12 The way section 25 of the Valuation of Land Act is framed, it is necessary to determine the proceedings before one embarks upon the exercise of considering whether or not to award costs. This is because it is impossible to embark on that exercise until one has determined in whose favour the proceedings have been determined. Given the language of the statute, I doubt whether there is any obstacle for an application for costs to be made after the conclusion of the hearing at which the proceedings were determined. In any event I am told, and I accept, that the issue of costs against the Valuer General was in fact raised on 7 August this year and, further, the written application, which was on 28 August 2003 was only three weeks after that hearing. I suspect that the first of the two authorities referred to by Mr Justice O'Bryan in Mansell v Keating, namely the Family Court case of Marriage of Kazimierczak [1987] FLC 76,419 is more applicable than the decision in Mansell itself. In the Family Court case, the court made it clear that where the power to award costs is derived from a statute, as is the case here, any limitation as to the exercise of that power must be found within the statute itself. I see no limitation which would prevent an application for costs being made three weeks after the determination of a proceeding, if indeed it was made three weeks after, contrary to what I said earlier.