The plaintiff's credibility
103The plaintiff impressed me as a man who believed that he was telling the truth, but was not in fact doing so. He was adamant about certain things, which I do not accept to be true. For example:
(1) His evidence that he did not ever go back and write anything in his diary after the event was, in my view, contradicted by the entries of 18 September 2007 and 11 August 2008.
(2) He was definite that the "green book" remained in his house at all times and that he had never taken it to a doctor's appointment, and yet he was ultimately forced to concede that he had taken it with him when he saw Dr Fowler on 8 October 2007.
(3) His evidence on commission was to the effect that he was dependent on his diary for many matters and yet the crucial symptoms which he would have me believe he told the defendant on 18 September 2007 do not appear in the diary entry for that day.
(4) His evidence that as his symptoms got worse he made more diary entries is not borne out by the diaries themselves, where the most detailed entry of what purportedly happened is for the 18 September 2007. Many consultations in 2008 had no diary entries at all, or none that recorded much beyond the time and place of the appointment.
104I do not accept the plaintiff's recollection of the18 September 2007 consultation. The consultation was one of many consultations about which he was asked questions but it is the only one that the plaintiff purports to remember well. He has little, if any, recollection of consultations that occurred considerably later. This tells against his credibility.
105Furthermore, if the plaintiff's evidence that he wrote the entry for 18 September 2007 that night were true, then the detailed entry would have been in the diary when he took it with him to Dr Fowler on 8 October 2007 with his list of complaints to impart and discuss. It is unlikely that, had he taken the trouble to document in such extraordinary detail what had occurred on 18 September 2007, he would not have related it to Dr Fowler on 8 October 2007, particularly in circumstances where the consultation on 8 October 2007 was, as appears from Dr Fowler's letter reporting to the defendant, entirely devoted to taking a history from the plaintiff. This is particularly so, in light of the plaintiff's evidence that, for some unexplained reason, he had lost trust in the defendant at that time.
106I do not consider the plaintiff to have provided a satisfactory explanation of the portion of the entry for 18 September 2007 that remains cut out. It is an open question whether it contained something detrimental to his case. Whether the missing portion contained something which betrayed its lack of contemporaneity is a matter which is not resolved by the evidence. I infer, however, in light of what I find to be an unsatisfactory explanation for its removal, that its inclusion would not have assisted the plaintiff's case.
107I do not accept the plaintiff's submission that his diaries operated as an aide-memoire. While it is true that the plaintiff cannot be criticised for not keeping notes of consultations since, unlike the defendant, he had no obligation to do so, it tells against his credit that he has endeavoured to use his diary entry for 18 September 2007 to give verisimilitude to his evidence about what occurred, when it was not contemporaneous.
108The defendant's unchallenged evidence is that in or about November 2007 he was served with a subpoena in unrelated proceedings brought by the plaintiff in the District Court. The significance of this evidence was not explored at the hearing. However it establishes that the plaintiff at least had the opportunity to have access to the defendant's clinical notes of the consultation on 18 September 2007. When the light of hindsight was shone by the subsequent diagnosis of sacral chordoma on the consultation of 18 September 2007, it is possible that the plaintiff may have inferred from his complaint of pain in the coccyx that he had in fact given a much more detailed history which could have led to an earlier diagnosis. The evidence does not permit me to make a finding on the balance of probabilities.
109I consider the following passage of McLelland CJ in Eq in Watson v Foxman (1995) 49 NSWLR 315 to be particularly apposite to the plaintiff's evidence in the instant case. His Honour said, at 319:
"...human memory of what was said in a conversation is fallible for a variety of reasons, and ordinarily the degree of fallibility increases with the passage of time, particularly where disputes or litigation intervene, and the processes of memory are overlaid, often subconsciously, by perceptions or self-interest as well as conscious consideration of what should have been said or could have been said. All too often what is actually remembered is little more than an impression from which plausible details are then, again often subconsciously, constructed. All this is a matter of ordinary human experience."
110Lord Pearce's dictum in Onassis v Vergottis [1968] 2 Lloyds Rep 403 at 431 is also instructive. I consider that the highlighted passages are apposite to the plaintiff's credibility in the instant case:
"'Credibility' involves wider problems than mere 'demeanour' which is mostly concerned with whether the witness appears to be telling the truth as he now believes it to be... Witnesses, especially those who are emotional, who think that they are morally in the right, tend very easily and unconsciously to conjure up a legal right that did not exist. It is a truism, often used in accident cases, that with every day that passes the memory becomes fainter and the imagination becomes more active. For that reason a witness, however honest, rarely persuades a Judge that his present recollection is preferable to that which was taken down in writing immediately after the accident occurred. Therefore, contemporary documents are always of the utmost importance. And lastly, although the honest witness believes he heard or saw this or that, is it so improbable that it is on balance more likely that he was mistaken? On this point it is essential that the balance of probability is put correctly into the scales in weighing the credibility of a witness. And motive is one aspect of probability. All these problems compendiously are entailed when a Judge assesses the credibility of a witness; they are all part of one judicial process. And in the process contemporary documents and admitted or incontrovertible facts and probabilities must play their proper part." [Emphasis added]
111It was my impression that the plaintiff's changes in version were affected by motive, self-interest and wishful thinking. He was a man obsessed with his own health, bodily functions and symptoms. He may have regarded the diagnosis of a large sacral chordoma in January 2009 as an affront, given the numerous relatively trivial complaints about various areas of his body which he had brought to the attention of several medical practitioners over the previous eighteen months, none of which permitted the diagnosis to be made. His desire to cast blame on a member of the medical profession for his imminent demise may be understandable, but was not, in my view, well-founded. It led him to reconstruct the past and to insert entries into his diary which were not contemporaneous and which, at least in part, fitted his preferred hypothesis.