The plaintiff had an exact knowledge of the economy of the household. I thought her a truthful and careful witness. She said that the deceased used to bring home his pay envelope unopened each fortnight - he was paid fortnightly. He kept £6 for himself and she had the management and disbursement of the balance, most of which went into an account on which she operated. The outgoings attributable to the house, instalments of principal and interest, rates, electricity charges and so forth were all met in this way as well as the ordinary expenses of housekeeping. She seems to have managed the family finances for the general benefit of the household. She bought her husband's clothes. The household furniture is said to have been her property. It was not included in his estate for probate purposes. It, or some of it, was however bought by his earnings. It included a television set, washing machine and other articles of a similar kind all paid for in this way. She had a motor car bought in the same way. She was not regularly employed herself, although she had some part-time work as a saleswoman in a shop for a period. She undertook this as a temporary arrangement to help meet the cost of some alterations and renovations to the house. Speaking generally, she was dependent on her husband. It is not necessary to set out the details of her evidence as to the way in which his earnings were expended. She arrived at a conclusion that the advantages measurable in money that she and the daughter were together receiving at the time of her husband's death amounted to £26 per week; and this was put forward as the amount of her direct pecuniary loss. It may be that, as counsel for the Commonwealth suggested, a more rigorous dissection of the expenditure would produce a lesser figure. But such calculations are difficult. They can become niggardly. The plaintiff and her husband had enjoyed together whatever they had. It is almost impossible to put separate prices upon their separate participations. But some assumptions must be made. I think that it is reasonable to conclude, on the basis that the deceased's salary would be £40 per week, that the advantages the plaintiff would have derived for herself and her daughter would have been a home in which to live and other benefits having a pecuniary value of not less than £25 per week. I propose to base an initial calculation on that sum. By what figure should I multiply it? The husband and wife each had, it seems, a normal expectation of life. He was in good health. She suffers from attacks of giddiness, but medical evidence was given that this condition would not significantly reduce her expectation of life. An actuary was called. Taking into account the statistical probabilities of death, as shown by the Australian life tables, he calculated what in the case of a husband aged forty-four and a wife aged forty is the present capital value of an income of £1 per week payable while both husband and wife live, the income to cease on the husband attaining the age of sixty-five. Calculated at 4½% it is £631; at 5%, £607; at 6%, about £560 - this last was not exactly calculated. It seems to me that to-day a rate of 5% may be assumed and that this may for the purpose of the calculation be taken as giving a figure of £600. Multiplied by 25 this gives £15,000. Some deduction it might be suggested should be made at this point, as the husband's earnings might, because of ill health or from some other cause, cease before he reached the age of sixty-five - the contingency of his death is allowed for in the actuarial calculation. But as against a possible cesser of salary before sixty-five there is the important certainty of superannuation upon retirement - and from this the wife might be expected to benefit. There are other possibilities too such as some remunerative employment after sixty-five. Predictions of what the future might have held, if death had not occurred when it did, make the assessment of damages "proportionate to the injury resulting from death" very much a matter of speculation. Reliance upon calculations based upon average life expectancies, without regard to the seeming probabilities of the individual case, can give a specious appearance of certainty to an unsure conclusion. No two cases are alike. One matter that it is always said must be taken into consideration in cases of this kind is the possibility of a widow remarrying. As this Court said in Carroll v. Purcell [1] , "This, for what it is worth in any particular case, has so long been regarded as having some value in the assessment of damages in fatal accident cases that it is profitless to debate how far the established rule is justified". The plaintiff said when asked about this: "Nobody can foretell the future. If I still feel the way I do now, I will never remarry". I was told by the actuary who gave evidence that about one-third of the women who become widows at the age of forty remarry at some time. This piece of information seems to me interesting but not very helpful. So much depends upon matters peculiar to the person and her circumstances, on various factors both emotional and material. However, I have taken the possibility of the plaintiff's remarrying into consideration along with various other prospects that counsel mentioned, or which have occurred to me, as telling one way or the other in the estimation of the pecuniary loss in this case. I have noticed, so far as seemed to me proper, a number of contingencies and probabilities and I have given a passing nod to what seemed to be mere possibilities. One thing weighs against another. I think, doing the best I can with imponderable data, that the pecuniary loss resulting from the death for the plaintiff and her daughter should be assessed at £15,000. But this is only one side of the account. From the loss must be deducted any pecuniary gains.