Perry Properties Pty Ltd v Ashfield Municipal Council

The respondent submits that the provisions of s 79C(1)(b) of the Environmental Planning & Assessment Act ("the EPA Act") draws the distinction between amenity impacts and social impacts and that over-riding such considerations is the question of the public interest as provided by s 79C9(1)(e) of the EPA Act. The respondent submits that whereas the Commissioner found that the consent could be granted from the perspective of the amenity impact he thereafter considered that the social impact was adverse. The Commissioner's finding that there was a reasonable fear of inappropriate behaviour was sufficient to justify the genuine concern and fears in the local community which constituted adverse social impact. It is submitted that perception, fear or concerns as to potential impact, can constitute a social impact and may be given determinative weight in the assessment. Whilst the Commissioner found that sex workers and their patrons did not typically behave in an inappropriate or anti-social manner there was nevertheless the scope to justify the fear of such behaviour.

Cripps J in Venus Enterprises identified the circumstances which could warrant refusal of a development namely, the creation of great offence to a significantly large part of the community. His Honour considered that if such offence was proven to exist, a development could be refused on town planning grounds. Such development might for example be of such type and location as would cause obvious affront to a section of the community because the development would be inimical to the practices or beliefs of that group.

In Kulin, Bignold J determined that ' widespread community reaction' against a development proposal was a factor to be considered in the context of the public interest. The tavern development in Kulin was proposed for a location directly opposite community facilities for families and young persons and was regarded by His Honour as inappropriate because of such juxtaposition.

The Commissioner specifically acknowledged that moral considerations were not regarded by him as sufficient to justify refusal of the application and in doing so adopted Murrell AJ's observation in Liu that:- …a diminished enjoyment of the perceived moral environment (as opposed to the neighbourhood physical environment) is not a matter which may properly be taken into account pursuant to s 90(i)(o) of the Act. The Commissioner continued at [54]:- If Murrell AJ is correct, it would simply be wrong to reject the application based on the number of objections to this proposed brothel. Moreover, if these objections are based on moral concerns again it would be wrong to reject the application.

Whilst this Court is not concerned with morals per se, it is obvious that a development such as a brothel might create repugnant social consequences depending upon numerous factors including proximity to antipathetic development. This was recognised by Murrell AJ when she referred to the fact that certain development could result in ' antagonism between a particular development and the religious or cultural values of an immediately affected and identifiable group' . In refusing leave to appeal against Her Honours decision (see Fairfield City Council v Liu (NSWCA no 40043 of 1998) Mason P made the following observation:- While the morality issue per se is irrelevant the demonstrable social effect of a particular brothel use is relevant under s 90(i) of the Act. Talbot J in Croucher v Fairfield City Council (1997) NSWLEC 88 interpreted Her Honour's judgment in a manner which accorded with the observations of Mason P.

The Commissioner, having determined that moral issues were irrelevant to his determination and that there were no physical amenity issues which warranted rejection of the development found that the residents and others were ' deeply worried about potential inappropriate behaviour of patrons and sex workers in the vicinity generally' which was the basis of the ' widespread, adverse community reaction' that caused ' great offence' . However, the Commissioner had already found as a fact that there was ' no persuasive evidence to support the conclusion that sex workers or their patrons typically behave in an inappropriate or anti-social manner' [42]. Accordingly it is apparent that fear was considered by the Commissioner as sufficient to reject the development application, even though his earlier finding rejected any rational foundation for this fear. There was nothing in the Commissioner's finding beyond the existence of such fear to support the ' widespread adverse community reaction' to the brothel.

Unlike the facts in Kulin the specific location of the proposed brothel was not found to be unsuitable. Nor is there any finding to suggest that offence has been caused to any particular section of the community. There is no finding that the proposed brothel, or its patrons would be atypical. The determinative finding is the existence of a nebulous fear of inappropriate or anti-social behaviour. The Commissioner has already found that such behaviour was not typically associated with this type of development.

A fear or concern without rational or justified foundation is not a matter which, by itself can be considered as an amenity or social impact pursuant to s 79C(1)(b) of the EPA Act. In Jarasius v Forestry Commission of New South Wales & Ors [No 1] (1990) 71 LGRA 79 Hemmings J considered generalised opposition to a proposed development. His Honour said at 92:- The applicant further submits that the wide definition of environment must involve not only the physical environment, but also include the social effects thereof and their impact on the relations between social groupings. It is therefore submitted that it is a relevant consideration as to whether there is likely to be a "significant" effect on the environment that the activity is a substantially controversial one. If that submission means that an activity which is otherwise not likely to significantly affect the environment could be seen to do so merely because it excited opposition by a section of the public, then I reject it. A similar submission was rejected in Newton v Wyong Shire Council (6 September 1983, unreported) and in so doing McClelland J said:- "I had an uneasy feeling that an attempt was being made to smuggle into planning and environmental law a new doctrine which might be expressed as follows: If local residents, however mistakenly, believe that a proposed scheme will be environmentally damaging, that belief is a factor, and an important one, which determining authorities should take into account in reaching their decisions".

A rational fear, or one having a real basis is a matter for consideration. However in view of the factual finding of the Commissioner concerning the absence of anti-social behaviour it is impossible to ascribe any basis to the objectors' concerns which rely upon the very existence of such behaviour. As a result it is an unjustified fear alone which the Commissioner determined was adverse to the application and which the Commissioner found was contrary to the public interest.

As a consequence the Commissioner's conclusion cannot be supported. A finding can be disturbed if there is no evidence to support its inferences: see The Australian Gas Light Co v The Valuer General (1940) 40 SR 126 per Jordan CJ at 138; see also Hope v Bathurst City Council (1980) 144 CLR 1 per Mason J at 10. The appeal accordingly succeeds.

1. The appeal be upheld.
2. The proceedings be referred to Commissioner Bly.
3. The exhibits be returned.

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.

21. Unlike the facts in Kulin the specific location of the proposed brothel was not found to be unsuitable. Nor is there any finding to suggest that offence has been caused to any particular section of the community. There is no finding that the proposed brothel, or its patrons would be atypical. The determinative finding is the existence of a nebulous fear of inappropriate or anti-social behaviour. The Commissioner has already found that such behaviour was not typically associated with this type of development.

22. A fear or concern without rational or justified foundation is not a matter which, by itself can be considered as an amenity or social impact pursuant to s 79C(1)(b) of the EPA Act. In Jarasius v Forestry Commission of New South Wales & Ors [No 1] (1990) 71 LGRA 79 Hemmings J considered generalised opposition to a proposed development. His Honour said at 92:-

The applicant further submits that the wide definition of environment must involve not only the physical environment, but also include the social effects thereof and their impact on the relations between social groupings. It is therefore submitted that it is a relevant consideration as to whether there is likely to be a "significant" effect on the environment that the activity is a substantially controversial one.

If that submission means that an activity which is otherwise not likely to significantly affect the environment could be seen to do so merely because it excited opposition by a section of the public, then I reject it. A similar submission was rejected in Newton v Wyong Shire Council (6 September 1983, unreported) and in so doing McClelland J said:-

"I had an uneasy feeling that an attempt was being made to smuggle into planning and environmental law a new doctrine which might be expressed as follows: If local residents, however mistakenly, believe that a proposed scheme will be environmentally damaging, that belief is a factor, and an important one, which determining authorities should take into account in reaching their decisions".

23. A rational fear, or one having a real basis is a matter for consideration. However in view of the factual finding of the Commissioner concerning the absence of anti-social behaviour it is impossible to ascribe any basis to the objectors' concerns which rely upon the very existence of such behaviour. As a result it is an unjustified fear alone which the Commissioner determined was adverse to the application and which the Commissioner found was contrary to the public interest.

24. As a consequence the Commissioner's conclusion cannot be supported. A finding can be disturbed if there is no evidence to support its inferences: see The Australian Gas Light Co v The Valuer General (1940) 40 SR 126 per Jordan CJ at 138; see also Hope v Bathurst City Council [1980] HCA 16; (1980) 144 CLR 1 per Mason J at 10. The appeal accordingly succeeds.

2. The proceedings be referred to Commissioner Bly.