Compliance with the Grant Requirement
31In order for the Applicants to succeed in overturning the Assessments they must prove on the balance of probability that they satisfied the Grant Requirement, that is, that subject to relevant exceptions, neither of them previously had a relevant interest in residential property.
32At its highest the Respondent's position is that:
(1) either Mr Simpson knew of, but has forgotten, his purchase and ownership of the Drummoyne property and therefore the Grant Requirement is not satisfied or Mr Simpson did not know of his purchase of the Drummoyne property but because title to the Drummoyne property was registered in his name and there is no relevant fraud on his part then, because of the principle of indefeasibility of title, Mr Simpson became the owner of a relevant interest in the Drummoyne property.
(2) There is no exception which precludes Mr Simpson having held a relevant interest in the Drummoyne property. In particular the registered Caveat is merely a claim that Mr Simpson held his interest as constructive trustee. That claim has not been tested or upheld in any court proceedings and there is no evidence of an order imposing that trust. Accordingly the Applicants, on whom the onus of proving their case on the balance of probability lies, have not proven the existence of the trust and the trust exception does not apply.
33I accept the general thrust of the Respondent's submissions as to indefeasibility of title of a registered proprietor, subject to relevant fraud and other exceptions such as the registered proprietor holding the property on trust.
34I note that despite efforts to do so neither party has successfully located a witness to the alleged signature by Mr Simpson to the Sale Transfer nor has the solicitor G.B. Burge been located. Both Mr Simpson's parents have passed away and cannot shed any light on the events involving the Drummoyne property from 1986 to 1988.
35I find that Mr Simpson is a witness of truth and accept his evidence that he was not aware at any relevant time:
(1) of the purchase of the Drummoyne property in 1986 in his name;
(2) of the sale of the property, apparently by him, in 1988 to his father;
(3) of the Caveat lodged over the title to the property in favour of his mother and father.
36Mr Simpson has acknowledged that the signatures and initials on the Mortgage are similar to his signature and initials and that from time to time when his father asked him to sign various documents he did so as he trusted his father. I note that the Mortgage identifies the mortgaged property by reference to title details and not by street address. I find that:
(1) it is more probable than not that Mr Simpson did sign and initial the Mortgage as mortgagor;
(2) this action occurred at the request of Mr Simpson's father; and
(3) Mr Simpson had no knowledge or understanding at the time he signed the Mortgage of the content or effect of the document nor that title to the Drummoyne property was registered in his name.
37Mr Simpson submitted that the purchase of the Drummoyne property in his name and its subsequent transfer to his father, both events occurring without his knowledge or consent are "dishonest and fraudulent practices committed by others". The Applicants have not alleged any fraud on the part of the person who transferred the Drummoyne property to Mr Simpson. Rather the Applicants submit that relevant fraud was committed by the person or persons who, unbeknown to Mr Simpson, used his name as the registered proprietor both for the purpose of registering title to the Drummoyne property and then for the purpose of transferring that title to Mr Simpson's father.
38Counsel for the Respondent submitted:
"The exception in the case of fraud has been interpreted as requiring actual fraud, that is, personal dishonesty or moral turpitude on the part of the registered proprietor." and "Fraud by a person or persons from whom the registered proprietor claims will not affect him or her, unless knowledge of it is brought home to the registered proprietor or his or her agents." (Supplementary submissions paragraphs 17 and 18)."
39It is not necessary to make a finding in relation to these submissions.
40The Purchase Transfer appears to be signed by G.B. Burge as solicitor for the transferee, that is solicitor for Mr Simpson. Mr Simpson's evidence, which I accept, is that he did not instruct G.B. Burge or any other person to act on his behalf in relation to any dealings involving the Drummoyne property. Accordingly he did not authorise G.B. Burge expressly or by implication to execute the Purchase Transfer on his behalf.
41The Respondent accepted the signature of G.B. Burge as solicitor on the Purchase Transfer on behalf of Mr Simpson as transferee and, at least impliedly, submits that there is no evidence of relevant fraud by the transferee or his agents and that merely because Mr Simpson may not have assented to a transaction (the registration in his name of title to the Drummoyne property), this does not amount to relevant fraud (paragraphs 18 and 24 of the Respondent's supplementary submissions).
42The Caveat which forms part of the Respondent's evidence is apparently signed by G.B. Burge as solicitor for the Caveator (Mr Simpson's parents) and states that the Caveator claimed "an equitable estate in fee simple" of the Drummoyne property "as beneficiaries of a constructive trust under which the registered proprietor (Mr Simpson) holds an estate or interest in fee simple...".
43The Respondent submitted in relation to the Caveat that the claim that Mr Simpson held his interest as constructive trustee for his parents "has not been tested or upheld in any Court proceedings. The fact that a claim is made in a caveat does not mean that it will ultimately be upheld by the Court". The Respondent further submitted that although a constructive trust may be imposed by order of the court in a range of circumstances ... "There is no evidence that any order was made in this case (or that there were proper grounds for so doing)" and "the Applicants have not provided any evidence of the circumstances in which it could be said that a constructive trust arose".
44The authority referred to by the Respondent consists of some extracts from Halsbury's Laws of Australia from [205-6100] to [205-6140]. At paragraph [205-6100] appears the statement "a constructive trust will be imposed over a property in circumstances where it would be a fraud for the legal owner to assert a beneficial interest in the property" and at paragraph [205-6140] "a constructive trust may be enforced as a trust even though it is not evidenced in writing and the trust creates an interest in land." Such a trust is (at [205-6100]) "imposed by the court regardless of the intention of the parties in order to satisfy the demands of justice and good conscience." Counsel for the Respondent included in the Respondent's authorities extracts from Jacobs' Law of Trusts in Australia by JD Heydon and MJ Leeming, Lexis Nexis Butterworths Australia 2006. The learned authors state at paragraph [1301] "the constructive trust ... is raised by operation of law" and "equity does not construct the trust, rather it attaches legal consequences to the circumstances".
45With respect I adopt the principles enunciated above. Accordingly not only is writing not required in order to create a constructive trust, the trust is created by operation of law, not by an order of a court. A relevant court may make an order imposing the legal consequences of actions which created the trust but the court does not itself create the trust.
46Both the Purchase Transfer which gave rise to the Respondent's claim that Mr Simpson held a relevant interest in the Drummoyne property and the Caveat claiming that the Drummoyne property was held by Mr Simpson under a constructive trust were signed by the same G.B. Burge in the first instance as solicitor for Mr Simpson and in the second instance as solicitor for the persons claiming that Mr Simpson held the Drummoyne property as trustee.
47In my opinion it would be unreasonable to assume that there was no relevant constructive trust when the document registering the claim for the existence of that trust, against the interest of Mr Simpson as owner of the property, appears to be executed by the same lawyer who, apparently as solicitor acting on behalf of Mr Simpson, executed the transfer pursuant to which Mr Simpson became registered owner of the property.
48I find, on the balance of probability, that Mr Simpson held the title to the Drummoyne property in his capacity as trustee for his parents from the date of registration of the Purchase Transfer in 1986 until the transfer of the Drummoyne property to his father in 1988.
49The Respondent's submission that the Applicants have not provided any evidence of the circumstances in which it could be said that a constructive trust arose is rejected having regard in substantial part to the documentary evidence produced by the Respondent showing the apparent multiple roles of G.B. Burge and the varying signatures purporting to be those of Mr Simpson on different documents and to the oral evidence of Mr Simpson that he did not sign the Sale Transfer and as to the relationship between Mr Collings and Mr Simpson's father.
50It was open to the Respondent to produce expert evidence to the Tribunal in relation to whether or not signatures purporting to be those of Mr Simpson on various documents, including the Sale Transfer, were signatures of Mr Simpson. The Respondent did not produce any such expert evidence. Rather, Counsel for the Respondent tested Mr Simpson's evidence under cross examination in several respects including in relation to his signature, the extent to which it may have changed over time, and whether or not he had signed the Sale Transfer as transferor. Mr Simpson's evidence was very strongly to the effect that there had been no material change in his signature since 1986 and that he did not sign the Sale Transfer. I accept Mr Simpson's evidence and find that he did not sign the Sale Transfer.
51The decision in Fiegert was to the effect that a person who knew he had a small interest in land forming part of a timeshare resort was not subsequently eligible for a grant. This did not support the Respondent's contention, at paragraph 23 above, that a person could acquire a relevant interest in land without having any relevant knowledge. It is not necessary to comment further on Fiegert or Counsel's contention in this decision.