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Judgment 1BASTEN JA: The applicant, Michael Patsalis, is presently serving a sentence of imprisonment following his conviction in 1999 for the crime of murder. An appeal against conviction was unsuccessful. In March 2012 he applied to the Supreme Court for an inquiry into his conviction pursuant to s 78 of the Crimes Appeal and Review Act 2001 (NSW). That application was considered by R A Hulme J and refused on 20 November 2012. Reasons were given for that determination which, whether appropriately or not, are to be found on Caselaw at [2012] NSWSC 1597. The decision, again whether appropriately or not, has been entered as an "order" on the court's computer records, JusticeLink. The applicant now seeks leave to appeal against the refusal of his application. 2The application originally named "Regina" as the respondent, as if this were an appeal in a criminal proceeding. It is not. The Crown Advocate, appearing on behalf of the Attorney General of New South Wales, asserted in a response filed on 11 March 2013 that the application is incompetent because the appeal would be incompetent. On 15 March 2013, the Attorney filed a motion to have the proceedings dismissed pursuant to r 13.4(1)(b) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) ("UCPR"). 3The Attorney's motion was listed for hearing on 20 March 2013. On the previous day the applicant filed an amended draft notice of appeal which sought, in addition to leave to appeal, relief under ss 65 and 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW). The Crown Advocate, appearing for the Attorney, resisted the proposed amendment on the following grounds: (1) prerogative relief could not be sought against a Supreme Court judge; (2) a proceeding for such relief could not be commenced in the Court of Appeal; (3) the decision-maker should have been joined as a party; (4) the proposed reliance on s 69 having been introduced after 15 March 2013, the application was outside the limitation period prescribed by r 59.10; (5) relief should be sought by way of summons and not in a draft notice of appeal; (6) the relief sought was misconceived because the judge had no duty to order an inquiry or a referral to the Court of Criminal Appeal; (7) relief in the nature of a quashing order was unavailable because there had not been a decision affecting legal rights and obligations, and (8) a judge of the Court not being a specified tribunal as defined in s 48(1) of the Supreme Court Act, the proceedings were not properly commenced in this Court. 4On 10 April 2013, the applicant provided a copy of a document entitled "Draft Amended Summons Seeking Leave to Appeal." The document responded to the comments made during the course of the proceedings on 20 March. First, it joined the Attorney General for New South Wales as the first respondent and the decision-maker, R A Hulme J, as the second respondent. It also identified, as "appeal grounds", a number of matters which, at least in form, claimed to be errors of law for which relief might be available in the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court. The orders sought similarly invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court. 5Some of the matters raised by the Crown Advocate, including (1), (6) and (7), go to substantive issues which are not appropriately dealt with by a single judge by an order preventing proceedings from being commenced by way of amended summons. The following matters should, however, be determined. 6First, there is the question of time. Because the decision in question was handed down before the new Pt 59 of the UCPR commenced, it is by no means beyond doubt that the time limit in r 59.10 operates. Even if it does, although the decision was dated 20 November 2012, it was apparently not provided to the applicant until 8 December 2012. On that basis, the three month period would have expired about 11 days before the applicant provided to the Court and to the Crown Advocate his proposed application seeking to rely upon s 69 of the Supreme Court Act. In those circumstances, were an extension of time necessary, it should be granted. 7Secondly, the Crown Advocate submits that the proceedings cannot be commenced in this Court, although she concedes that they might be commenced in a Division and transferred to this Court (or indeed commenced in this Court and transferred to a Division) if necessary. The argument is unattractive for a number of reasons. The first is that any challenge to a decision of a judge in a Division should properly be determined in this Court and not in the Division. Secondly, this Court may in any proceedings before it, "exercise any power, jurisdiction or authority of the court": Supreme Court Act, s 44. The Court would not willingly conclude that an available jurisdiction could not be exercised because of an absence of procedure for commencing the proceeding. 8Thirdly, s 48, which assigns certain matters to this Court, includes such matters "as are necessary or convenient for the discharge of the functions of the Court of Appeal": Supreme Court Act, s 48(2)(j). 9There remains a question as to whether the supervisory jurisdiction of the court extends to a decision, not being an appellable judicial decision, of a judge of the Court. If the Attorney seeks to argue that it does not, such an argument may raise an issue as to the scope of the principles articulated in Kirk v The Industrial Court of New South Wales [2010] HCA 1; 239 CLR 531. That is not a matter appropriate for determination by a single judge of the Court; indeed, it may require notices to be given under s 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). The applicant also refers in his submissions to sections in the Judiciary Act and to the principle identified in Kirk. Accordingly, the parties should consult as to the appropriate form of the s 78B, to be provided by the Attorney. 10Putting the last matter to one side, the other procedural steps should not preclude a grant of leave to amend the summons to seek relief in the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court, in the alternative to leave to appeal. 11In support of the existence of a right of appeal, albeit subject to the grant of leave, the applicant relies primarily upon s 101(1) of the Supreme Court Act. That provision permits an appeal to this Court from "any judgment or order of the court in a Division". There is, as the Crown Advocate has noted, authority for the proposition that this provision only applies to an order made in exercise of judicial power and that the determination of an application of this kind is an administrative rather than a judicial act. 12The applicant has raised a number of points in response. These include the fact that the decision of R A Hulme J was delivered with all the trappings of a judicial decision. Further, the decision was entered as an "order", suggesting it had some judicial character. These are not issues properly resolved on an objection to competency by a single judge. As the matters raised in the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court must be dealt with by three judges of the Court, it is appropriate that a determination on the application for leave to appeal be addressed at the same time, as these are alternative processes. 13The other matters raised by the Crown advocate are all available for consideration by the court hearing the amended summons. 14As part of the amended summons, the applicant has included a request to rely on "fresh" or "new" evidence. As the matter is proceeding, at least in part, in the original jurisdiction of the court, it is not an application requiring satisfaction of s 75A(8) of the Supreme Court Act. If there were to be a grant of leave to appeal, that section might be invoked. In any event, the admission of the evidence, being documentary records falling within a narrow compass, can be addressed at the hearing of the summons. The appropriate documents should be included in the white folder. 15In relation to the timing of the hearing, both parties wish that it be heard as soon as possible. However, the applicant has outstanding an application for legal aid under the pro bono scheme operated by the Bar Association. Obviously there should be an opportunity for that application to be dealt with before the matter is heard. There is also a need for further directions to be given in respect of submissions. Accordingly, it is unlikely that the matter will be listed before July; in which case outstanding issues with respect to legal aid will have been determined well before the date for hearing. 16The Court makes the following orders: (1) Grant leave to the applicant to file an amended summons in the form of the "Draft amended summons seeking leave to appeal" dated 10 April 2013. (2) Treat the statement of the nature of the case in that document as submissions in support of the application. (3) Direct that following consultation with the applicant, the Attorney file and serve an appropriate notice under s 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). (4) Give leave to the parties to file and serve further submissions in accordance with the following timetable: (a) any supplementary submissions on the part of the applicant, by 26 April 2013; (b) any further submissions on behalf of the Attorney General, by 24 May 2013; (c) any submissions in reply for the applicant, by 4 June 2013. (5) Direct that the parties confer for the purpose of preparing a white folder containing the material necessary to be provided to the Court for the hearing of the summons. (6) Direct that so much of the first respondent's notice of motion filed 15 March 2013 as has not been disposed of, be stood over to the hearing of the summons. (7) Refer the matter to the Registrar to fix a date for hearing of the summons with appropriate expedition. (8) Costs of today be costs in the summons proceedings.