21 In assessing the objective seriousness of the offence, it is a relevant consideration that the work being performed by Mr Taylor which resulted in the injuries sustained involved a procedure that created a risk to safety. That much is evident, in the first instance, by reference to the Internal Memorandum of the defendant included with the prosecutor's documentary material. That memorandum, dated 15 January 1999, was sent by Mr Frank Hill, Project Engineer with the defendant, to a number of senior management of the defendant. That memorandum dealt with the sludge recycle system. Amongst other matters canvassed in that memorandum was pipe work and blockages. On that issue, Mr Hill wrote:
The two major problems with the pipe work for the sludge system are identification and blockages. Very few of the pipes have any identification labels which makes location difficult for anyone who may not be familiar with the process. Due to various modifications, the pipe runs in certain areas leave a lot to be desired and will cause blockages. To clean pipes, the operators are required to remove valves to gain access to the pipe. This can be unsafe and cause manual handling injuries .
Blockages in pipes have been a major source of the system not being reliable. This causes housekeeping problems, but more seriously creates a safety issue. Operators are put at risk of physical injury and burns from water and sludge at the entry to pumps . It is therefore important to reduce the blockage at the source. This will mean running pumps in a ring main system when not batching. (emphasis added)
22 Clearly, in 1999, the defendant was on notice that the clearing of blockages was a problem and that the need for operators to access the pipes in the way they were required to was 'unsafe'. Further, that blockages in pipes 'creates a safety issue'.
23 Whatever steps may have been taken by the defendant to address the issues raised by Mr Hill, they were clearly inadequate. That much would be evident from the circumstances of the accident to Mr Taylor. However, there is more adverse evidence than that of the defendant's continuing failure to address the need for a safe system of work to clear blockages from pipes used to recycle cement sludge at it's workplace. Incidents which occurred between 1999 and 2002 whereby employees of the defendant sustained injuries while in the process of clearing pipe blockages are as follows:
(i) Mr Jim Beaty on 10 December 1999.
(ii) Mr George Evening on 10 September 2001.
(iii) Mr Mathew Sultana on 11 October 2001.
(iv) Mr Lam Tran on 19 September 2002.
24 Counsel for the defendant submitted that reference to the above earlier incidents for the purposes of emphasizing the reasonable foreseeability of Mr Taylor's accident were not relevant. They were not relevant, it was said, because the above earlier incidents involved the clearing of pipe blockages at number 6 sludge pump and not the main sludge tank transfer pump which was where Mr Taylor suffered his injury. The two pumps 'perform a different function'.
25 That may well be so but ultimately they each pump sludge with the attendant problems of potential blockage and the need for clearing. That much is clear in the penultimate sentence of para [9] of the affidavit of Mr Jarvi, where he stated:
Each one pumps sludge, but at different parts of the plant and in different parts of the process.
26 Further, the memorandum of Mr Hill detailed above makes no distinction between the different functions of pumps at the defendant's premises as far as identifying the safety issues caused by blockages with the pipe work for the sludge system.
27 Against the above background, Mr Taylor's accident was clearly foreseeable. As was stated in Capral, the presence of 'a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury' will necessarily result in the offence being more serious in nature. As such, the starting point for the determination of foreseeability within the context of the objective seriousness of the offence is whether there was 'an obvious or foreseeable risk to safety against which appropriate measures were not taken': Laurenson Diecasting at 476.
28 On the basis of the warning contained in Mr Hill's memorandum in 1999 and the continuing incidents that occurred involving employees of the defendant in the clearing of pipes associated with the sludge recycling system culminating in the accident involving Mr Taylor in 2003, I am satisfied there were clearly foreseeable risks inherent in the clearing of blockages in the defendant's sludge recycle system. Further, I am satisfied that since 1999 at least, the defendant has failed to deal with those clearly foreseeable risks adequately such as to ensure its employees were not exposed to risks to their health and safety in unblocking the sludge cycle pipes.
29 Given the way in which the hot slurry burst from the hose and pump when Mr Taylor opened the pump at the point at which the hose met the pump, it was fortunate that the burns he sustained were not more serious. Certainly, the protective clothing he had on went some way to reducing the impact of what could otherwise have been much more serious injuries.
30 Further, it is relevant to the objective seriousness of an offence to consider if there were readily and easily available remediation steps which could have been undertaken by the defendant before the accident to prevent injury occurring. To put it another way, one should have regard to remediation or the extent of remediation that is done post the accident, as an indication of the extent to which foreseeability of injury was readily identifiable.
31 The affidavit of Ms Knox deposes to those steps the defendant has taken since Mr Taylor's accident. As she stated:
[20] Since the accident, James Hardie continues to be committed to improving its OHS system, as demonstrated by engineering changes that were made to the number 6 sludge test pump (Pump), these include:
(a) replacing the cam-lock with a bauer fitting;
(b) adding a dump value to the pump; and
(c) altering the pump to include flush pipes.
These engineering changes have been designed to eliminate any risk of exposure to hot cement slurry when removing blockages from the pump. Exhibited to me at the time of afffirming this Affidavit and marked 'PK23' is a photograph of the pump taken after these changes were made.
[21] The introduction of the bauer fitting has resulted in three significant safety improvements being made, as the bauer fitting:
(a) requires less force to open the fitting than the cam-lock;
(b) is easier to open at a distance with a rope or similar device than the cam-lock; and
(c) it has a single longer lever (as opposed to the cam-lock having two smaller lever devices) which enables a simpler mechanism to control the opening of the lock.
[22] The introduction of the flush pipes and dump value allow the maintenance operator to further check where a blockage might be located and enables easier access to remove blockages located near the dump valve.
[23] Since the accident, James Hardie has equipped the Rosehill Site with infra-red temperature guns to provide employees with easier access to temperature guns to check the temperature of a machine which could have latent heat.
[24] Since the accident, James Hardie has changed the work instruction in relation to removing blockages from slurry pumps. The new work instruction outlines in detail the steps that should be taken to unblock the sludge pump. This instruction has been communicated to all relevant employees. Exhibited to me at the time of affirming this Affidavit and marked 'PK8' is a copy of the new work instruction, entitled 'RWI-UBP 417, Unblocking the main sludge pump transfer pipes'.
[25] Since the accident, a new procedure has been developed to ensure that employees have considered all the risks before attempting to unblock pumps. The new procedure requires a maintenance operator to obtain a specific clearance to work from their direct supervisor before clearing any blockage. The procedure provides that a maintenance operator must report to their Team Leader so they can discuss and evaluate the task. After the Team Leader has provided a secondary opinion, the Team Leader places his or her personal lock on the machine and provides a written clearance to work for the maintenance operator. After the task has been completed the Team Leader must return to the machine to remove his or her personal lock before the machine can be switched back on. Exhibited to me at the time of affirming this Affidavit and marked 'PK9' is a copy of the Clearance to Work Procedure entitled RWI-450-CC, Clearance Certificate'.
32 Reference to the documented new work instruction RWI-UBP-417 and the Clearance to Work procedure RWI-450-CC annexed to Ms Knox's affidavit confirms the steps taken by the defendant as deposed to by Ms Knox. It must be said, however, that the defendant was not only in a position to have done all it has now done well before the accident but one would wonder why those steps were not taken when the similar incidents occurred to other employees before Mr Taylor.
33 Mr Wawrzyniak deposes to the verbal instructions that he says was in place prior to the accident. He stated:
[5] Prior to the accident to Mr Taylor there was a procedure in place to unblock the sludge pumps. Jason Biggs, the Manufacturing Superintendent, verbally communicated the procedure to James Hardie employees. The general steps that were reiterated to check that it was safe to open were:
(a) Wearing personal protective equipment;
(b) Isolating the pump;
(c) Waiting until latent heat or pressure had dissipated from the sludge pump by:
(i) waiting for up to an hour for the sludge pump to cool;
(ii) hosing cold water over the machine; and
(d) Using an implement, such as a narrow rope, to release the cam-lock on the sludge pump at a distance.
[6] One of the reasons that it is important to wait until the heat has dissipated from the sludge pump before attempting to open the cam-lock is because the heat of the cement slurry does not always transfer to the external metal parts of the pump.
34 It cannot be said with any certainty that Mr Biggs' verbal communication to 'James Hardie employees' included Mr Taylor. Further, there is nothing to confirm when and the circumstances in which such a verbal communication was made. Given the importance of ensuring a safe system in the unblocking of sludge pumps, a 'verbal communication' in the most general sense is inadequate in all the circumstances. The fact that the defendant has pleaded guilty to the offence in the terms pleaded is acknowledgement by the defendant of that inadequacy.
35 I do acknowledge, however, when regard is had to Ms Fox's affidavits as to the extensive training programmes Mr Taylor had undertaken with the defendant between 1998 and 2002 in relation to both trade and safety training matters, that the defendant has an extensive and ongoing programme evincing a proactive commitment to occupational health and safety.
36 I note Ms Knox's affidavit that, prior to the accident in 2003 relevant to this offence, Mr Taylor had been awarded certificates that authorised him to do particular tasks. Those certificates were known as General Clearance to Work Certificates. In 2001, Mr Taylor was awarded such Certificates in relation to 'the mixing station, the silica plant and hot work'. Additionally, in May 2001, Mr Taylor had undertaken and been assessed for Clearance to Work training.
37 The significance of these Clearance for Work Certificates as well as the training undertaken, all completed in 2001, is that it underscores the defendant's proactive attention to training and the assessment of employees in order to ensure they are able to carry out a job safely. In short, whatever inadequacies are highlighted by the accident involving Mr Taylor, they demonstrate an aberration in the defendant's occupational health and safety systems rather than evidence of a systemic disregard for workplace safety.
38 Taking account of the facts and circumstances as well as those considerations identified, I assess the offence objectively as being in the mid range of seriousness.
39 The decision of the Full Bench in Capral clearly indicates that general and specific deterrence are factors that should be given weight in all but exceptional circumstances. The Full Bench said at 643-644 that:
We consider that the extract from the judgment of Hungerford J in Fisher v Samaras Industries Pty Limited accurately states the approach that members of this Court should take in relation to the question of deterrence, both general and personal or specific, when sentencing an offender in relation to a serious breach of the legislation. It follows that those aspects of deterrence are matters which should normally be given weight of some substance in the sentencing process.
40 In respect of specific deterrence, the Full Bench held in Capral at 644-645:
In sentencing, a court may disregard the element of specific deterrence if satisfied that the risk of re-offending is low or non-existent. The court may form such a view as a result of the rehabilitation of the offender: R v Corner (unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, 19 December 1997) or because the offender will not have the opportunity to commit a similar offence in the future: R v Macdonell (unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, 8 December 1995). However, we think it unlikely that the weight to be attached to specific deterrence could be reduced to zero in cases of offences under the Act.
41 The defendant is part of a large multinational corporate structure. As Ms Fox deposed:
[5] James Hardie is a subsidiary of the publicly owned company James Hardie Industries NV. James Hardie was registered as a proprietary limited company on 6 October 1998. In November 1998, James Hardie took over the Rosehill site from an associated entity.
[6] James Hardie's business is purely involved in the business of manufacturing and marketing fibre cement building products.
[7] James Hardie operates three fibre cement plants in Australia at the following sites:
(a) Rosehill in New South Wales;
(b) Carole Park in Queensland; and
(c) Meeandah in Queensland.
[8] As at the end of September 2005, James Hardie employed 573 employees Australia wide, of whom 281 were located at the Rosehill site.
[9] The scope of the operation at the Rosehill Site is such that:
(a) The production capacity is currently 22 million standard yards of product per year; and
(b) The man hours are currently 6,040 hours per week and 314,080 hours per year (depending on the demands in the building industry).
42 On behalf of the defendant, the need for consideration going to general deterrence was acknowledged. In relation to specific deterrence, it was submitted, given all the defendant has undertaken both before and since Mr Taylor's accident, specific deterrence could be disregarded as part of my penalty considerations.
43 I have already acknowledged the defendant's overall proactive commitment to occupational health and safety. Nevertheless, the defendant continues to operate in an industry that presents ongoing and significant responsibilities in order to ensure that it's employees can work in a workplace environment free of risks to safety. In all the circumstances, I believe specific deterrence is relevant to my considerations on penalty tempered by those matters to which I have earlier referred, evincing as they do, a positive commitment to workplace safety.
44 The defendant is entitled to have taken into account it's early plea of guilty. In assessing that, the Court is guided by the decision of R v Thompson; R v Houlton (2000) 49 NSWLR 383, the principles of which are well settled and need no elaboration. I assess that discount at twenty five per cent.
45 It was acknowledged by the prosecutor that the defendant cooperated in relation to it's investigations concerning the accident involving Mr Taylor.
46 On the documentary evidence before me, I am satisfied that the defendant does approach it's occupational health and safety responsibilities as part of a structured and ongoing process with generally commendable results. Overall, the defendant is entitled to be given credit as an employer who is both proactive and properly committed to it's workplace safety responsibilities.
47 I note also Ms Fox's statement on behalf of the defendant to the following effect:
[34] As James Hardie operates a heavy manufacturing industry involving fibre cement manufacture they are acutely aware of the OHS risks in its businesses and James Hardie takes its OHS responsibility very seriously. James Hardie is constantly changing and developing and improving its OHS System. What occurred to Mr Taylor was, and remains a matter of profound regret to James Hardie. On behalf of James Hardie, I would like to express James Hardie's sincere regret that this accident occurred.
48 According to the medical report tendered by the prosecutor, Mr Taylor returned to work with the defendant in June 2003 on light duties. He subsequently accepted a redundancy package in November 2003. He is now employed elsewhere as a maintenance fitter.
49 I am satisfied the defendant is entitled to further favourable consideration by way of mitigation for the subjective features I have identified.
50 The prosecutor has sought a moiety of the penalty imposed. The prosecutor is the Secretary of the Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union (AMWU) New South Wales Branch. His affidavit in support of the moiety stated as follows:
[1] I am the Prosecutor in these proceedings.
[2] The AMWU has an OHS Unit, at the Granville Office, which is headed up by Mr Dave Henry.
[3] The OHS Unit undertakes the following tasks on behalf of the AMWU for AMWU members:
(a) Conducting training as an accredited WorkCover trainer for AMWU members and companies and delivering non-WorkCover OHS training.
(b) Conducting safety inspections at workplaces where the AMWU has award coverage and there is a suspected breach of the OHS Act.
(c) Organising and running the bi-annual AMWU NSW Branch OHS Conference.
(d) Writing OHS newsletters for AMWU members.
(e) Representing the interests of the AMWU with regards to health and safety at Unions NSW.
(f) Negotiating OHS and workers compensation policies and programs with key government departments.
(g) Developing and implementing AMWU campaigns on safety and workers compensation and responding to all branch based enquiries.
[4] I undertake to give any moiety of the penalty ordered to be paid to me by this Court to the AMWU.
[5] I am authorised by the AMWU to give an undertaking that those funds will be used by the AMWU solely for occupational health and safety related purposes.
51 Mr Bastian was not required for cross examination and his affidavit was admitted without objection. Further, no objection was taken by the defendant to the order sought by the prosecutor in relation to a moiety of the penalty.
52 There have been a number of prior first instance decisions of this Court that have dealt with the issue of the allocation of a moiety of the penalty imposed to persons other than the usual statutory authority such as WorkCover, as being within the scope of s122 of the Fines Act 1996: see the decision of Walton J Vice-President in O'Sullivan v The Crown in the Right of the State of New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) [2003] NSWIRComm 303 at [185] - [194]; Haylen J in Coombes v Patrick Stevedores Holdings Pty Limited [2005] NSWIRComm 56 at [101]-[111]; and Boland J in Geoff Derrick v ANZ Group Limited (No 2) [2005] NSWIRComm 145 at [3]-[25]. In each case, for the reasons stated, the Court ordered a moiety of one half of the penalty imposed to be paid to the prosecutor. See also my earlier decisions in Peter Presdee v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2005] NSWIRComm 389 and Geoff Derrick v Westpac Banking Corporation [2006] NSWIRComm 76.
53 As reference to the cases referred to will attest, taken together, they represent an exhaustive consideration of this issue. I do not propose to repeat them in this judgment. Suffice to say, I would concur with the overall conclusion in those judgments that the prosecutor in this matter falls within the scope of s122 of the Fines Act and that the Court has the capacity to order a moiety in his favour. I propose to do so.
Costs