Representations 15(a) and (b)
28 Turning then, to the alleged representations, it is convenient to consider (a) and (b) together. Mr Corke does not assert a representation in the terms pleaded in (a). As to (b) he says that one of the officers present said:
"Paramedical Services cannot transport patients on public roads."
[Affidavit 19 January 1998 par 18]
Q 4 in the letter of 12 May 1995 asks the question whether the use of the applicant's ambulance contravenes s 23 of the Ambulance Services Act. Clearly, there was some discussion about s 23 at the meeting attended by Mr Webster.
29 Mr Webster accepts that he said words to the effect of:
"the Ambulance Service of New South Wales is the only service entitled to provide pre-hospital care and transport for a fee."
[Affidavit 9 March 1998 par 7]
.
He accepts that he said that the applicants would have been operating outside the Ambulance Services Act by providing an ambulance service for hire or reward (T p 144 (15-20)). He also accepts (T p 144 (29-32)) that he told the meeting that the applicant could not transport patients on public roads if for hire or reward. He says (T p 153) that he was expressing "a view that I held about the operation outside the Ambulance Act". He says (T p 154) that he probably took a copy of s 23 with him to the meeting and thinks that he left it there. Mr Corke does not agree with this aspect of Mr Webster's evidence.
30 In a letter of 22 March 1995 (Vol 8 p 177) a legal officer of the Health Department advised the Chief Executive Officer of the respondent that it was arguable that the applicant's activities in providing first aid services for reward contravened s 23(1)(b) of the Ambulance Services Act on the basis that the services were of a similar nature to those provided by the respondent. At this time, it was I think, a common view within the more senior members of the respondent that the provision by the applicant of ambulances and paramedic services or facilities at sporting and other public events for reward attracted the operation of s 23(1) of the Ambulances Services Act and was unlawful without the consent of the Director-General of Health. I am satisfied that this was Mr Webster's view (T p 154). There was, I think, concern within the respondent at this time about the applicant's activities (see the evidence of Mr McLachlan at T p 69, 74), which was reinforced by the concerns expressed by the Health & Research Employees Association at the meeting attended by Mr Webster on 8 May 1995 (Vol 3 p 264) about the provision of ambulance services by private contractors.
31 That being so, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that at the meeting with Mr Corke in May 1995 there was discussion of s 23 of the Ambulance Services Act, and that Mr Webster expressed the view at this meeting that the applicant was not entitled to provide ambulance and paramedic services at sporting events for reward, nor could it lawfully transport injured persons from those events to hospital for reward. That finding does not, of course, support a finding of the representations in the precise terms pleaded although, at least in some respects, it comes close.
32 But the question which then arises is where my finding leaves the applicant. If I am right in my view that Mr Webster was expressing an opinion as to the impact of s 23 on the applicant's activities in providing ambulances at sporting events (and the way in which Q 4 in the letter of 12 May 1995 was structured, and the fact that Mr Corke was satisfied with the answer given by Mr Mikhail suggests that nothing stronger than an opinion was conveyed) there is no basis for a conclusion that Mr Webster did not hold that opinion, or that it was without reasonable foundation. On that basis there is no contravention of s 42.
33 Even if I am wrong in the view that there was merely an expression of an opinion, and Mr Webster made statements as to what the legal position in fact was, then what he said was, in my view, a correct statement of the position. The operations which the applicant conducted in providing ambulance and paramedic services at race tracks and other sporting events for reward were, as a matter of fact, similar to the operations carried on by the respondent in that regard.
34 The applicant submitted that, nonetheless, the operation of s 23(1)(b) was not attracted because the provision by the respondent of ambulance and paramedic services at sporting and other events was not an operation carried on by the respondent "under this Act". That is because s 12(1)(a) only authorises the provision of "ambulance services" which has its defined meaning. The provision of an ambulance and paramedics at a sporting fixture is not a service "relating to" the work of rendering first aid to, and the transport of, sick and injured persons, because, so it was submitted, no one may become sick or injured.
35 This submission would produce the consequence that the respondent's activities, insofar as they concern the provision of ambulances at sporting events, are ultra vires, at least if no one is injured. In my opinion the submission pays insufficient regard to the words "relating to". A service calculated to enable "ambulance services" to be provided should the need for them arise is, in my view, a service "relating to" the work of rendering first aid to, and the transport of, sick and injured persons because it enables that work to be undertaken should the need arise.
36 It is beside the point that the applicant may not impose an extra charge for conveying an injured person from the sporting venue to the hospital should it be necessary for this to be done and should one of the respondent's ambulances not be available. The applicant's brochure (Vol 2(a) p 1-7) describes the services which it provides and the fees that it charges for provision of those services. The brochure represents that an ambulance, fitted and equipped for the transport of injured persons, will be supplied in connection with the provision of those services. If there is an on-site medical centre or sick bay, the ambulance may be used to transport the injured person to that location. Only exceptionally will the on-site ambulance (whether supplied by the applicant or the respondent) be used to convey the injured to an off-site location, because the conduct at the sporting event would have to be suspended until the ambulance returned or a substitute provided. But that does not mean that the provision of an ambulance on site is outside the definition of "ambulance services", nor does it mean that if such an ambulance is used for transport of a sick or injured person, whether to another location on site or to a location off-site, the provision of that transport is otherwise than for fee or reward. By implication the brochure represents that transportation services will be provided if and as needed as part of the service offered in return for the fee. It was not submitted that the applicant's brochure was not in accordance with that fact.
37 Even if I am wrong in my view that the statements, whether regarded as statements of opinion or of fact, are not misleading or deceptive, there is the further problem that, on the evidence of Mr Corke they had no continuing impact on him or the board of CAMS. He asked the applicant the questions listed in the letter of 12 May 1995, including a question in relation to s 23 of the Ambulance Services Act, and received satisfactory answers. Both he and his board were satisfied that the applicant complied with all the requirements to provide medical services to race meetings. In the light of that evidence, I cannot be satisfied that the applicant suffered any loss or damage by the conduct in question.
38 Counsel for the applicant put his case on the basis that I should conclude that by reason of representations (a)-(d) the applicant lost the chance of securing engagements for the provision of ambulance services to CAMS affiliated clubs until 1997, when the rules were changed by the addition of "or equivalent" after the words "by the State Civil Ambulance Service".
39 Representations (c)-(d) have yet to be considered. But, in relation to representations (a) and (b), the first problem is that there is an inconsistency between counsel's statement as to the effect of the CAMS rules in the years in question, and the letter of 2 August 1996 which he tendered (Vol 8 p 234) quoted in par 17 above, written to Mr Mikhail in response to a letter from a CAMS officer of 1 August 1996 (Vol 8 p 233) recommending that affiliated clubs should use the applicant's paramedical services. Whatever the resolution of this problem, the more fundamental problem is that there is simply no link to be found in the evidence between representations made to Mr Corke by the respondent's officers in May 1995 and any inability on the part of the applicant to secure engagement from CAMS affiliated clubs in the period 1995-1997.
40 If it be the fact that the CAMS rules in that period were such as to preclude the use of the applicant's services by CAMS affiliated clubs, there is no evidentiary foundation for a conclusion that this state of affairs was referable to the misleading conduct alleged. If that is not the fact, and if the CAMS letter of 2 August 1996 (or the view expressed in it) was in some way instrumental in bringing about that result then, again, there is no evidentiary linkage between that letter and the misleading conduct alleged. If there is some other explanation, then again there is no evidentiary link between that explanation, and the representations pleaded.
41 For all of these reasons the claim based on representations (a) and (b) must fail.