Confidentiality of the amount of compensation
42 The parties joined in submitting that the Court should make an order preserving the confidentiality of the amount of compensation. They sought the making of that order pursuant to s 37AG(1)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) on the ground that it is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice.
43 The Court invited separate submissions as to the appropriateness of the confidentiality order. In support of the application, SANTS provided an affidavit from Mr Pearson, the first of the named claimants. Mr Pearson's affidavit discloses the following:
(a) the negotiations which the Applicant conducted with the State were on a confidential basis and the Applicant had understood, at the time of the negotiations, that the amount agreed upon would be kept confidential;
(b) the amount of compensation is a compromise figure taking into account both legal and factual uncertainties and, further, the Applicant's desire to avoid further disclosure of the highly secret men's law to which reference was made earlier; and
(c) the potential for there to be a critique in the wider Aboriginal community, and in particular amongst the Western Desert People, of the compensation amount. Such a critique may be positive or negative, informed or uniformed, merited or unwarranted.
44 More generally, both the Applicant and the State submitted that the prospect of the compensation sum being kept confidential was a significant factor in the obtaining of agreement. Both parties pointed out that the principles concerning the assessment of compensation under s 51 of the NT Act are still not finally settled, even taking account of the first instance decision in Griffiths v Northern Territory of Australia (No 3) [2016] FCA 900, (2016) 337 ALR 362 and the Full Court decision in Northern Territory of Australia v Griffiths [2017] FCAFC 106, (2017) 346 ALR 247 and that the compromise was reached in this particular context.
45 Both parties referred to the suppression order made by Mansfield J in De Rose v State of South Australia [2013] FCA 988. That suppression order also concerned the amount of the compensation. Mansfield J gave three reasons for concluding that suppression of the amount of the compensation was necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, as the following passage indicates:
[82] … The disclosure of that figure, where there are presently no decisions addressing in a reasoned way how compensation under the [NT Act] is to be assessed, may create expectations either on the part of other applicants or on the part of other States or Territories in other matters which private consensual agreement should not produce. In addition, the disclosure of that figure may be seen to set a tariff for other compensation claims that it would be quite inappropriate to set as each set of circumstances will necessarily be different. It may therefore impede independent negotiation by the State or by other States or Territories or other compensation claims. Finally, the disclosure of that figure may draw attention to the Nguraritja, and may invite criticism - positive or negative - from other compensation claimants under the [NT Act] in a way which would be unfair. It may also invite criticism - positive or negative - of the State itself. The unfairness would flow from the fact that, as the figure has been agreed in private mediation and negotiations, it is not possible to know the detailed considerations which led to the agreement. All of those factors mean that disclosure of that figure may impede the prospects of satisfactory negotiation of other compensation claims. That would impede and prejudice the proper administration of justice, especially where the [NT Act] encourages the negotiated outcome of applications under it.
46 There are some countervailing considerations. These include the importance of the open justice principle, the fact that the compensation involves expenditure of public money and the interests of transparency and accountability with respect to the compensation sum. Further, things have moved on since the decision in De Rose. There are now the two decisions in Griffiths to which reference was made earlier. It is also reasonable to think that, in some respects, the disclosure of the compensation figure in this case may facilitate negotiations in other matters.
47 Nevertheless, I am persuaded that the suppression is appropriate, in particular having regard to the matters to which Mr Pearson deposed and the considerations to which Mansfield J referred in De Rose. In addition, I have taken account of the evident policy of the NT Act to encourage the resolution of matters by agreement, and the circumstance that, this being an early compensation case, the parties conducted their negotiations on the basis of an expectation of confidentiality. The circumstance that the applications for special leave to appeal to the High Court in Griffiths remain undetermined at this is also material, as it indicates that, even in those matters, finality in the proper approach to the assessment of compensation has not been achieved.
48 In this combination of circumstances, I accept that the maintenance of confidentiality of the compensation sum is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice. I attach particular significance to the basis upon which the parties negotiated having regard to the confidentiality order made in De Rose. I observe that in the future when the principles concerning the assessment of compensation become more settled, parties may not be able to proceed on that assessed basis, especially having regard to the countervailing considerations to which I have referred.
49 Accordingly, the Compensation Agreement to which reference is made in the Orders is attached in a redacted form. The un-redacted version of the Compensation Agreement will also be attached but in a sealed envelope which is marked that it is not to be opened without the leave of a Judge of this Court.