here, reference was made by the respondent to the passage of Heerey J in Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corporation (1991) 29 FCR 429 at 441 where it was said of the similar Commonwealth FOI provision in section 41(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982(Cth) :
"Turning to the criterion of unreasonableness prescribed by the s 41(1) exclusion, it seems to me that attention is directed, amongst other things, to whether or not the proposed disclosure would serve the public interest purpose of the legislation, which is to open to public access information about government which government holds, this being information which in truth is held on behalf of the public. I do not think it is necessary in order to make out the s 41(1) exclusion that there is some particular unfairness, embarrassment or hardship which would enure to a person by reason of the disclosure. Such matters, if present, would doubtless weigh in favour of exclusion. But if the information disclosed were of no demonstrable relevance to the affairs of government and was likely to do no more than excite or satisfy the curiosity of people about the person whose personal affairs were disclosed, I think disclosure would be unreasonable."
34 I respectfully agree with these observations in the context of the NSW Act. However, I do not think that the relevant interest of the applicant in the present case is merely that of curiosity.
35 I prefer the analysis of Lockhart J in the same case (Jenkinson & Heery JJ agreeing) at page 483, where he said:
"The object of the Act, as expressed by s. 3, is to give the "Australian community" the right of access to information in the possession of the Australian Government. What is "unreasonable" disclosure of information for purposes of s. 41(1) must have as its core public interest considerations. The exemptions necessary for the protection of "personal affairs" (s. 41) and "business or professional affairs" (s. 43) are themselves, in my opinion, public interest considerations. That is to say, it is not in the public interest that the personal or business or professional affairs of persons are necessarily to be disclosed on applications for access to documents. The exemption from disclosure of such information is not to protect private rights, rather it is in furtherance of the public interest that information of this kind is excepted from the general right of public access provided the other conditions mentioned in sections 41 and 43 are satisfied. An examination of the other provisions of Part IV of the Act concerning exempt documents confirms this approach."
36 In the NSW context, the "touchstone" in personal affairs cases generally is consideration of section 5(2)(b) of the objects provision of the FOI Act which requires the Tribunal (and administrators making decisions under the FOI Act) to consider whether withholding the documents is "reasonably necessary for the proper administration of the Government".
37 Having considered the documents themselves and all of the evidence and submissions, I am satisfied that withholding the subject documents, for the present, is reasonably necessary for the proper administration of the respondent's functions and disclosure would involve the unreasonable disclosure of information concerning the personal affairs of Dr A.
38 I determine that the decision under review is affirmed."
63The approach to the release of information under the FOI Act is significantly different to that of the GIPA Act. The considerations are not the same as that to which Judicial Member Robinson was referring. Nevertheless, the considerations most aligned are those found in the table to section 14 of the GIPA Act at clause 1 which states:
1 Responsible and effective government
There is a public interest consideration against disclosure of information if disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to have one or more of the following effects (whether in a particular case or generally):
(a) ...,
(d) prejudice the supply to an agency of confidential information that facilitates the effective exercise of that agency's functions,
...
(f) prejudice the effective exercise by an agency of the agency's functions,
(g) found an action against an agency for breach of confidence or otherwise result in the disclosure of information provided to an agency in confidence,
...
64These considerations are relevant to the construction to be given to the HCC Act.
65In this matter, the staff statements have a dual purpose. They were not prepared for the sole purpose of the investigation into the HCCC complaint. However, they were obtained in the exercise of the investigative function. As Judicial Member Robinson observed, the HCCC receives and acts on complaints regarding health practitioners. Its functions involve the collection of a significant amount of confidential and personal information. It is necessary that health practitioners cooperate in these investigations and the protection afforded by section 99A of the HCC Act is a significant factor in obtaining that cooperation. In my view, that protection applies notwithstanding the dual purpose of the staff statements.
66I appreciate that this leads to an unsatisfactory outcome for the Applicant. I do not think that her interest is merely one of curiosity. She has a valid reason for wanting to obtain the statements so as to better understand her treatment. In my view, it is open to the individual authors of the statements to consent to the release. If that consent is given then the conclusive presumption of an overriding public interest against disclosure would not be applicable as section 99A(1)(a) would provide an exemption. However, in the absence of that consent, I agree with the Respondent that there is a conclusive presumption of an overriding public interest against disclosure and the statements should not be released.
67In the circumstances it is not necessary that I consider the relative strengths of the factors in favour of disclosure and those against disclosure. However, I note that under the HCC Act the protection of the health and safety of the public must be the paramount consideration and I am generally of the view that release of information provided in confidence in relation to a complaint might affect the HCCC's ability to carry out investigations and the exercises of its functions. If the individual authors of the statements consent to the release, the Respondent can weigh this against the factors in favour of release and may well form the view that the statements should be released.
68In my view, the Respondent has correctly determined that that there is a conclusive presumption of an overriding public interest against disclosure of the statements. The decision to refuse to release the information should therefore be affirmed.