Pekbilimli v Regina

Ground 1 - "Backdate not granted" 13 On 18 March 2004 the applicant was sentenced to imprisonment for 6 years from 25 July 2002 with a non-parole period of 2 years and 6 months to expire on 24 January 2005 in respect of offences involving break, enter and steal. He was released to parole in respect of that sentence on 24 January 2005. The subject offence was committed whilst the applicant was on parole. 14 The applicant was arrested in respect of the subject offence on 28 September 2005. Bail was refused. 15 On 21 October 2005 the applicant's parole was revoked and he was ordered to serve the balance of term to commence on 28 September 2005 and expire on 3 October 2008. 16 The non-parole period imposed for the subject offence was made concurrent with the period of imprisonment to be served in consequence of the breach of parole save for the period between 3 October 2008 and 11 November 2008.

17 The Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (the Act) s 47 provides: (1) A sentence of imprisonment commences: (a) subject … to any direction under subsection (2), on the day on which the sentence is imposed… (2) A court may direct that a sentence of imprisonment: (a) is taken to have commenced on a day occurring before the day on which the sentence is imposed,…

(3) In deciding whether or not to make a direction under subsection (2)(a) with respect to a sentence of imprisonment, and in deciding the day on which the sentence is taken to have commenced, the court must take into account any time for which the offender has been held in custody in relation to the offence to which the sentence relates. 18 Section 24 of the Act provides: In sentencing an offender, the court must take into account: (a) any time for which the offender has been held in custody in relation to the offence … 19 Other than in exceptional circumstances, if an offender has been held in custody from the date of arrest to the date of sentence solely in relation to the offence for which he is being sentenced, the Court will backdate the sentence so that it commences upon the date the applicant went into custody referrable to that offence - R v Close (1992) 31 NSWLR 743 at 748, R v Cook [1999] NSWCCA 234 at [39]. 20 However, in this case, the applicant was not in custody from the date of arrest to the date of sentence solely in relation to the offence on 10 July 2005. He was in custody during that period due to both the revocation of his parole for the offences for which he was sentenced on 18 March 2004 and the subject offence on 10 July 2005. As Hunt CJ at CL (as he then was) said in R v Andrews (NSWCCA unreported 28 April 1993): The parole is revoked because, by reason of the further offence committed, it has been demonstrated that the applicant was unable to adapt to normal lawful community life and therefore is no longer entitled to parole in relation to the earlier offence. 21 In Callaghan v R [2006] NSWCCA 58 this Court per Simpson J (James and Hall JJ agreeing), held a sentencing judge has a discretion to backdate to some point (not necessarily to the date of revocation of the parole) even where the period in custody is not wholly the result of the offence for which the applicant is being sentenced. 22 Such a discretion is a wide one. In Markarian v R (2005) 215 ALR 213 at [27] the High Court confirmed: Judges at first instance are to be allowed as much flexibility in sentencing as is consonant with consistency of approach and as accords with the statutory regime that applies. 23 The subject offence was a significant one. It was committed in circumstances where imprisonment for previous similar offences had had no effect, where the offence was committed in breach of parole and where it was, as his Honour observed, an offence which was both serious and odious. To back date the subject sentence from the date of its imposition would, depending on the extent of the backdate, have resulted in the non-parole period of the subject sentence being entirely, or almost entirely, subsumed by the balance of the parole sentence. This, in all probability, would result in the applicant receiving no actual punishment for the subject offence.

24 In the circumstances the sentencing Judge chose not to backdate the sentence. In my opinion this course was open to him in the proper exercise of his sentencing discretion. In my opinion no error by the sentencing judge has been demonstrated and this ground of appeal fails.

Ground 2 - No pre-sentence report 25 No pre-sentence report was before the sentencing judge. No pre-sentence report was requested by the parties or the court. There is no statutory requirement that such a report be provided in a case of this nature. The applicant obtained a report from the psychologist Dr Taylor. That report was before the sentencing Judge. It was comprehensive and contained material favourable to the applicant, more so than a pre-sentence report was likely to have done. The pre-sentence report may have referred to alternative sentencing options but this would have been irrelevant, there being no realistic sentencing option other than full time custody. In my opinion no useful purpose would have been served by obtaining a pre-sentence report. This ground of appeal fails. 26 The applicant in an undated hand written document headed "Grounds of Appeal" had asserted his legal representation was "very bad" and that he was not in the courtroom when matters relating to his case were discussed. No details of these matters were provided by the applicant and they were not pursued by him at the hearing of the application. The facts available to the court do not suggest that, if there were any deficiencies in either regard, they resulted in any prejudice to the applicant. Conclusion

27 This is a court of error. Its powers in respect of an appeal on sentence are prescribed by s 6(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912. The court will interfere with the sentence imposed in the court below only if it be shown that the sentencing judge was in error and then only if it forms the positive opinion that some other, less severe, sentence is warranted in law and should have been passed - R v Simpson (2001) 53 NSWLR 704 at [79]. 28 In my opinion error has not been established nor has it been established that some other sentence, less severe, is warranted in law and should have been passed. Accordingly, whilst I would grant leave to appeal, I would dismiss the appeal. 29 I propose the following orders: (1) Leave to appeal granted.

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