Planning approach
The amending SEPP
28Mr Larkin, for the council, and Mr Staunton, for the applicant, agree that the effect of the amending SEPP is to repeal SEPP (ARH) in its application to development applications of the type before the Court subject to the savings provision in cl 54A(2) and that under s39 (2) of the Land and Environment Court Act , the Court is required to apply cl 54A(3). They further agree that the amendment is 'imminent and certain' but disagree on the weight to be given.
29Mr Larkin submits that 'the effective repeal of the SEPP is a matter to which the Court should attach great weight as a relevant consideration under s79C and of itself is a reason for refusal'. He refers to Terrace Towers v Sutherland Shire Council [2003] NSWCA 289, where Mason P held at [51]:
Cowdroy J did not err in law in paying significant weight to the fact that LEP 2000 was actually in force at the time of the proceedings before him. It remained a draft instrument as far as the proposal was concerned, by virtue of the command of the transitional provision. Section 79C(1)(a)(ii) nevertheless authorised the consent authority to pay regard to relevant provisions in a draft instrument. Its provisions had become certain and its commencement imminent (in relation to the date of lodgment of the instant development application). Common sense explains why significant regard may be given to one whose commencement is imminent and whose terms have become certain. "Imminence" indicates close temporal proximity of application, but stops short of "presence" or "arrival".
30Mr Staunton refers to the decision of Lloyd J in Blackmore Design Group v North Sydney Council [2001] 118 LGERA 290 at [30] where His Honour states:
Whether one applies the test of "significant weight", or "some weight", or "considerable weight" or "due force" or "determining weight" to the later instrument is not, however, the end of the matter. The savings clause still has some work to do. The proposed development is a permissible development by dint of the savings clause. In giving the 2001 LEP the weight of being imminent and certain, that does not mean that there is no further inquiry. It is necessary to look at the aims and objectives of the later instrument and then see whether the proposed development is consistent therewith. Various expressions have been used to define this concept, but the approach which has been favoured in the Court of Appeal is to ask whether the proposal is "antipathetic" thereto (Coffs Harbour Environment Centre Inc v Coffs Harbour City Council (1991) 74 LGRA 185 at 193).
31Mr Staunton submits that the amending SEPP does not contain aims or objectives nor does it alter the stated aims of SEPP (ARH) in cl 3. In Mr Staunton's submission, the proposal is consistent with these aims and the amending SEPP is not a reason to refuse the application.
Findings
32I accept that the amending SEPP is imminent and certain and that it must be given significant weight. However, this does not mean that the development should automatically fail, as it would be prohibited under the amending SEPP. Rather, the 'savings clause still has some work to do'. Clause 54A(2) provides that the application may be determined as if the amending SEPP had not been made. The proposal therefore remains permissible and the aims and relevant provisions of SEPP (ARH) apply. Clause 54A(3) includes the additional requirement that consent must not be granted to the development unless the compatibility of the design of the development with the character of the local area has been considered (the Character Test). This is the key question before the Court.
Non discretionary development standards
33The other matter in dispute between the parties is whether cl 14(1) is a non discretionary development standard.
34Mr Staunton submits that in accordance with s79C(2) and s79C(6)(b) of the EPA Act, cl 14 (1) is a non discretionary development standard. The proposal complies with cl 14(1) and therefore its requirements cannot be taken into further consideration in the application of the Character Test and the relevant principles of SEPP 65.
35Mr Staunton submits that if cl 14(1) is not a non discretionary development standard 'then it must follow that there are no non discretionary development standards contained in SEPP (ARH) not withstanding their express identification in clause 3 and the use of the words 'A consent authority must not refuse consent...' which is entirely co-incident with the terminology used in s79C(2)(b) of the EP&A Act to describe non discretionary development standards. This would give the words in cl 3 no work to do'.
36Mr Larkin submits that cl 14(1) is not a non discretionary development standard as defined by s79C(6)(b) of the EPA Act as it is not explicitly or implicitly identified in SEPP (ARH) as a non discretionary development standard and therefore s79C(2) does not apply.
37Mr Larkin acknowledges that it is possible for an instrument to implicitly identify a development standard as a non discretionary development standard but that 'the Court will not, by a process of implication, read words into a statutory instrument which are not there' (see R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681). Further, the onus is on the Applicant 'to identify the terms of the implication, and to explain why it should be made, bearing in mind that what is involved is an exercise in construction' (see Carr v Western Australia (2007) 232 CLR 138 at [6]).
38Mr Larkin submits that the implied identification of cl 14(1) as a non discretionary development standard:
is inconsistent with the express terms of cl 16 of the SEPP. In any legal instrument, nothing can be implied that is inconsistent with the express words of the instrument.... (see BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Hastings Shire Council [1977] HCA 40; (1977) 52 ALJR 20 at [26])
39In Mr Larkin's submission, the implied identification of cl 14(1) as a non discretionary development standard must be 'something in this policy' which would then affect the application of SEPP 65 as the consent authority 'is not entitled to take those standards into further consideration in determining the development application' under s79C(2). This would affect the consideration of the design principles required by cl 30(2)(b) of SEPP 65 and is therefore inconsistent with the express terms of cl 16 of SEPP (ARH).
40Mr Larkin submits that the implication that cl 14(1) is a non-discretionary development standard must be a 'process of the words actually used in SEPP (ARH)'. The only explicit reference to non discretionary development standards is in cl 3(b) of SEPP (ARH) and there is nothing that connects this to cl 14(1) or that 'requires cl 14(1) in its application to a development of the type before the Court to be a non discretionary development standard in order to achieve the particular purpose specified in... cl 3(b)'.
41Further, Mr Larkin submits that as cl 14(1) is not a non discretionary development standard the consideration of the principles in SEPP 65 and the Character Test is not limited by the restrictions imposed by s 79C(2). Matters such as density, bulk and scale can relevantly be considered despite the developments compliance with the density standard in cl 14(1)(a)(ii).
Findings
42Section 79C(2) of the EPA Act provides that:
If an environmental planning instrument or a regulation contains non-discretionary development standards and development, not being complying development, the subject of a development application complies with those standards, the consent authorit y :
(a) is not entitled to take those standards into further consideration in determining the development application, and
(b) must not refuse the application on the ground that the development does not comply with those standards, and
(c) must not impose a condition of consent that has the same, or substantially the same, effect as those standards but is more onerous than those standards,
and the discretion of the consent authority under this section and section 80 is limited accordingly.
43Section 79C(6)(b) defines non discretionary development standards to mean:
"non-discretionary development standards" means development standards that are identified in an environmental planning instrument or a regulation as non-discretionary development standards.
44Section 4 of the EPA Act defines development standard as:
"development standards" means provisions of an environmental planning instrument or the regulations in relation to the carrying out of development, being provisions by or under which requirements are specified or standards are fixed in respect of any aspect of that development, including, but without limiting the generality of the foregoing, requirements or standards in respect of:
(a) the a r ea, shape or frontage of any land, the dimensions of any land, buildings or works, or the distance of any land, building or work from any specified point,
(b) the proportion or percentage of the area of a site which a building or work may occupy,
(c) the character, location, siting, bulk, scale, shape, size, height, density, design or external appearance of a building or work,
(d) the cubic content or floor space of a building,
(e) the intensity or density of the use of any land, building or work,
(f) the provision of public access, open space, landscaped space, tree planting or other treatment for the conservation, protection or enhancement of the environment,
(g) the provision of facilities for the standing, movement, parking, servicing, manoeuvring, loading or unloading of vehicles,
(h) the volume, nature and type of traffic generated by the development,
(i) road patterns,
(j) drainage,
(k) the carrying out of earthworks,
(l) the effects of development on patterns of wind, sunlight, daylight or shadows,
(m) the provision of services, facilities and amenities demanded by development,
(n) the emission of pollution and means for its prevention or control or mitigation, and
(o) such other matters as may be prescribed.
45Clause 14(1) includes standards that cannot be used to refuse consent which include density and scale, site area, landscaped area, deep soil zones and solar access. These are numerical standards with which the proposal complies.
46I am persuaded by Mr Larkin that for a residential flat development, where SEPP 65 is applicable, cl 14(1) of SEPP (ARH) is not a non discretionary development standard within the meaning of s 79C(2) and 79C(6)(b) of the EPA Act. Clause 14(1) is not expressly identified in SEPP (ARH) as a non discretionary development standard and its implied identification would be inconsistent with the express terms of cl 16.
47The finding that cl 14(1), for the type of development before the Court, is not a non discretionary development standard does not mean that there are no such standards implicitly identified in SEPP (ARH) or that the aims in cl 3(b) have no work to do.
48Even if I am wrong in this conclusion, the development standards in cl 14(1) are 'quantitative' standards whereas a 'qualitative' assessment is required for the consideration of the Design Principles in SEPP 65 and the 'Character Test' in the amending SEPP. While FSR is an aspect of density, scale and building bulk, it is not the only matter to be considered in addressing these principles. Numerical compliance does not preclude an assessment of the location, distribution or arrangement of FSR on a site, the design and articulation of the building in which the FSR is accommodated and its physical impacts. Section 79(2)(a) precludes further consideration of numerical development standard in determining the application but not an assessment of the qualitative aspects of the development.