Third way Mr Perera put his case
13 At the hearing on 11 December 2019, Mr Perera denied that he was relying on a claim to have a set-off, counter-claim or cross-demand.
14 In the course of the hearing, Mr Perera handed up proposed Additional Orders (as written):
1. Applicant to pay $47,375.45 to the Litigants Fund of the Federal Court of Australia.
2. Respondent to pay the costs of the proceeding in Genworth Financial Mortgage Insurance Pty Ltd v Hodder Rook & Associates Pty Limited (2008/00290472) to the trust account of Australian Securities and Investment Commission.
3. Applicant to release the $47,375.45 in the Litigants Fund of the federal court of Australia, once the respondent pays Australian Securities and Investment Commission the costs of the proceedings in Genworth Financial Mortgage Insurance Pty Limited v Hodder Rook & Associates Pty Limited (2008/00290472).
4. The bankruptcy notice number 242810 issued on 7 August 2019 be set aside.
15 Mr Perera said that he was relying on s 41(6) of the Bankruptcy Act. It is useful to set out ss 41(5) and (6) as follows:
(5) A bankruptcy notice is not invalidated by reason only that the sum specified in the notice as the amount due to the creditor exceeds the amount in fact due, unless the debtor, within the time allowed for payment, gives notice to the creditor that he or she disputes the validity of the notice on the ground of the misstatement.
(6) Where the amount specified in a bankruptcy notice exceeds the amount in fact due and the debtor does not give notice to the creditor in accordance with subsection (5), he or she shall be deemed to have complied with the notice if, within the time allowed for payment, he or she takes such action as would have constituted compliance with the notice if the amount due had been correctly specified in it.
16 It was put to Mr Perera that it was not apparent that his application was based on s 41(6). His response was that he understood the difficulties with establishing mutuality and he therefore brought his case on the basis that the amount of Genworth's costs order "in my submissions, it will be probably completely disappeared but if any form of adjustments then this should be a - the amount stated is not correct" and on the basis that the authorities in his list of authorities support that. Mr Perera relied on Somes v Duke Group Ltd [2000] FCA 248 at [26], Hamilton v Warne [1907] HCA 24; 4 CLR 1293; (said to be citing para 3 at lines 9-24, but this is not a comprehensible citation); and Burton v Belgravia Investments Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1840 at [24].
17 Counsel for Genworth objected to Mr Perera raising this argument to set aside the bankruptcy notice at this time on the bases that:
(1) While the authorities on which Mr Perera relies are uncontroversial in stating the principle that a bankruptcy notice which is overstated may be a nullity, those cases are premised on there being an overstatement. There is nothing in what Mr Perera said at any of the case management hearings or in his submissions which raises a "spectre of an argument" that there had been an overstatement, nor is there anything in his evidence that suggests that moneys have been paid to Genworth or that there is overstatement in the bankruptcy notice. Rather, Mr Perera has relied on what he terms a "third party judgement".
(2) On 15 October 2019 the solicitors for Genworth wrote to Mr Perera in the following terms:
We refer to the case management hearing before Farrell J on 11 October 2019.
We understand from your submissions at the case management hearing that:
1. You no longer say that you have the benefit of any debt assigned to you;
2. You say instead that the Bankruptcy Notice issued to you should be set aside as:
a) You have a judgment against Hodder Rook & Associates Pty Ltd (HRA);
b) HRA has an entitlement to costs against your client; and
c) Once HRA obtains payment for that asserted entitlement to costs from our client, you will then pay the money you owe to our client.
Please provide your confirmation by reply email that the above accurately sets out the basis upon which you say that the Bankruptcy Notice should be set aside.
Genworth's solicitors say that there was no reply to those this email.
18 Mr Perera argued that saying that the debt had been paid by tripartite set-off is, in effect, saying that the bankruptcy notice is overstated. He confirmed that he was relying on a tripartite set-off, but said that he was not relying on mutuality to do so. On that basis he proposed the Additional Orders; if he pays money to the Litigants' Fund, Genworth is assured that it will receive the moneys once they have paid the amount of costs payable referable to the notice of discontinuance to ASIC in relation to Hodder Rook, which is deregistered. It will not matter if Hodder Rook has other creditors. Mr Perera made submissions relating to the impact of Hodder Rook being de-registered having regard to ss 601AA - 601AE of the Corporations Act, and in particular s 601AE, to the effect that ASIC must behave like Hodder Rook itself when it receives money. After the money is paid to ASIC in accordance with the second Additional Order, he will put his claim under Mr Perera's costs order to ASIC and if he gets something from the moneys paid to ASIC, that will be that. While there may not be evidence before the Court as to Hodder Rook's liabilities, if he gets something from ASIC, then the bankruptcy notice must have been overstated within the meaning of s 41(6) of the Bankruptcy Act.
19 Counsel for Genworth relied on written submissions. Counsel submitted that, while the Court may have power to make the first Additional Order, it would not properly make the second order on the basis that it affects ASIC's rights and ASIC is not a party. In any event, the amount (if any) that should be paid under the second Additional Order is unknown as any entitlement Hodder Rook may have to costs as a result of the notice of discontinuance have not been assessed. The third Additional Order would obviate the purpose of the Litigant's Fund, if the person paying money into it controlled the disposition of those funds. Further, Hodder Rook has ceased to exist and there is no evidence of Hodder Rook's financial position (importantly, its creditors). There is therefore no evidence before the Court that could, on a rational basis, establish that the amount claimed in the bankruptcy notice would be reduced at all.
20 The Court finds that, while Mr Perera's argument is creative, it cannot be accepted.
21 First, Mr Perera made no express reference to ss 41(5) or 41(6) in any of his evidence or submissions prior to it being raised orally at the hearing on 11 December 2019. It appears to be designed to side-step the requirement for mutuality, but it does not do so successfully. The Court rejects the proposition that any amount which Mr Perera might receive from Hodder Rook at some time in the future results in an overstatement of his debt to Genworth under Genworth's costs order.
22 Second, in any event, as submitted by counsel for Genworth, Mr Perera did not give notice that he claimed that the bankruptcy notice was overstated as required by s 41(5) of the Bankruptcy Act and Mr Perera has not tendered any amount which (on his argument) might have been correctly stated in the bankruptcy notice. It would have been impossible for him to do so as any costs payable to Hodder Rook by Genworth as a result of the notice of discontinuance have not been assessed and there is no evidence of Hodder Rook's liabilities to creditors other than Mr Perera, so that, even if Mr Perera were otherwise correct in his arguments (which the Court does not accept), he has not established the amount by which the bankruptcy notice is overstated or that it is overstated at all. The authorities on which Mr Perera relied are predicated on there being an overstatement.
23 Third, these proceedings are not the appropriate venue in which to make the Additional Orders which are, in effect, orders for the enforcement of Hodder Rook's costs entitlement (if any) under the notice of discontinuance. It would not be appropriate to grant Mr Perera effective control of the release of moneys paid to the Litigants' Fund. As ASIC has not been given an opportunity to make submissions as to the effect of ss 601AA-601AE. In light of the foregoing it is both unnecessary and inappropriate to analyse Mr Perera's arguments concerning the proper interpretation of those sections.