Page v Commissioner of Police

JUDGMENT 1The plaintiff is a former Senior Constable of Police. He was attested as a Probationary Constable of Police on 14 September 1984 and thereupon become a contributor to the Police Superannuation Fund established under Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906 (the Act). 2It would appear that the plaintiff last physically worked as a Senior Constable of Police on 13 November 1996. On 19 March 1997 he was removed from the Police Force by a notice issued by the Commissioner of Police pursuant to s 181D of the Police Act 1990, as that Act is now known. After the plaintiff's removal from the Police Force, the Commissioner of Police issued to him as "Statement of Service" stating that he was a member of the New South Wales Police Service from 2 July 1984 until his services were terminated on 19 March 1997. 3On 22 April 2008, 11 years after he was removed from the Police Force, the plaintiff, by his solicitors, made an application to the SAS Trustee Corporation (STC) for a "hurt on duty pension" pursuant to s 10B(2) of the Act. Eventually, on 26 February 2009, the Police Superannuation Advisory Committee (PSAC) certified that at the time of his "exit" from the Police Force he was incapable of personally exercising the functions of a police officer on account of the infirmity of "post traumatic stress disorder" (PTSD). 4On 4 March 2009 the defendant, by his delegate, determined that the suffering by the plaintiff of the infirmity of PTSD was not caused by his having been hurt on duty (HOD). Aggravated by that decision of the Commissioner of Police, the plaintiff brings an application to this Court seeking that the decision of the Commissioner of Police be set aside and replaced by a decision that the suffering by the plaintiff of the infirmity of PTSD was caused by his having been HOD. 5Yesterday afternoon a nice point of law arose, which both counsel acknowledge is not a matter that is currently before me. Section 10B of the Act is headed, "Medical examination of disabled member and determination of whether hurt on duty". The first two subsections of s 10B are these: "(1) An annual superannuation allowance or gratuity must not be granted under section 10 to a former member of the police force who is discharged unless STC (having regard to medical advice on the condition and fitness for employment of the member) has certified the member was incapable, from a specified infirmity of body or mind, of personally exercising the functions of a police officer referred to in section 14(1) of the Police Act 1990. (2) An annual superannuation allowance or gratuity must not be granted under section 10 to a former member of the police force who resigned or retired unless: (a) the former member notified the Commissioner of Police before the member's resignation or retirement and within 6 months of receiving the injury which has caused the members infirmity of body or mind, of that injury, and (b) if the regulations so require, the notification was in the prescribed form, and (c) STC (having regard to medical advice on the condition and fitness for employment of the member) has certified that the former member was incapable, from that infirmity of body or mind, of personally exercising the functions of a police officer referred to in section 14(1) the Police Act 1990 at the time of member's resignation or retirement." 6One will note that subs (1) speaks of a person who is still a member of the Police Force, but subs (2) refers to a former member of the Police Force "who resigned or retired." The plaintiff neither resigned nor retired. He was, to use the verbiage of s 181D of the Police Act 1990, "removed", or to use more common language, had his services terminated. 7There is no definition in the Act that would provide me with an extended meaning for the concepts of resignation and/or retirement. There is, in reference in other sections of the Act, a reference to a member who has been "discharged" but clearly that refers to discharge from the Police Force after being certified incapable of fulfilling the duties of office because of some medical infirmity, whether it be HOD or otherwise. 8The plaintiff has submitted that I can use provisions of s 181D(8) of the Police Act 1990 to resolve the issue as to whether the plaintiff, not having retired or resigned, can obtain an HOD pension. That subsection is in the following terms: "For the purposes of this Act, removal of a police officer from the NSW Police Force [formerly the Police Service] under this section has the same effect as if the police officer has resigned (or, in a case of police officer who is of or above the age of 55 years, had retired) from the NSW Police Force [formerly the Police Service]." 9However, the verbiage of that subsection, its initial verbiage, clearly relates it only to the Police Act 1990 itself and does not, for example, refer to the present Act or any other enactment relating to the New South Wales Police. 10However, whether the plaintiff be entitled to a hurt on duty pension, assuming that he succeeds in this Court, is a question that ultimately must be decided by STC rather than the Commissioner of Police and, if the plaintiff is aggrieved by a decision of the STC, he can make a further application to this Court, but nominating the STC as the appropriate defendant. Equally, it is a matter that could well be litigated in the Supreme Court. In any event, it is clear that, at the current time, I have no jurisdiction to make a ruling on that question. I merely point this out: that in all other cases of which I have dealt with the type of matter that I am currently discussing, the former member of the Police Force commenced proceedings in either the Supreme Court in its Administrative Law division or in the Industrial Court of New South Wales seeking to have the s 181D notice set aside; generally what then happens is that the Commissioner agrees to withdraw the 181D notice but permits the plaintiff to submit a letter of resignation with effect from the same day as the 181D notice became effective. However, that has not occurred in the current matter. No doubt the present defendant would rely on the well-known principle that consuetudo est optimus interpres legum: practice is the best interpreter of the law. 11Quite frankly, I could deliver appropriate reasons for judgment in a few short pages. However, the case is now in its 10th day. In light of the care which has been lavished on this case by both parties and their lawyers it is appropriate for me to deal with the matter in a long-handed fashion even though, as I said, ultimately the case is fairly straightforward to decide. 12The case has lasted 10 days because of the following circumstances. The hearing initially commenced on Tuesday, 9 November 2010. The last evidence was given on Friday, 12 November 2010. The last witness to give evidence, at that stage, was Dr Peter Snowdon, who was sworn at 2.37 pm. Submissions then commenced. I pointed out some difficulties arising for the plaintiff from the evidence given by Dr Snowdon. Eventually I granted the plaintiff an adjournment in order to obtain further evidence to try to remedy the problem which I saw arising from the evidence of Dr Snowdon. Such evidence has now been given. The hearing could only recommence on Wednesday 30 May 2012 and commenced late on that day because I was still part heard in a matter from the previous day. 13Much of the first three days of last week was taken up with an application by the defendant for leave to amend the defence. For reasons given on Thursday 31 May 2012, that leave was refused. The question which arose from the evidence of Dr Snowdon was other possible causes of the plaintiff's PTSD. The plaintiff merely relies upon his experiences at what is known as the Strathfield massacre, which occurred on Saturday 17 August 1991. Evidence given by Dr Snowdon suggested that the plaintiff's childhood experiences might be an alternative cause of the plaintiff's PTSD. As a result, it has been necessary to almost reconstruct the plaintiff's life. That was what caused the matter to take so long. 14The plaintiff was born on 8 February 1951. He is currently 61 years old. At the time that he was attested as a probationary constable of police he was 33 years old. At the time that he was removed from the police service he was 46 years old. The earliest medical records relating to the plaintiff that are before me tell me of his physical condition at the age of 8. The first medical evidence before me is a letter from Dr Ian Alexander of Corrimal bearing date 5 March 1959. All but the penultimate paragraph of the doctor's letter I shall shortly quote. It is addressed to "The Skin Specialist" at the Children's Hospital at Sydney. The substance of the letter is this: "Many thanks for seeing Ronald Page, aged 8 years. This is a real problem which will require a lot of management, and kind consideration, and help to both the child and his parents. This boy has a particularly severe form of Infantile Eczema, he has had it for eight years with its varying periods of severity and remissions. He has seen many Doctors and many Specialists, and has been to your Out-patient's Department for quite a long period and even been in Eastern Suburbs Hospital for one year as an in-patient. All this has been to no avail, the child has the eczema worse than ever, and I firmly believe that a change of environment, away from his parents is the only chance that he has of a cure. I strongly urge that this boy be admitted to your hospital as an in-patient and then after a period of treatment in your hospital, he could then perhaps be sent to one of your convalescent homes. As you can realise he has had all the approved and perhaps all the disapproved of, forms of treatment, he has even had Cortizone treatment. My firm belief is that this change of environment is essential. His parents are unfortunately not well off and they cannot send him to a Boarding School, they cannot afford to send him away, they have spent too much now, on his treatment, and they are good types and would do anything for their child. In the short time that I saw him I tried, very presumptuously I know, with bland zinc cream with 1% crude coal tar and some antihistamines, and if anything he got worse while this was going on, he needs hospitalization." 15That which Dr Alexander was recommending at that time would appear to have been providing medical opinion for the treatment of atopic eczema. In a report of 10 January 2010 the plaintiff's treating psychiatrist, Dr Jeffrey Streimer, said this about the treatment recommended by Dr Alexander: "It is important to understand that in this era there was an accepted but not proven psychosomatic theory about emotional factors causing physical illness such as eczema. These theories have subsequently been abandoned and replaced by observation that clinical association does not imply causality. In particular, because inflammatory skin conditions are associated with general emotional distress, the theory attempted to attribute the cause of the eczema (which was scientifically unknown) to emotional factors as well as realising that severe eczema caused generalings, malaise and emotional dysregulation. This theoretical approach was at its zenith in this period of the 1950s, especially with children. Consequently all arousal, including that from interactions that caused arousal, was seen as potentially causative as well as a reaction to eczema." 16It can be seen therefore that the breaking of interaction between the plaintiff and his parents was thought to be a likely cure for the plaintiff's atopic eczema. Such is not now the view, as I understand it, from Dr Streimer. It would appear that the plaintiff was not admitted as an inpatient to the Royal Alexandra Hospital for Children, at that time, as a result of Dr Alexander's intervention. However, the plaintiff had, from very early in his youth, I assume from either kindergarten or year one, commenced to attend the primary school at the Royal Children's Hospital, which was known as Fred Birk's Activity School. There are some records from the Royal Children's Hospital. It would appear that the plaintiff was under the care of Dr Cains, the honorary dermatologist. Dr Cains referred to the plaintiff to Dr DWH Arnott, a psychiatrist: it would appear, the honorary psychiatrist at the Royal Children's Hospital at the time. 17Dr Arnott saw the plaintiff on 10 November 1959. The plaintiff was still eight years old. The note made at the time is this: "Ronald was seen in the clinic today by Dr DWH Arnott, who noted that he appears to have an abnormally sensitive constitution and there appears to be little in the way of psychological factors that account for his physical symptoms. Nor is there anything to show that environmental factors, or even his hospitalisation experiences, are responsible to any great extent for his behaviour or sleep disturbances. Dr Arnott advised Mrs Page that Ronald needed to have an unstressful life as far as possible and pointed out that he should do well at school, provided he is able to fit comfortably into a schooling situation where teachers are not over demanding and were other children are not too competitive. This has been shown by Ronald's success and improvement since commencing to attend Fred Birk's. Mrs Page reported that Ronald had lost appetite and weight since running out of Pacatal three weeks ago. He complained that he felt 'different' and kept asking for the tablets. Dr Arnott said that they should be continued indefinitely and Mrs Page was advised to get some more for him. Ronald will be seen again in four months." 18Dr Klug, in oral evidence given on 1 June 2012, told me that the drug Pacatal was a phenathiazine antipsychotic agent which is no longer prescribed; however, the drug also acts as an antihistamine. The notes of the Royal Children's Hospital tell me that there was a further attendance for psychiatric interview on 3 March 1960, and one on 5 July 1960. 19The plaintiff attended another psychiatrist, Dr Ross Williams, on 23 March 1961. The notes made at that attendance are: "Mrs Page regards that, although Ronald is more alert and concentrating better in school, his tension has returned and this is particularly disturbing at night time. Librium caps 1 mane p.c. and 1 p.r.n. nocte was prescribed. Also, Ritalin tabs ½ mane may be used if his concentration flags at school. Ronald will be seen again in [7 weeks]." 20I shall comment shortly on the prescription of Librium. 21The plaintiff did not attend an arranged psychiatric interview on 18 January 1962. However, there is a note that the plaintiff saw Dr Ross Williams again on 7 March 1962. The entry for that day is this: "Ron settled down steadily whilst taking the Monase, which he has been out of for a week. He flared up, however, with yesterday's and last night's hot weather. Monase tabs 1b.d. for a week was prescribed, then one daily; Librium was changed to mgm 5b.d. as he was having difficulty at school through drowsiness on the full dose. Ron will be seen again in 14 weeks." 22Prof Alexander McFarlane, in his report of 5 September 2011, tells me on p 28 that Monase was a drug that was originally believed to be a monoamine oxidase inhibitor. Its chemical name is Ethyltryptamine. He went on to say that ultimately it was found to exert its pharmacological effect as a serotonergic releasing agent and also a non-selective serotonin agonist. In oral evidence he explained that merely means it was a "mood elevator" or, to use common parlance, an "upper". Librium was a drug that used to be prescribed before Valium and had the same effect as Valium, that is, that it was a relaxant. Hence one can see why it might cause the plaintiff to feel drowsy during the day when he was at school. Those are the only psychiatric records from the plaintiff's childhood. 23There are notes made by the dermatologist, Dr Cains, in the year 1961 and notes which appear to have been made by a physician in the same year. They do not tell me anything other than that the plaintiff essentially had atopic eczema, which sometimes was causing problems and at other times was not causing problems. The final record from this time is a letter written on behalf of Dr Cains to the superintendent of the "Balmain and District Hospital" dated 10 September 1965. At that time the plaintiff was 14½ years old. The letter commences by pointing out that the plaintiff was too old for his treatment to be continued at the Children's Hospital. The substance of the letter is this: "He has been under Dermatological care since 1959 with a long history of recurrent intractable infantile eczema. This was associated with very marked [psychic] upsets and he has a good deal of treatment through the Child Guidance Department. I last saw him early in 1964 when his skin condition was greatly improved. At this stage he was being treated with steroid preferably [illegible] to locally bad areas and tar cream for general use in the leg and arm flexures. However, when I last saw him his condition did not require a great of dermatological management." 24Accordingly, it would appear that Dr Cains last saw the plaintiff when he was aged 13 in 1964 and he was doing relatively well at that time. The word which I have set out in square brackets in the above quotation was typed "physic" but it is agreed that it is a misspelling of psychic. Furthermore, the medical practitioners who have given evidence refer to the "Child Guidance "Department" as the psychiatric ward for children. There is no medical evidence to cover the plaintiff's teenage years and his twenties. 25The next set of documents relate to the time that the plaintiff applied to join the New South Wales Police. There is a medical questionnaire completed by the plaintiff on 2 November 1981 and a further questionnaire completed by the plaintiff on 6 June 1983. In each of those the plaintiff admitted to having suffered from asthma and skin problems and of having had in the past some injury to a knee, back or joint. Other illnesses described were chicken pox, measles and mumps, and of the plaintiff having had to undergo tonsillectomy, presumably secondary to tonsillitis. In each questionnaire the plaintiff denied having been a patient in "a mental or other hospital", although clearly there is a reference to the plaintiff being hospitalised in his infancy in the Eastern Suburbs Hospital. 26Accompanying those medical questionnaires is a certificate of Dr AV Grantham, a general practitioner of Petersham, dated 18 July 1983, and a letter from Dr Steven Lee, a dermatologist, dated 7 November 1981. Dr Grantham confirmed that the plaintiff had a "chronic skin disorder" but denied that the plaintiff had been suffering from eczema. Next to the doctor's comments are these: "Had a rash for many years but that has subsided for past 18 months (as per specialist report on original application)." 27When a question was asked about past medication the only matter disclosed was that he was currently not on any except for Diprosone, which I understand to be a treatment for a skin condition. The report of Dr Steven Lee is remarkably short. Dr Lee saw the plaintiff on 5 November 1981. He found that the plaintiff had atopic dermatitis. He went on to say this: "This is a common skin complaint and it is definitely not an infectious or contagious condition, with treatment, prognosis is excellent and should not interfere with the average person's ability to work. In particular, I feel that Mr Page's dermatitis should not affect eligibility for joining the Police Force." 28The police medical records in summary form are exhibit J and are continued at p 143 of exhibit A. They extend from 24 July 1984 until 29 June 1990 and there is no suggestion in those records of the plaintiff having any psychiatric complaint or any disturbing stressor. There are notes of the plaintiff's being examined by the police medical officer to be admitted to the Police Force on 1 December 1981 and 6 August 1983 and also on 2 July 1988, if I be reading exhibit J correctly. However, all those records indicate that the plaintiff was essentially fit to be a constable of police. There are also records of vaccinations but again nothing to suggest any ongoing psychiatric illness, psychiatric symptoms, or the plaintiff's experiencing some stressor other than things to which he may have been exposed at work. 29The plaintiff's history of what had happened to him in his childhood is unreliable. I do not mean that in any pejorative sense, although some of the plaintiff's protestations of being unable to remember things strained credulity at times. For example, there were histories given to doctors which clearly could only have been given by the plaintiff and not, for example, by his mother or wife, which the plaintiff would not concede he had given. For example, the plaintiff came under the care of Dr Phillip Cameron of 165 Rowntree Street, Balmain, on 3 June 1986. The first thing noted by Dr Cameron is this: "SEVERE CHILDHOOD ECZEMA hospitalised for long periods during infancy." 30On 15 November 1996 the plaintiff saw Dr Streimer and gave him this history about his childhood experiences: "Had very severe infantile asthma and eczema. Spent one month in hospital, aged one year! Alone, dark room, and was tied down. Didn't know how to feed self till aged two years because hands tied. Age five years, dentist wet pants. 'Mummy, he tried to kill me.' (with mask). Stayed at children's hospital school till aged 12 years. Unable to be at ordinary school more than a few days but then, despite parents' fears, took himself to high school and became well and strong." 31Clearly, a child aged one year would not be able to recall what happened to him. I accept that what the plaintiff told Dr Streimer about himself at the ages of one and two is probably what the plaintiff believed, from talking with his parents. However, a 5-year-old might easily remember a frightening visit to the dentist. The plaintiff's evidence about that occurrence is completely unsatisfactory. I accept that that is what happened, because the plaintiff himself must have told Dr Streimer about it in the visit of 15 November 1996. 32Other evidence suggests that the plaintiff's hospitalisation in his infancy was for about a year, but it probably involved his being taken home from time to time, probably at weekends, because no doubt the plaintiff's mother would need to be with him while he was in hospital. However, I can accept that the plaintiff was suffering from atopic eczema throughout his childhood, that is until the age of 13 years, and he was asthmatic and, from the list of medications which he still takes, is probably still asthmatic, and that part of his treatment was with drugs which had a psychotropic affect, but that can easily be explained by the physical condition of suffering from eczema with a resulting itch and the need to scratch, and the need to control his behaviour and activity, and with a general feeling of malaise resulting from such conditions. 33It has been submitted, on behalf of the defendant, that the plaintiff's experience at the dentist when he thought that he might be being killed by the doctor using a mask to administer anaesthetic might be a relevant stressor which would give rise to a latent PTSD or perhaps one should say give rise to a late onset PTSD. However, none of the doctors except D Snowdon believed that the suffering by the plaintiff of atopic eczema or asthma could cause a PTSD. I shall return to that issue again later, because ultimately it will decide the outcome of this matter. 34I have referred to what I know of the plaintiff's treatment and medical condition from the police medical officers records between 1984 and 1990. The records of the plaintiff's general practitioner, Dr Snowdon, also enable me to consider the plaintiff's health in the period from 3 June 1986 to the time of the Strathfield massacre on 17 August 1991. There is no suggestion in the doctor's entries during that period of any need for psychiatric medication or any relevant stressor. The plaintiff attended upon Dr Cameron for many conditions over the period from 1986 to 1990. Many of them were for mundane matters such as upper respiratory tract infections. Another was for an injury to the plaintiff's right wrist in which he fractured his scaphoid. Another attendance was for recurrent conjunctivitis. There were also consultations for a nasal discharge and some consultations where the plaintiff had an "itchy rash on forearms" which could have been a recurrence atopic eczema. The plaintiff also attended upon the doctor for some things such as a mild headache. Again, there is nothing in Dr Cameron's notes to suggest any psychiatric treatment was needed between 1986 and August of 1991, nor is there any history of any relevant stressor. 35Thus I am missing records relating to the plaintiff for the period from his 13th year until his 30th year. However, a part of that period is covered by evidence given by the plaintiff's wife, Mrs Mary Louise Page, who swore an affidavit on 13 April 2011 and gave oral evidence on 1 June 2012. I have no hesitation at all in accepting the evidence of Mrs Page. She migrated to Australia from Northern Ireland in April 1970. She was then 17½ years old. Shortly after she arrived in Australia she met the plaintiff. In par 4 of her affidavit she said this: "It was just after his father died. He was about 19 years of age and working at a bank. He was upset over his father's death but he soon got over his grief and became the main breadwinner for the family." 36I do know from other records that the plaintiff's father died at the age of 53 as a result of a pulmonary embolism after going herniorrhaphy. I know other from other medical histories that when the plaintiff's father died at the age of 53 the plaintiff was 19 years old. That history is consistent. The plaintiff and his wife married on 5 February 1972, when the plaintiff was shortly to turn 21. Mrs Page said in her affidavit: "6. Before the Strathfield Massacre in August 1991, Ron was an easy going and relaxed man with a come-what-may approach to life. He did not have tempers and rages, he was not irritable, and little things did not upset him. He was a good husband. We enjoyed an active social life. He was fun loving and did not seem to get upset very much at all. He took adverse events in his stride. He was a good father and was very much hands-on with our two sons and appeared to enjoy day-to-day family life. 7. I do not recall Ron ever commenting that he was distressed during his childhood. I do recall Ron telling me about fun times that he had with his family and friends when he was living in Balmain and Leichhardt. I recall him warmly reminiscing about playing in the Salvation Army Band." 37Mrs Page went on to describe changes that she noticed in her husband after 17 August 1991. The contrast between the plaintiff's condition prior to 17 August 1991 and after it is stark. Not only were there problems in the matrimonial home between the plaintiff and his wife, and the plaintiff and his sons, there were also problems with friends and those with whom Mr and Mrs Page used to socialise. 38Again, accepting Mrs Page's evidence as I do, there is nothing to suggest from her intimate knowledge of the plaintiff between 1970 and August of 1991 that the plaintiff had any ongoing psychiatric symptoms or was exposed to any other potential psychic stressor. That of course narrows down the period in respect of which there is no evidence other than that of the plaintiff to the period from 1964 when the plaintiff was last seen by Dr Cains and 1970 when the plaintiff first met his wife, a period of some six, perhaps at most seven years. 39What happened to the plaintiff during those seven years is quite clear. There are in evidence copies of the plaintiff's schoolboy diaries for each of the years 1964, 1965, 1966 and 1967. The first two of those years were spent at Drummoyne Boys High School. The last two years were spent at the Ibrox Park Boys High School at Leichhardt. There is nothing in the diaries to suggest anything other than that the plaintiff was an ordinary schoolboy. In fact, he may have been a mischievous schoolboy. I note that in his diary for 1967, when he was in what we now call Year 10, he gave as his next of kin Mr Riga Mortise of Never Never Land in the suburbs of Birds Nest, and that his religion was Klu Klux Klan. That is the long way from the Salvation Army. However, boys of that age behave in that fashion. 40I do know from histories recorded by medical practitioners that in his high school days the plaintiff played rugby. There was also playing "football" but I do not know whether that is a reference to his playing rugby league or soccer as distinct from rugby. In any event, there is nothing to suggest that the plaintiff had any problems at school and there is no history of the plaintiff's having any disciplinary problems or the like at school or anything which might suggest a psychiatric condition which could manifest itself in some fashion or the other. 41I then have the plaintiff's work history. That work history is best recorded by Dr Streimer when Dr Streimer examined the plaintiff on 16 December 1996. The history is given at p 123 of exhibit A. The history is essentially that the plaintiff left school with the School Certificate at the end of year 10. He then joined the Rural Bank, initially working at an office on the corner of Martin Place and Elizabeth Street as an office boy. He did that work for 12 months. He was bored by that work. He then worked in the advertising section for six months but did not find it particularly exciting. He then went to work as a teller at the main branch of the Bank in Sydney. He worked as a teller for 2½ years. There was no armed hold up that occurred whilst he worked as a teller. He then left the Rural Bank to work for "John and Merrivale" as a cashier. That was a fashionable job. However it was very high pressure and the plaintiff left it because he did not like working with "egotistical personalities". I trust that Mr Page will not apply to work as a barrister's clerk. 42The plaintiff then joined the motor vehicle industry. He became a service adviser for Peter Warren Ford at Liverpool. He worked there for two years. He then worked for Jack Brabham Ford at Bankstown for four years, then for City Ford as a service reception manager for 18 months. He then went to the retailer of Jaguar motorcars as an assistant service manager and did that for two years. He then opened his own business in the protection of paint applied to vehicles. I always called such paint "duco" but that I now know to be a brand name. Concurrent with his paint protection business, the plaintiff worked as a courier and worked, inter alia, for Fleet Flyers. 43The plaintiff then applied to join the Police Force. The reasons given by the plaintiff to Dr Streimer for his joining the Police Service were that he wanted to help people and that his maternal grandfather had been a policeman and his wife's father had been a policeman in the Royal Ulster Constabulary. 44There is no suggestion that during the period of working between leaving school at the end of 1967 and commencing at the Police Academy on 2 July 1984 that the plaintiff was unemployed for any period of time, or had any need for extended periods off work which might indicate an incapacity for work due to some infirmity of either body or mind. There is nothing in the current case to suggest that the plaintiff was inconvenienced in any fashion between his 13th year and joining the Police Force at the age of 33. In particular, there is no suggestion that the plaintiff's asthma and atopic eczema caused him any real or grave concerns or any incapacity for work or any problems dealing with other people in the 20-year period between the plaintiff's leaving the care of the children's hospital and joining the New South Wales Police Force. 45Furthermore, the records relating to plaintiff up until the time he joined the Police Force and such medical records that are available do not show any ongoing problem or any major concern or any other potent stressor in the plaintiff's life prior to his involvement in the Strathfield massacre. 46Yesterday [6 June 2012] I described the plaintiff's history, both his personal and employment history antecedent to the Strathfield massacre on 17 August 1991. It is convenient now to recount the plaintiff's working history in the Police Force prior to the Strathfield massacre. 47After having been attested as a Probationary Constable of Police, the plaintiff was assigned to work in general duties at the Balmain Police Station. In July of 1985, after some 10 months performing general duties, the plaintiff was transferred from general duties to performing Highway Patrol duties at Five Dock. On the anniversary of his being appointed as a Probationary Constable of Police he was appointed a Constable of Police. In 1990 the plaintiff was transferred from the Highway Patrol at Five Dock to the Highway Patrol at Glebe, and it was whilst performing Highway Patrol duties at Glebe that the plaintiff was involved with the Strathfield massacre. 48The inference to be drawn from the evidence is that the plaintiff had an affinity for performing work in the Highway Patrol because of his background in the automobile industry, commencing in approximately 1972. There is nothing in the evidence to suggest that the plaintiff had any difficulties with his immediate superiors at any time in the Police Force prior to the Strathfield massacre. 49Mr Naylor of counsel, who appeared for the plaintiff, has prepared written submissions and they have been marked for identification 6 and will be left with papers. Those written submissions are comprehensive. They in fact remind me of a suggestion made by one of my senior colleagues, who is now retired, that rather than counsel preparing written submissions or delivering oral submissions, each should submit a written form of judgment which the judge could adoptdepending on the party for whom he found. If I be permitted to do so, I will adopt without attribution the summary of the oral evidence given by the plaintiff as outlined in Mr Naylor's submissions. 50On 17 August 1991 the plaintiff was performing Highway Patrol duties at Glebe. He was in the Glebe Police Station when he heard a message on the police radio, VKG, to the effect that there had been a shooting at the Strathfield Plaza and requesting that police cars proceed urgently to that location. The plaintiff drove to the scene at a rapid speed accompanied by two other police officers, Bruce Martin and Vicky Spooner. He drove there with his lights and sirens activated. The plaintiff described the journey as taking about 10 minutes. Most Sydneysiders would be delighted if they could get from the Glebe to Strathfield in 10 minutes, a journey which usually would take about 30 minutes. 51The plaintiff parked his vehicle in the street between the Strathfield Plaza and the Strathfield Railway Station, near the bottom of the ramp that led to a car park on the roof of the plaza. About 1½ minutes before his arrival there the plaintiff heard a radio message that led him to believe that the offender may have been shot, although in his oral evidence the plaintiff said that the offender was believed to be leaving or may have left. 52After parking his vehicle the plaintiff alighted, drew his firearm and ran up the ramp to the second level of the car park. The plaintiff observed a dead body lying face down. That body was in fact that of the offender, Wade Frankum. The plaintiff saw a rifle near the deceased's body. The plaintiff believed that the offender had shot himself in the head, leading to his demise. That appears to have been, in fact, what happened. 53The plaintiff then made his way into the plaza by taking an escalator from the top level of the car park into the shopping plaza. He saw four dead in a café which was situated in the centre of the complex, and that café was surrounded by shops. One of the deceased was a young girl who had been stabbed repeatedly in the back. She was laying slumped over a bench. The wound was such that the plaintiff could see the coffee table through the wound in the victim's torso. Two of the other deceased had been shot. They were a mother and daughter. Two boys aged about 10 and 13, or perhaps a little older, were with the younger woman. That woman was the boys' mother. The elderly deceased woman, the boys' grandmother, appeared to the plaintiff to resemble his own mother. She had been shot in the forehead and "it had taken the top of her skull off and there was a crease right through the brain matter". 54The only difference between that elderly deceased lady and the plaintiff's mother was that they wore different glasses and as far as the plaintiff was aware his mother did not have a red overcoat, which was a garment worn by the deceased. At the time the plaintiff's mother lived with the plaintiff and his wife in a granny flat. Indeed, the evidence suggests that the plaintiff lived in his parents' matrimonial home and after his father died his mother continued to live with him but a granny flat was constructed for her and she lived in the granny flat with the plaintiff and his family after the plaintiff's marriage. 55The fourth deceased lady was a person whom the plaintiff came to know as Rochelle Milburn. The plaintiff heard a girl screaming. Her name was Caroline Dickerson. Ms Dickerson was standing near the front door of the shopping complex. She was particularly upset because she could not find her mother and her girlfriend, Rochelle Milburn. The plaintiff obtained a description of Ms Dickerson's mother and went looking for her but was unable to find her. He then obtained a description of Rochelle Milburn, who was described as wearing a "hot pink" top. The plaintiff made his way to the coffee shop but was unable to find Ms Milburn. He made further attempts to do so. On his second attempt he again saw the elderly lady who reminded him of his mother. On his second attempt the plaintiff noted a young woman who matched Ms Milburn's appearance, and who appeared to be dead, in the coffee shop. The plaintiff returned to Ms Dickerson and informed her that he had located her friend. Ms Dickerson was crying hysterically. The plaintiff made a further attempt to locate Ms Dickerson's mother. 56The plaintiff was so concerned that the elderly lady was his mother that he found it necessary to go to a newsagent in the Plaza to make a telephone call to his home to check on the whereabouts of his mother and to ensure that she was alive and well. The plaintiff returned to speak to Ms Dickerson. He informed her that a number of people had been taken to hospital. He then took Ms Dickerson to the Concord Repatriation Hospital to look for her mother. Staff at the hospital informed the plaintiff that Ms Dickerson's mother was not at Concord Hospital and that some of the injured had been taken to Royal Prince Alfred Hospital. The plaintiff then drove Ms Dickerson in his police vehicle to Royal Prince Alfred Hospital. There they located Ms Dickerson's mother, who was about to go into theatre to have her wounds surgically treated. The plaintiff left Ms Dickerson with her mother at that hospital and returned to Strathfield to look for his colleagues from the Glebe Police Station. The plaintiff later signed off at the end of his shift and went home. That is the synopsis of the oral evidence of the plaintiff. 57The closest contemporary document made by the plaintiff is a typewritten report accompanying his claim for HOD benefits, which bears date 20 February 1992. That contemporary document is in terms which I shall shortly state. If there be any inconsistency between the plaintiff's oral evidence and the somewhat contemporaneous document, I would prefer the contemporaneous document as being more accurate than evidence given by the plaintiff 19½ years later. The written document is this: "On 17 August 1991 after 3.15 pm I was the driver of M203 with S/Const Martin and Sgt Spooner. After receiving a message via VKG that a man had gone berserk with a firearm at Strathfield Plaza, it was again relayed via VKG that the message was 'Confirmed'. Shots had been fired, man had gone berserk with a gun. We attended the location of Strathfield Plaza. Upon our arrival, we attended a 1st Floor Car Park at the location of the offender's deceased body. I organised for the body to be covered with towels. I, along with other police officers, searched the car park for any wounded or deceased victims. I then attended the location in the Plaza where the offender had fired most of the shots and assisted where possible the CDA [ambulance officers] with victims of the incident. I then observed a young female (surname Dickerson). She was hysterical. She indicated to me that she could not locate her mother and her girlfriend. She supplied me with a description of them. I went to the scene of the coffee shop where the offender had initiated his murderous rampage. I viewed most of the deceased persons, the young girl who had been stabbed, the cafe owner and the other females in an attempt to determine if any of them were the mother or girlfriend of the young girl Dickerson. They were not. I returned to Dickerson and indicated to her that I was unable to locate her mother or girlfriend. At that time I was approached by a CDA officer who said to me that he believed that both the mother and girlfriend had in fact been killed. I spoke with Dickerson further to confirm descriptions of her mother and girlfriend. She said her mother was wearing a blue top; she had watched her put it on that morning at home. They had gone to Strathfield railway station to meet her girlfriend Rochelle Milburn; when she alighted from the train she noticed that she had a bright coloured top. All three females had then gone to the coffee shop at Strathfield Plaza and were about to be seated when the melee began. Dickerson's mother pushed both girls aside and told them to run. She was a shot twice. The offender, Frankum, then turned and fired at Milburn hitting her and forcing her down under a table; that was why I was unable to locate her body in the cafe. As for the mother, she had been shot but had not died. She was treated by CDA and rushed to hospital. Upon returning to Dickerson, the CDA officer again said that both the mother and girlfriend had been killed. This time, Dickerson heard him say it, and she became extremely hysterical. The CDA personnel in attendance requested that she be transported to RPA for treatment of the hysteria. I then asked her if I could contact anyone. She gave me her brother's name and address and phone number; but I could not get in contact with him. I later ascertained that the mother had not died but had been transported to Concord Hospital for treatment of gunshot wounds. She later died. I attended the coffee shop location again and this time discovered the body of the girlfriend, Milburn. I attended RPA Hospital and spoke with Dickerson. She had been sedated, and I informed her that I had located her mother at Concord Hospital. I had also located her brother and arranged for him to be notified and for Dickerson to be conveyed to Concord Hospital." 58There clearly are some discrepancies between the plaintiff's oral evidence and that report, but the essence is the same. The plaintiff attended upon the Strathfield massacre shortly after it had occurred, viewed the body of the deceased offender and the bodies of others, and was intimately involved in trying to ascertain the whereabouts of one of those who was injured and ultimately died, and was intimately involved in dealing with that lady's daughter. 59The plaintiff told me in his oral evidence that he did not sleep on the night of the Strathfield massacre and that he did not sleep on the following Sunday night. It is unclear whether his next shift was on Sunday 18 or Monday 19 August 1991. Little turns on that. 60On his next shift, the plaintiff ascertained that there were a number of police involved in the investigation of the Strathfield massacre, that is, police from the Glebe Police Station. The plaintiff said this: "... during the course of the day I found out that there was myself, Vicky Spooner, Bruce Martin, a couple of police officers from downstairs [probably general duties], Renee Bradford and somebody else, so that there was five of us from Glebe that had been at Strathfield. I was still feeling stunned and I decided to take it upon myself to ring the police medical office and ask that they could send somebody out to see us, and I think their response was, "Oh were you there were you?" And I said, "Yeah, I'm not the only one, there was a number of us there." So, they said, "Well, we'll send a person out." I think that was a psychologist, I don't even remember who it was." 61The plaintiff then said that that person came out either the next day or the day after but his recollection was unclear. Shortly afterwards in his evidence, the plaintiff says this about his next shift at Glebe: "I was upstairs in the Highway Patrol office and one of the fellows from downstairs, one of the general duties guys, came upstairs and said, you know, "Just for whatever reason, he might have come up to see ... (not transcribable) ... I don't know." And he said to me, "Hey Pagey." I said, "What?" He said, "You heard about Strathfield massacreStrathfield Plaza?" I said, "What?" Because I didn't know what he was talking about. And he said, "People shop there on a Saturday morning now." And I said, "What?" And he said, "Oh, it's murder in the afternoon", which is a police humour thing. I laughed. It was as though someone had just lifted a weight off me. And I said to whoever was in charge, I think it might have been Clarry Scanlon, the sergeant, I said, "I've got to go home and go to sleep." And he said, "Good, go, because you're no good to us here the way you are." So I went home and I slept for 16 hours. I felt guilty about it." 62The plaintiff went on to tell me that his feeling of guilt was engendered by anger. The plaintiff was then asked whether he took any leave and he said he told me that he took annual leave but that did not commence until early December 1991. 63On 4 February 1992 the plaintiff saw Dr Jeffrey Streimer for the first time. The plaintiff gave a history of the first few days after the Strathfield massacre to Dr Streimer. That is contained on p 89 of exhibit A. The plaintiff told Dr Streimer that he did not sleep on the nights of the 17th, 18th and 19th of August, and that he then "passed out." He then referred to having a debriefing from Ms Jan Westerlink incorrectly identified by Dr Streimer as Ms Jan Westering. Ms Westerlink was the police psychologist at that time. The plaintiff went on to tell Dr Streimer that on the morning of the fourth day after the massacre, which would have been on the morning of 20 August 1991 he rang Ms Westerlink and saw her for one hour, and that it felt as if a "weight had been taken off his shoulders." 64The plaintiff told Dr Streimer that he wanted to help the girl, clearly Ms Dickerson, because of that girl's sacrifice of her friend but the powers that be would not cooperate in allowing the plaintiff to give assistance to Ms Dickerson. I accept that shortly after the Strathfield massacre there was a debriefing by Ms Westerlink at the Glebe Police Station for inter alios the plaintiff. The question then becomes whether there were symptoms that could be attributed to PTSD between that date and the formal diagnosis of the plaintiff's condition by his general practitioner, Dr Cameron on 16 January 1992. 65There are entries in Dr Cameron's notes which suggest that there were not any symptoms during that period. For example, the plaintiff attended upon Dr Cameron on 23 September 1991 with an upper respiratory tract infection. The plaintiff had a non-productive cough and the doctor then refers to the plaintiff's sputum as being green and not brown. The plaintiff had no shortness of breath, nor any chest pain. The plaintiff gave a history of occasional fever. On examination, Dr Cameron noted the plaintiff's chest was clear. He diagnosed bronchitis probably due to a secondary infection. He prescribed erythromycin. There is nothing to suggest in that entry any psychiatric symptoms. The plaintiff attended upon Dr Cameron again on 6 January 1992. At that time the plaintiff was on annual leave. The first entry in the general practitioner's notes for that day is, "Well". There is then a reading of the plaintiff's blood pressure and a complaint about something on the right-hand side of the plaintiff's of the body, which required him to use Intal Forte. Originally I thought that could be a reference to a problem in the plaintiff's right eye but I am unsure to what it refers. The next line, on the same date, refers to the prescription of eye drops to be taken twice each day or as the need arose. In any event, there is no suggestion that at that time the plaintiff made any complaint to Dr Cameron of symptoms referrable to a psychiatric illness, and indeed the reference to being "well" is somewhat disturbing. 66However there is evidence that speaks in the other direction. In her affidavit, Mrs Mary Louise Page said this: "8. On 17 August 1991 I was at home at Hubert Street in Leichhardt when I received a telephone call from Ron. He said to me words to the effect, 'Can you go upstairs and check mum is at home?' I thought it an odd request but when I returned to the phone after checking that she was home he said to me, 'It doesn't matter, I just wanted to make sure she was at home'. In the days following the 17 August 1991 he said to me words to the effect, 'It was awful, there were so many dead bodies...I don't want to talk about it anymore'. 9. After the Strathfield massacre incident in August 1991, Ron's personality and behaviour changed. He became increasing short-tempered, lacking in patience, he withdrew socially and he appeared to become pessimistic about his life and over protective of his two sons, Scott and Ryan. Scott was born on 27 September 1984 and Ryan was born on 2 June 1900." 67Accordingly, at the time of the Strathfield massacre Scott was aged six and about to turn seven and Ryan was aged one. There is other evidence, namely medical histories of the plaintiff's becoming short-tempered with members of his family in the period between the Strathfield massacre and January 1992. As I said yesterday, I have no hesitation in accepting the evidence of Mrs Page and I accept that there was a change in the plaintiff's temperament during the period immediately following the Strathfield massacre. A change of temperament is not something that the person undergoing the change might observe or appreciate and therefore is not something that, for example, a person might complain of to a general practitioner unless the person undergoing the change had it drawn to his or her attention and agreed with the observation of the person drawing to his or her attention. In other words, this change of temperament, the change of outlook, is not necessarily something that the plaintiff would report to Dr Cameron. 68The plaintiff's first attendance on a medical practitioner, as distinct to the police psychologist, for PTSD, was on 16 January 1992. The notes in Dr Cameron's records are these: "Insomnia; GIT [gastrointestinal tract] upset; involved in police duties at Strathfield massacredirect involvement with dead and dying." 69A certificate issued on that day by Dr Cameron certifies his patient to be suffering from "post traumatic stress syndrome," which is but another way of diagnosing PTSD. The plaintiff attended upon Dr Cameron on the following day, 17 January 1992, and told Dr Cameron that he had seen a police counsellor and would not be put back in general duties for the time being. The plan outlined in Dr Cameron's records was to refer the plaintiff to Dr Jeffrey Streimer for post traumatic stress counselling. 70A certificate issued on 16 January certified the plaintiff as suffering from post traumatic stress syndrome and certified the plaintiff as being unfit until 3 February 1992. On 3 February 1992, although there is no entry in the general practitioner's notes to the same effect, Dr Cameron wrote a certificate for unfitness for work until 17 February and also a referral letter to Dr Jeffrey Streimer. 71Dr Streimer first saw the plaintiff on the following day, 4 February 1992. Clearly, Dr Streimer had been alerted by Dr Cameron to his diagnosis. After taking some description of the plaintiff's experience at the Strathfield massacre, Dr Streimer's history continued by recounting that in October 1991 a policy decision had been made by the Commander of the South West Region that senior traffic police who had more than five years' experience in Highway Patrol would have to go back to performing general duties for six months, and that such work might involve viewing dead bodies. 72The plaintiff then made a complaint to Dr Streimer about being "singled out" but used the plural, which means that there some special attention being paid to members of the Highway Patrol. The plaintiff told Dr Streimer that he used the Highway Patrol to avoid viewing deceased persons. Dr Streimer then took a history that the plaintiff would not go back to work in general duties, even if it required that he go off on sick leave for 12 months. 73The evidence is that on or about 16 January 1992 the plaintiff phoned the Glebe Police Station and asked what his next rostered shift was. He was told that he was rostered on to perform general duties. The plaintiff told Dr Streimer that he told the officer on duty, who informed him that he was returning to general duties, that he was "sick". The evidence strongly suggests the plaintiff had a panic attack at that time, which was a precipitating event which caused him to see Dr Cameron and to be referred to Dr Streimer. 74Essentially the plaintiff's position is that as a Highway Patrol officer he could avoid, to a large extent, viewing deceased bodies and dealing directly with trauma to the person, but if he were to perform general duties he could not avoid that and, therefore, that he needed to stay in the Highway Patrol in order to prevent his being re-exposed to scenes of mayhem, such as the scene that he was exposed to at the Strathfield massacre. 75In essence, and perhaps sub silentio, the defendant's position is that the plaintiff liked working in Highway Patrol and being transferred from it back to general duties was no more than an expression of dissatisfaction or discontent with the administrative decision made by his superiors. To use language which I had to use in the Compensation Court in trying to tell an unsuccessful applicant why her claim for compensation failed, the plaintiff merely "got the shits with work": Mercer v Central Coast Alternative Care Group (unreported, 5 October 2000, 49736/98). 76However, that position ignores strong evidence suggesting that the plaintiff truly had a panic attack on 16 January 1992. Both he and his wife thought that the plaintiff was having a heart attack. The plaintiff's evidence in that regard is corroborated by that of his wife, and, as I said earlier today and yesterday, I accept Mrs Page's evidence without reservation. One might understand that a person, working in the Highway Patrol since July of 1985, when told in January 1992 that he had to return to general duties for a six-month period might be upset and disenchanted. But upset and disenchantment would not cause a panic attack, where the plaintiff and his wife believed that the plaintiff was undergoing a myocardial infarction, and the other symptoms strongly suggest a true panic attack. 77In evidence, the difference between general duties policing and the exposure to dead bodies and Highway Patrol policing and exposure to dead bodies was explored. Clearly members of the Highway Patrol regularly see bodies and severely injured persons as a result of motor vehicle accidents. This Court regularly hears about police officers when they attend motor vehicle accidents see badly mangled bodies, decapitated bodies, bodies which have been impaled by parts of motor vehicles, in particular steering wheels, and even descriptions of fellow police officers who have been killed in motor vehicle accidents which were gruesome. This issue was explored, in particular, with Professor McFarlane and he was able to draw a distinction between an accidental death, which most motor vehicle deaths are, and between wilfully inflicted harm caused by a mass murderer, and there is some force in that distinction. The plaintiff's position essentially is that, yes, he came upon dead bodies in the course of his duties in the Highway Patrol but essentially he left the bodies to be dealt with by ambulance personnel whilst he would merely take over the control of the alleged crime scene and the direction of traffic. He would not have to deal with deceased persons in the way that he needed to deal with the deceased at the Strathfield massacre and in particular deal with a person such as Ms Dickerson, a person who was intimately involved with the massacre and who was hysterical, trying to find her mother and her friend, the friend having been killed and the mother being severely injured and who died shortly after operative treatment of her wounds. There is a distinction, although it is subtle. 78However that subtle distinction can affect the psyche. I accept that to be the case. I can, therefore, accept that the prospect of the plaintiff's being transferred back to general duties did have an element of telling the plaintiff that he might be exposed again to a scene such as a Strathfield massacre and could trigger symptoms of PTSD. Equally, I cannot ignore the fact that at the same time the plaintiff is likely to have been gravely disenchanted by this administrative decision to move from what is a specialist police job, the Highway Patrol, to general duties; a slight indignity, taking somebody from work he liked to work that he did not like. It will be clear from further reasons, which I am required to give, that other absences were precipitated by otherwhat I might call"industrial" problems rather than trauma problems. In those circumstances, one can see how the defendant's cynicism about the plaintiff's claim arises. 79It is clear from Dr Streimer's contemporaneous notes, and from his letters of 4 March 1992 and 30 March 1992 addressed to Dr Cameron and from his letter of 30 March 1992 addressed to the Police Force, that Dr Streimer accepted a diagnosis of PTSD directly arising from the plaintiff's experience at the Strathfield massacre. Indeed that was the position of Dr Streimer in subsequent reports and in his oral evidence to me on 4 June 2012. 80On 20 February 1992, the plaintiff made a claim for HOD benefits. That was received at the Glebe Police Station and sent to police headquarters, where it arrived on 24 February 1992. A submission, bearing various dates in May 1992, recommended that the police accept that the plaintiff was HOD as a result of the Strathfield massacre and that that was the cause of the plaintiff's absence from work commencing on 16 January 1992. A formal determination to that effect was issued on behalf of the defendant on 1 June 1992. It refers to an injury on 17 August 1991, refers to the type of injury as being PTSD, and accepted that that was received whilst the plaintiff was on duty and that that grounded the plaintiff's absence from work from 16 January 1992 to 3 March 1992. 81It would appear the plaintiff returned to work on 3 March 1992. In a report of 26 May 1995, the plaintiff stated that after this period of absence: "I returned to work and was advised that, against my wishes and the recommendations of my doctors, I would in fact be rotated to general duties. The rehabilitation section has recommended that I return to duty in the Beats Section; however, this was denied. I accepted that this was to be the case and got on with the job." 82On 14 March 1993, records of the police service indicate that the plaintiff was returned not to general duties but to "Beats". That is a document at p 177 of exhibit A. However the plaintiff's Highway Patrol allowance was to cease as and from that date. One could therefore see that another reason for disenchantment and for being upset at being transferred from Highway Patrol to general duties was financial loss. Page 179 of exhibit A, another internal police document, again refers to the plaintiff being transferred to beat duties rather than general duties. However, subsequent documents refer the plaintiff as performing "general duties" rather than "beat duties". Whilst a transfer may have been theoretically to "beat duties", I am prepared to accept that the transfer was in fact back to general duties. However, whilst the plaintiff was performing general duties nothing untoward occurred. 83He was transferred back to Highway Patrol with effect from 5 June 1994. That is attested to by page 180 of exhibit A and at the following page. Toward the end of 1994 the plaintiff got into trouble with his superiors at the Highway Patrol at Glebe. A contemporaneous document made by the plaintiff on 19 December 1994 refers to, "Discrepancies in the Highway Patrol 'day book'". The report is in the following terms: "The discrepancies that exist are due to a number of reasons. I feel the main reason for these started about 3 years ago when I attended the "Strathfield massacre". Approximately 6 months after attending Strathfield, I suffered from a condition known as "Post Traumatic Reaction Syndrome" and was treated successfully for this condition. All Psychiatrist accounts totalling $1,400 were accepted and paid for by the NSW Police Department and I was informed by the PMO [police medical officer] that the Department had accepted the condition as being work related or [HOD]. A side effect of the condition is "Paranoia" and unfortunately though I new [sic] this to be the case I did not appreciate fully how it would affect me until it did. I have been informed that this has been the reason for my extremely poor performance in relation to my transferring my actual daily figures of Traffic and Parking Infringements and Official Cautions into the "Day Book" accurately. The way in which this affected me was that during my annual leave in August this year at about the time of the Strathfield massacre I saw a report on Television which caused me to muse over the events of three years ago and without realising I started to lose sleep, became short tempered and became more susceptible to the paranoia which accompanied those thoughts. I then started to try and cover up my poorer work performances by placing incorrect figures in the Day Book, yet that in itself seemed to me to be inane as I have always been a firm believer in the Day Book figures being only a partial performance indicator. I think, reflecting back upon those Day Book entries and seeing that on some days I recorded nil entries I was trying to balance out my Paranoia and what I normally would have done in regards to a more realistic approach. The Paranoia affected me in a way that made me think some people were out to get me, or trip me up. I then started to read into things more than was really there and when I would reflect on events which I thought were directed towards me and put them all together I finished up tripping myself up and doing a better job on myself than any two people could possibly have done. I have spoken to my Peer Support Officer Sergeant Lunne in relation to this matter and have sought assistance from the Psychiatrist who treated me for the initial condition which I suffered from, which now enables me to understand and do something about my condition allowing me to be able to respond to the abovementioned memorandum. I feel that my Paranoia came to a head last week when these discrepancies were brought to my attention. I immediately thought somebody had been doctoring my figures because all the time that I had been deluding myself I really had no idea of what I was doing and I know that sounds feeble but because of my state of mind it was totally unjustified to my way of thinking. There are some of the discrepancies which are just the interpretation of my understanding of the way the day book worked, for example on 17/9/94 I have 12 persons reported, 1 check speed, 10 radar speeds, 14 driving offences and 4 cautions. Actual is 2 check speeds, 10 radar speeds, 3 driving offences yet the 3 driving is incorrect as any speed is to be registered as a driving offence therefore the Actual is a combination of 2 check speeds, 10 radar speeds plus 3 driving offences which should read as 15 driving offences, also the 2 check speeds only 1 was written on the pm shift, and the other was written on the night of the previous shift which happened to be 12.15 am of the 17/9/94 of the shift was a PM shift of the previous day thereby being a check speed of the 16/9/94 and bringing its figure more into line with what it should have read. Another example of my interpretation is that a person cautioned for a driving matter was to be shown as 1 person reported, 1 driving offence, 1 caution, hence the figures shown on 12/9/92 as 2, 2, 2, which was only 2 people spoken to in relation to 2 driving matters and both were cautioned. Current Position: Now that I have sought treatment and realised the way that I have let myself down and others especially in my immediate group, I am in a position to rectify any and/all damage both to the NSW Police Department and any persons involved with me during the time of my illness. I might add that I still have a fare [sic] bit to do to get completely past the position I now find myself in, just the realisation of what has been happening to me generally puts me in good stead for the future." 84One might be forgiven for thinking from that report that there was some quota that the plaintiff had to fill in carrying out Highway Patrol duties. For example, so many persons were to have traffic infringement notices, there were to be so many, for example, speed checks, so many RBT checks and the like. One does not need to read such a quota system into operation into that report because the plaintiff gave direct evidence to the exact effect that there were quotas that had to be filled. The penultimate paragraph of the report I have just quoted could be construed as an attempt by the plaintiff to "juggle the figures", or which might cause a cynic to observe that there are lies, damned lies, and statistics. 85However, the fact remains that the plaintiff was caught out making incorrect entries in the official records of the Highway Patrol. When reprimanded about that, he believed himself to be becoming paranoid and to have invoked his experience of the Strathfield massacre as a justification for his sense of paranoia. Paranoia does not explain the incorrect entries. What does explain the incorrect entries is inefficiency or ineffectiveness as a Highway Patrol officer. The plaintiff had been a Highway Patrol officer essentially since July 1985, less a period of one year. At the end of 1994 he had essentially been a Highway Patrol officer for 7½ years. Why would he then commence to "cook the books", to cover up his inefficiency as a Highway Patrol officer? That is, in essence, explained by Professor McFarlane in his report of 5 September 2011. At p 19 of his report the Professor said this: "[It] will suffice to say many individuals stay in the workplace while unwell and attempt to disguise and cover over their symptoms and problems functioning. Their dysfunction often comes to light through apparent issues of misconduct." 86The Professor then refers to an article on that very issue, referable to the effects of PTSD on combat-deployed members of the "Marines", but I do not know whether that refers to the Royal Marines or the US Marines. In other words, Professor McFarlane tells me that a reason for the plaintiff's inefficiency in being a Highway Patrol officer was likely to be the fact that he may have had symptoms of PTSD. 87The report which I have quoted in extenso is, as I stated, dated 19 December 1994. The plaintiff had, prior to that date, attended upon Dr Streimer on 16 December 1994. Dr Streimer's history was that on that day the plaintiff was unable to function. He had returned to Highway Patrol in May 1994 and the plaintiff told the doctor that incorrect figures had been recorded against his name which did not tally with the daybook. The plaintiff told Dr Streimer that on 30 occasions, in 50 entries, the figures were not accurate. The plaintiff told the doctor that he was going to be investigated by Internal Affairs in the following week. The plaintiff clearly told Dr Streimer that he was concerned that he could be taken out of Highway Patrol again. The plaintiff told the doctor that there was a new superior in the Highway Patrol, identified in the evidence as Sergeant Marsh, who had replaced Senior Sergeant Tamplin. It is clear that the plaintiff believed that Sergeant Marsh was "out to get him". The plaintiff was concerned that he was "losing his marbles". The diagnosis offered by Dr Streimer, at that time, was a panic attack and an adjustment disorder with an anxious mood. Notably, the doctor did not diagnose PTSD. However the plaintiff invoked PTSD as the problem which had caused him to react in the way he did. Nevertheless, there is some medical evidence to the effect that this was a recurrence of PTSD. The medical evidence is a short report of 21 March 1995 made by Dr Roderick Gray, a police medical officer, contained on p 29 of exhibit A. The report is this: "This officer was assessed by Dr McGinty, Senior PMO on 29.12.94 and then followed up by telephone on 8.2.1995 as he was then on nightshift. He appeared to have developed some paranoid ideas and symptoms of PTSD. He was treated by Dr Streimer and Dr McGinty felt that he was fit for full duties including rotating shiftwork, confirmed by her conversation with him on 8.2.1995. Should there be any concerns about his behaviour or work performance we will arrange for review of his condition by a PMO." 88It would therefore appear that Dr McGinty, the Senior Police Medical Officer, accepted at the time that some paranoid ideation of the plaintiff was a symptom of PTSD. Evidence to the same effect is contained in the report of Professor McFarlane, to which I have earlier referred. 89On p 18 of the Professor's report, he comments on remarks made by Dr Peter Snowdon in a report dated 2 February 2010. Towards the top of p 18 there is a reference to Dr Klug, but that is clearly a reference to Dr Snowdon. Dr Snowdon referred to paranoia as being not associated with PTSD. The Professor continues thus: "The latter is a question of fundamental importance to this case. Clinically many patients with posttraumatic stress disorder do in fact develop paranoid thinking. This is part of the hypervigilance associated with this disorder where individuals come to view their environment as generally malevolent. Studies of paranoid thinking in the general population ... is a general example of this issue. A further study of a similar phenomenon by Freeman ... concluded that persecutory ideation is common in traumatised individuals. The intervening variable is levels of anxiety. It also has been long recognised that similar symptoms are common in war veterans where the paranoid thoughts are related in content to their traumatic experiences ... In Mr Page's case, this association is consistent with a diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder. After a horrific event such as the Strathfield massacre, it is easy to understand how an individual would be preoccupied with external threats in their environment and the unpredictable behaviour and violence of others. After this event, Mr Page was particularly sensitised because of his preoccupation that one of the victims reminded him of his own mother. In understanding his subsequent behaviour, superficially this may not necessarily appear logical or obviously linked with the Strathfield massacre. For example, the belief that being on Highway Patrol would somehow protect him from such experiences, in my opinion, represents a form of avoidance. The avoidance does not lie in the reality that he will not be exposed to death on Highway Patrols but rather about the possibility of coming across an incident similar to the Strathfield massacre in this role. The propensity for an individual with posttraumatic stress disorder to develop paranoid symptoms is almost in part dependant on the nature of the traumatic stressor. Paranoia is closely related to hypervigilance where an individual scans the environment for danger and is preoccupied by the risk of malevolence in other individuals. The Strathfield massacre is an obvious example of where an individual wreaks havoc and mayhem in an environment that would normally be seen as being peaceful and safe. In this context, Mr Page's reaction to an individual becoming agitated and aggressive particularly where his welfare is threatened is an obvious trigger to his concerns about such malevolence. It is important to understand that this is not simply a logical response but is related to his preoccupation and perception of the traumatic event at Strathfield Shopping Centre and its various elements. In summary, in my opinion, Mr Page's behaviour became somewhat disorganised and illogical in the aftermath of the Strathfield massacre. His paranoid thinking is consistent with what has been demonstrated in a number of other environments amongst traumatised individuals. In other words, an experience such as the Strathfield massacre which is of an extremely traumatic and violent nature can come to permeate subtle aspects of an individual's psychological framework that are not reflected simply in a diagnosis such as posttraumatic stress disorder. Furthermore, [inherent] in the condition is a pervasive increased reactivity to minor stressors and propensity to respond with hyper vigilance and also with withdrawal." 90If the plaintiff were truly paranoid it can therefore be seen as a symptom of PTSD. However, this Court's experience of almost 18 years dealing with matters of this nature, and for many years prior to that when I was at the Bar, indicates that many police officers would be justified in feeling paranoid when they come into conflict with their superiors. The Police Force is an organisation which by its nature is hierarchical, and where the ancient adage ira principis mors est applies: the anger/wrath/ire of the prince/chief is death. Perhaps one could say of the Police Force that ira principium mors est: that the ire of one's superiors is death. The police hierarchy can form a view about a serving officer which cannot be overcome by the exercise of reason or a fair consideration of evidence. I do not say that lightly, but I am afraid that it is this Court's experience. 91However, all I can say of the plaintiff's reaction to this trouble concerning his misstating relevant statistics is that the symptoms that he may have developed at that time could be consistent with PTSD but equally could be wholly consistent with the diagnosis offered by Dr Streimer at the time, a panic attack secondary to an adjustment disorder related to the stressor in question, the discovery of the plaintiff's having been inefficient or ineffective and essentially "cooking the books". 92The plaintiff's next visit to Dr Streimer was on 16 June 1995. That which prompted the plaintiff to go there is not explicable by either inefficiency or inattention to work nor by paranoia. It is only explicable by misconduct. On 16 May 1995, the plaintiff underwent an interview with Senior Sergeant Campbell. Subsequently he was interviewed by Inspector Horton on 22 May 1995 for a period that the plaintiff estimated was 5½ hours. That interview continued on 23 May 1995 for between, according to the plaintiff, 1½ and 2 hours. Those timings are contained in a note given by the plaintiff to Dr Streimer which appears at p 167 of exhibit A. 93Exhibit 2 are copies of records of interviews made on 22 and 23 May 1995 with Inspector Horton. The record of interview on 22 May commences at 10.40 am and concludes at 2.56 pm, and the interview conducted on 23 May 1995 commences at 8.01 am and concludes at 10.08 am. The first part of the first question of Inspector Horton on 22 May 1995 is this: "I am making inquiries in relation to an allegation that yourself and a number of other police attached to the Glebe patrol have been working at the APIA Club at Leichhardt without having first obtained departmental approval." 94There is no doubt, because the plaintiff admits it, that he commenced working at the APIA Club on 27 March 1995 in secondary employment without the approval of the defendant. Indeed the plaintiff admitted in the interview with Inspector Horton that he had earlier applied for permission to work at the APIA Club in secondary employment but that request had been refused. In other words, not only was he acting without permission in taking a job at the APIA Club on 27 March 1995, the plaintiff knew he had earlier been denied permission to work at the APIA Club: therefore, when he commenced work on 27 March 1995 he was not only working without permission but contrary to a decision made by the Commissioner of Police concerning himself directly. 95Essentially, the plaintiff was working as a doorman. The plaintiff admitted that when he commenced working at the APIA Club he deliberately disobeyed the Commissioner's instruction in relation to the secondary employment. The plaintiff was asked questions by Inspector Horton about other members of the police force who may have been working at the APIA Club and who were members of the Glebe patrol. They included Sergeant Joanne Lunn, Senior Constable Harris, Constable Uslu and Constable Marks. Indeed the questioning certainly suggests that plaintiff was himself complicit, if not the principal, in their being recruited to work at the APIA Club. The plaintiff admitted to handing two other police officers their pay envelopes. The record of interview is replete, and I use that adjective advisedly, with averments by the plaintiff that he could not recall the answers to questions to which he was asked. 96Towards the conclusion of the interview on 22 May 1995, the plaintiff was directed by Inspector Horton not to discuss any matter raised during the interview on that day with any other police officer that he knew, or had reasonable cause to suspect, might be a witness involved in the investigation into secondary employment at the APIA Club. 97On the following day the plaintiff was asked some searching questions. Part of his answer to question 238 was this: "I find the arh inflections [sic] and the manner in which you are asking me questions, I feel I would like an observer here. I'm not coping to [sic] well. I feel sick in the stomach again. My heart is pounding in my chest." 98The plaintiff was then asked whether he would like a doctor to be called, to which the plaintiff replied that he would like to see his own doctor. He was then asked whether he would like an ambulance to be called and he said, "no". The interview was suspended at 9.22 am but recommenced at 9.56. Again the plaintiff said, after the interview was recommenced, that he was unable to locate a peer support officer and that he had contacted the Police Association and spoken to his own medical practitioner and had an interview arranged with his medical practitioner at 6.15 pm. When asked to explain what his illness was the plaintiff said this: "I feel nauseous, sick in the stomach, I feel unsteady on my feet, my heart pounding in my chest, and I feel confused, all my hands are tingling that's it." 99When asked to read through what had already been transcribed by the typist the plaintiff replied, "No, I'm sick. I am going home". 100When one reads the interview as a whole, which I have, one comes to the conclusion that Inspector Horton had the plaintiff, to use the vernacular, on the ropes in his questioning of him, and the plaintiff found himself in a very delicate position, on a very sticky wicket, and did not like to continue to answer questions which clearly might not be answered to the plaintiff's own advantage. 101The computerised records of Dr Cameron for the same day, 23 May 1995, record the plaintiff attending at 6.35 pm. The notes are these: "stress plus, plus, plus from current interrogation re unofficial second job; 5.5 hours of interview with boss; feels being got at; became very agitated, fingers tingling, nauseated plus, plus, felt confused, overwhelmed; not fit for duty pro temp; o/w one week, to see [Jeffrey Streimer]." 102The plaintiff attended upon Dr Cameron again on 30 May 1995. Dr Cameron recorded that the plaintiff was still highly stressed, that he was having difficulties with sleeping and that he was feeling "detached" and absent, which I infer are symptoms of dissociation. Dr Cameron also recorded that the plaintiff was feeling as if he had just overcome a bout of influenza, and that the plaintiff obtained a certificate that he is not fit to resume duties until he saw Dr Streimer on 16 June 1995. The plaintiff did see Dr Streimer on 16 June 1995 and complained about his being interviewed by Senior Sergeant Campbell and Inspector Horton. After noting the duration of the interview and the names of the interviewers, Dr Streimer continued thus: "Patient felt completely traumatised by relentless, belligerent, repetitive and excessive interrogation. He had admitted to taking work on in first instance and felt prolonged subsequent interview was a cruel interrogation by someone who was good at it and whose reasons he could not fathom. Within 5-10 minutes of the first interview he began to feel similar reactions as PTSD following earlier trauma." 103The doctor's diagnosis was an acute stress reaction secondary to a prolonged interrogation and a dissociative fugue. Dr Streimer sent a report concerning this consultation to the Police Force. That report bears the date 25 October 1995. In that report the doctor says this: "My diagnosis was that he was suffering Acute Stress Reaction. I further explained his symptoms as being those associated with panic and this panic was arising out of a feeling of being cornered and trapped. In this way it resembled his earlier PTSD although it would not be classified as post traumatic stress response but rather an anxiety disorder. I assured him that this was a normal reaction to perhaps, an unusual situation and at this stage did not indicate a markedly pathological reaction or severe mental disorder. I felt it to be clearly a work related stress reaction." 104The doctor went on to express a favourable prognosis, just as he had expressed a favourable prognosis in March 1992. This acute stress reaction was a reaction to being caught out doing the wrong thing. In doing the wrong thing, the plaintiff was not acting in the course of his employment. In doing what he did, he was acting contrary to the express terms of his employment. That he should be investigated for it is completely explicable by the terms of his employment. What arose out of this investigation did not arise out of or in the course of the plaintiff's employment. It arose out of his own misconduct. That finding of mine is consistent with findings of myself and my colleagues earlier when discussing, for example, the reaction of police to being cross-examined and reproached at the Wood Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service. If what takes a person to the interview is misconduct, what arises at the interview is the consequence of the misconduct rather than something that arises out of the employment. 105The plaintiff was not to see Dr Streimer again until 15 November 1996. In the meantime things did not go adversely for the plaintiff, at least initially. On 21 June 1995 the plaintiff applied for a position advertised in the Police Service Weekly as controller of the Police Citizens Youth Club in the eastern suburbs. In his application the plaintiff pointed out that he had been in the Police Force for 11 years, that he had worked for 7 years in Highway Patrol, that he had worked for 12 months in "Beats", that he had worked in general duties for 2½ years and that he had 4½ years' experience in managing the Blue Light Disco in the Balmain/Glebe district. As well as being activity involved in his own sons' sporting activities, the plaintiff pointed out that he was a qualified referee for rugby league in the Balmain district and that he also attended Police Rugby League matches. 106A formal transfer application was signed by the plaintiff on 23 June 1995 and a recommendation was made by his superiors before the plaintiff's transfer to the PCYC in the eastern suburbs, but that was not to take place before 13 August 1995 if that was "suitable". The approval appears to have been given by the local District Personnel Coordinator, by the Mid-Western Suburbs District Commander, by the South West Region Commander, and also by an Inspector with the PCYC. There is no doubt that the plaintiff obtained that transfer. For the plaintiff to obtain that transfer indicates that there was no establishment animus in the Police Force against the plaintiff. 107After the plaintiff's transfer to the PCYC there was a continuing investigation into the plaintiff's claim for HOD benefits referable to his absence from work commencing on 23 May 1995 and ending on 15 July 1995. The plaintiff's application for hurt on duty benefits at that stage was declined. There was then also an investigation about allegations that the plaintiff and another officer had allowed a real estate agent to steal a facsimile machine owned by a complainant, and also an allegation of intimidation of the complainant. This complainant would appear to be one Christine Griffith, about whom I will say more shortly. However, at the same time that that was going on there were also continuing investigations about the plaintiff's taking secondary employment at the APIA Club. This was referred to the Ombudsman and eventually it was decided that the plaintiff should be charged Departmentally. As at 3 April 1996 there were six departmental charges offered against the plaintiff. Eventually, they were dealt with on 4 November 1996 when the plaintiff was served with a "Notice of Decision or Determination" advising him of a decision to impose fines totalling $1500. There was one charge of disobedience, two charges of neglect of duty and three charges of misconduct. Two of the charges of misconduct were of untruthfulness when being interviewed by Inspector Horton. 108Shortly prior to the service of the notice on 4 November 1996 imposing the fines, there was a flurry of activity in the Local Court at Balmain. On 15 October 1996 the plaintiff filed a complaint with the Local Court and a summons issued. The plaintiff was the complainant in those proceedings and the defendant was Christine Griffith. The plaintiff's complaint is this: "The defendant is known to the complainant through the course of his duties as a New South Wales police officer. The complainant has known the defendant for approximately 5 years and has previously arrested her and received information from her as a community informant. The defendant has previously approached the complainant on friendly terms. The complainant recently advised the defendant that he did not want to associate with her for professional and personal reasons. Since then the defendant has harassed and threatened the complainant and his family. He has received nuisance and abusive telephone calls to his residence. He and his family were approached and verbally abused in the street by the defendant on 13/10/96. Later that evening the defendant sent a messenger to his residence with a list demanding him to return $7,000 worth of listed items, being his property. The defendant has threatened that she will make (false) allegations against the complainant concerning criminal matters. She is also alleged to his wife and other persons that he has extramarital affairs. The complainant fears that this harassment, abuse and threats will continue." 109As anyone with any familiarity of the law would completely understand, on 23 October 1996 Ms Griffith took out a complaint and summons against the present plaintiff saying that he was guilty of harassing her. The complaint is this: "The complainant was having a relationship with the defendant for a period of 13 months. After they separated she attempted to retrieve property which belonged to her. The defendant rang her at her home address and said to her, 'You've ruined my life, I don't have a wife after today, and I have also lost my job. I've got some squaring up to do with you and your mate Horton'. The complainant is fearful that the defendant will attempt to cause her bodily harm due to the fact that he blames her for what he sees as her allegedly destroying his life. The complainant is a member of the New South Wales Police Service and as such has access to a firearm." 110On its face, Ms Griffith's complaint lacks any merit. The plaintiff had not lost his job. The plaintiff had not lost his wife; he and his wife are still married. There is no evidence to suggest that Ms Griffith was an associate of Inspector Horton, but it is highly probable that Inspector Horton's name may have been mentioned by the plaintiff to Ms Griffith: indeed, it is highly probable that the plaintiff may have complained to Ms Griffith about his being interviewed by Inspector Horton. 111There was no attempt by the defendant in these proceedings to suggest that anything that was said by Ms Griffith was true. However, the fact remains that, as a police officer, the plaintiff's association with Ms Griffith was irregular and therefore could be the subject of some suspicion. Ms Griffith informed the plaintiff about the whereabouts of the man wanted on a charge of murder. As a result of information conveyed by Ms Griffith to the plaintiff, that offender was arrested. It appears that Ms Griffith was then used by the plaintiff as an informant but was not formally recorded as being the plaintiff's informant. There are procedures to be dealt in the New South Wales Police where a police officer wishes to use a known person in the community as an informant. It would appear that Ms Griffith then became enamoured of the plaintiff and was approaching him when he was working at the PCYC, and that led to his trying to dissociate himself from what he perceived to be her unwanted advances to him. That led to the activity in the Local Court at Balmain. 112On 15 November 1996 the plaintiff attended upon Dr Streimer and was placed on sick report commencing on 15 November 1996. On the same day, the plaintiff completed a claim for HOD benefits. He gave, as the date of the incident giving rise to the claim, 13 November 1996, which was a Wednesday. In answer to the question "how did the injury/illness occur?", the plaintiff recorded this: "Following an in-service course for emergency and incident management. A phone call was received by me from Commander PCYC T Jamieson re secondment of me back to GDs for a period of two months approx." 113The emergency and incident management course (EIM) occurred in August. The phone call did occur on 13 November 1996. An internal police memorandum of 3 March 1997 appears at p 219 of exhibit A. Under the heading "Background", the first thing stated is this: "On 13 November 1996, Senior Constable Page was informed that he was to be seconded to general duties for a period of two months, he subsequently reported on sick report due to [PTSD]. He has remained on sick report to date and intends to apply for medical discharge." 114Dr Streimer's contemporaneous records for 15 November 1996 commence at p 113 of exhibit A. They record that from 17 July 1995 the plaintiff had been working at the PCYC, which was "excellent" and which was a business and which returned good profits. The notes then record that the plaintiff had attended the EIM which, again, brought up in the plaintiff's mind what had happened at Strathfield and made the plaintiff again feel vulnerable. The doctor goes on to record that he had the same physical symptoms as he had at Strathfield having undergone that course. The next complaint is of the secondment, by his boss, to the City of Sydney patrol to do general duties for two months. The doctor noted the plaintiff said that it "feels like a punishment". The doctor's notes go on to record that "strife likely" and then there is a reference to the continuing drama between the plaintiff and Ms Griffith and a reference to the plaintiff's feeling as if he was being "attacked out of the blue" which, again, appears to indicate some feelings of paranoia. 115Suffice it to say that the plaintiff never returned to work after seeing Dr Streimer. His claim for hurt on duty benefits for the absence 15 November 1996 was declined. Prior to the plaintiff's making an application to be medically discharged he was served with a draft of an order under s 181D of the Police Act 1990 on 22 January 1997. That can be gleaned from p 151 of exhibit A, which contains rehabilitation case management notes made by officials of the Police Force. They record that on 23 January 1997 the plaintiff rang and stated that he was very upset as he had been served with papers on the preceding day, in the afternoon, requesting him to show cause as to why the Commissioner should have any confidence in him. The draft order contains these grounds: "That between July 1995 and July 1996, you were involved in an improper association with Christine Griffith, a person whom you knew to have an extensive criminal history; That you failed to comply with Informants Management Plan and Commissioner's Instruction 65.04 in that you did not register Christine Griffith as an informant, nor did you record details of meetings with her or inform your Commander of your relationship with her; During an investigation by Professional Integrity Branch, you were untruthful to Detective Sergeant Gilroy who was conducting the inquiry; Whilst performing duties at the Paddington Police and Citizens Youth Club you improperly used Federation motor vehicles in direct contravention of the guidelines established by that organisation; Your history of undertaking unauthorised secondary employment within the security industry; Your extensive complaint history, including allegations of assault, incivility and untruthfulness." 116That order was made by the then Commissioner of Police, Mr Peter Ryan, on 19 March 1997 thereby removing the plaintiff from the New South Wales Police. 117Notwithstanding his removal the plaintiff persisted in his claim for hurt on duty benefits for his absence commencing on 15 November 1996. A letter of 8 May 1997 commences at page 226 of exhibit A. However, the Police Force maintained its denial of the claim and the plaintiff was advised by the letter of 28 July 1997 of the defendant's decision and of the plaintiff's rights to appeal, for which he should seek "independent legal advice". The right of appeal in respect of sick leave prior to retirement lies with the Government and Related Employees Appeals Tribunal and not with this Court. Since that time the plaintiff has maintained himself and his family by being a limousine driver. 118At the commencement of my reasons yesterday I outlined essentially how the current proceedings arose and it is not necessary for me to repeat that. 119There is before me an irrefragable fact. I perhaps ought to have said that there are before me two irrefragable facts but only one of them is presently relevant. The first irrefragable fact is that the plaintiff has the condition of PTSD. The second irrefragable fact, the one not presently relevant, is that at the time that he left the Police Force the plaintiff personally was incapable of personally exercising the functions of a police officer referred to in s 14(1) of the Police Act 1990. The second irrefragable fact comes regularly before me in applications under s 10(1A) of the Act where the STC, rather than the Commissioner of Police, is the defendant. I have had cause to observe over the best part of 18 years that sometimes one or both of those irrefragable facts is completely erroneous or completely contrary to the weight of the evidence. 120However, the scheme established by the Act makes it clear that I am bound to accept that the plaintiff has PTSD. The decisions to that effect are numerous: in Gannon v Commissioner of Police (2004) 1 DDCR 380 I refer to a number of earlier authorities. There have been subsequent authorities which have been referred to by Mr Naylor in his submissions on behalf of the plaintiff but I do not need to cite them because the proposition is basic to any litigation in matters in this List. It is not open for me to find, for example, that the plaintiff does not suffer from PTSD but from some other psychiatric condition or that he does not suffer from the condition at all. 121I must accept that he has the condition and that he was incapacitated by it at the time that he was removed from the New South Wales Police. In Gannon I discussed another issue that often arises in these matters: that sometimes the nature of the diagnosis determines the cause of the condition itself. Commencing at [4] in Gannon, I said this: "4. The first submission raised by the defendant is that, as a matter of law, the Court is not bound by all the implications arising from the certified infirmity. As is fairly typical in these cases, there are a number of differential diagnoses and often one, and sometimes more than one, of those diagnoses becomes the certified infirmity. Some diagnoses suggest the cause of the diagnosed condition itself, that is, suggest the cause of the infirmity. For example, whilst it is not here relevant, a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder implies that the disorder has been induced by trauma. Equally, in the current matter, where the diagnosis is an adjustment disorder, an adjustment disorder is, according to the accepted psychiatric definitions, a condition that has been induced by some psycho-social stressor. 5. There are also a number of psychiatric conditions, the diagnosis of which implies that the condition is inherent, genetic, constitutional, idiopathicuse whatever synonym one wants to describe the same concept. For example, the diagnosis of a personality disorder is the diagnosis of an innate, inherent or constitutional condition, which is unlikely to have been either caused or incited in any way by an external stressor. 6. Likewise, the diagnosis of, for example, major depression is the diagnosis of a neuro-chemical abnormality in the brain which cannot be caused by an external stressor, although most medical practitioners would accept that an external stressor induces the symptoms of the condition in about 40 percent of cases. 7. Of course, the concept of the diagnosis pointing to the cause of the illness is not limited to psychiatric conditions or infirmities of the mind. It can also apply to infirmities of the body. The diagnosis of boilermaker's deafness or deafness of the like origin, the proper medical diagnosis being sensori-neural deafness, postulates that the deafness has been induced by exposure to acoustic trauma over a period of time, rather than to any inherent or medical condition such as otosclerosis. 8. Equally, the diagnosis of the condition which is sometimes called repetitive strain injury and sometimes called occupational overuse syndrome, usually in reference to some problem in the upper limbs of the human body, implies the condition has been induced by repeated use, for example, of the hands and forearms. 9. The submission has been made by the defendant is that the Court is not bound to accept that, where the diagnosis implies that the condition is reactive to an external stressor, such is the case. In the context of workers compensation law, I have held that a medical panel certificate, which is conclusive as to the quantum of deafness, is also conclusive as to the aetiology of that deafness: Smith v Norton Pty Ltd (1995) 13 NSWCCR 277. In so holding, I relied not only on the terms of the appropriate statute but also on what fell from the High Court of Australia in Smith v Mann (1932) 47 CLR 426. There it was pointed out that sometimes the condition of a workman is inseparable from its cause." 122In [10] I went on to point out what fell from the Court of Appeal in Saad v Commissioner of Police (1995) 12 NSWCCR 70, and then went on to consider subsequent cases. What I said about PTSD in Gannon is still pertinent. The diagnostic criteria for PTSD are before me. They are exhibit C. Criterion A is this: "The person has been exposed to a traumatic event in which both of the following were present: (1) The person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or events that involved actual threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self or others (2) The person's response involved intense fear, helpless, or horror. Note: In children, this may be expressed instead by disorganised or agitated behaviour" 123The lack of punctuation at the end of clauses is a noteworthy feature of the DSMIVTR. The same point is made by Dr Streimer in his report of 10 January 2010. On p 3 of that report, the doctor says this: "Firstly PTSD is one of very few DSM diagnoses that require the eliciting of a specific link to a cause. DSM generally avoids making diagnoses based on causality wherever possible and rather relies on phenomenology, that is purely the presence of symptoms that meet inclusion and exclusion of criteria. However, in making a PTSD diagnosis both the essential Criteria A & B can only be satisfied by evoking a cause i.e. specific details of the traumatic event and the specific features of the trauma's re- experiencing including actual recollections of trauma. Recall of the events need [sic] to be elicited at diagnostic interview, (but ideally only to the extent that the associated emotional distress potentially re-evoked is manageable & does not disrupt the therapeutic relationship). As well as the standard exploratory practice of asking about childhood development, the patient's past history needed to be explored when PTSD was suspected to seek other traumata of possible aetiological significance. I was alert to the general possibility of multiple aetiological contributions because the question of such multiple contributions had been a central part of my published research into war trauma in Australian Vietnam Veterans & my work on PTSD at the Royal Commission on the use and effects of chemical agents on Australian personnel in Vietnam." 124I did not earlier cite diagnostic criterion B because it is adequately summed up in that extract from Dr Streimer's report. The patient must give a history of having recurrent or intrusive distressing recollections of the traumatic event and/or similar phenomena. In cross-examination, Dr Streimer pointed out that the plaintiff gave a history of phenomena similar to what he recalled of the Strathfield massacre. 125Essentially in this matter, when I look at all of the medical evidence it all goes one way and one way only. Dr Streimer saw the plaintiff after 15 November, on 20 and 29 November and 6, 12 and 16 December 1996 and 6 January 1997. The plaintiff did not return to see Dr Streimer until 4 June 2009 and that was clearly after the decision of Commissioner of Police, which gives rise to the current proceedings and clearly was engendered by the need to obtain a medical report. One can perhaps thereby deduce the cynicism with which the current proceedings have been approached by the defendant. Nevertheless Dr Streimer, who would appear to specialise somewhat in PTSD, is firmly of the view that the cause of the plaintiff's PTSD is his experience at the Strathfield massacre. 126At the foot of the first page is a report of 10 January 2010. The doctor says that, on the balance of probabilities, the cause of the PTSD that the plaintiff was suffering from at the time of his "resignation" from the New South Wales Police in 1997 was caused by his exposure to the events at the Strathfield massacre. He then goes on, on the following page, to set out his reasons for coming to that opinion. At the foot of the second page the doctor says this: "I can find no evidence that the PTSD that Mr Page was suffering from at the time of his resignation form [sic] the Police Force on 19 March 1997 was caused by any of his childhood experiences." 127The doctor then spends the following page and a third giving his reasons for that view. At the foot of p 3 the doctor says this: "In exploring this developmental history, while there were difficult circumstances and a few frightening incidents they do not constitute evidence of disorder. I elicited no symptoms of childhood difficulties of any clinical significance, no symptoms of childhood anxiety disorders and especially no symptoms sufficient to diagnose a childhood PTSD. There is no evidence of neglect, abandonment or abuse. His parents, especially his mother seemed to have been actively positively involved with him both at home and in hospital. There was no evidence of childhood mental health problems, no maladjustment, no disorder diagnosed at the time nor did I subsequently retrospectively consider that there was any evidence that such a diagnosis was present or likely." 128In addition to what the plaintiff had told Dr Streimer, the doctor was also provided with the records that are now available from the Royal Hospital for Children, Camperdown. When asked to specifically comment on those records, Dr Streimer said in his supplementary report of 26 July 2011: "In my opinion there is no evidence from the copies of the records obtained from the Children's Hospital at Westmead (of the notes from the then Camperdown Children's Hospital) that the conditions of childhood eczema and asthma that Ron Page suffered or the consequent hospitalisation caused or materially contributed to a PTSD." 129The doctor then spends the rest of the page, that is most of p 6 of that supplementary report, in giving his reasons for expressing that view. 130The next psychiatrist to see the plaintiff was Dr Graham Edwards, who was qualified by STC. Dr Edwards saw the plaintiff on 8 December 2008. His report is a mere six and a half pages, for which I am grateful. It is clearly the report that was relied upon by PSAC to issue the certificate which it did. His diagnosis was of PTSD. He thought the plaintiff had suffered from that condition from 1991 and that it was present at the time that the plaintiff left the Police Force. He thought the condition was apparent and was described by Dr Streimer in reports dated 1992, 1995 and 1996. 131As to on the question of the extent of the infirmity, Dr Edwards expressed this view: "I believe he would not have been able to cope with the full normal responsibilities of a police officer [even] if he was not dismissed." 132Presumably, the doctor might think that the plaintiff may have been able to cope with duties at the PCYC or perhaps even duties in the Highway Patrol but not general duties. On page 6 of his report, the doctor expressly accepts that the relevant stressor in 1991 was the Strathfield massacre. 133The plaintiff relied upon a number of reports of Dr Peter Klug who gave oral evidence on two occasions, in 2010 and more recently last week. Dr Klug initially interviewed the plaintiff on 7 December 2009 and 7 January 2010. His primary report is of seven pages. Dr Klug diagnosed an acute stress disorder for approximately a month after the plaintiff's exposure to scenes of the Strathfield massacre and then expressed the view that the plaintiff suffered chronic PTSD, which was impartial or substantial remission. I am afraid I do like to apply Ockham's Razor, why should one accept an acute stress disorder and then the development of a PTSD when the diagnosis of PTSD alone is sufficient to explain the plaintiff's psychiatric symptoms? 134There are supplementary reports from Dr Klug of 6 August 2010 of three pages, of 1 November 2010 of eleven pages and of 5 October 2011 of four pages. Dr Klug made it abundantly clear that he accepted the diagnosis of PTSD and that he thought the relevant stressor was the Strathfield massacre on 17 August 1991, and could discern on the history that he obtained and the histories put to him in various ways that that was the only matter which could be an appropriate stressor. Indeed, the doctor specifically denied that the plaintiff's childhood experiences, that is, experiences relating to his chronic eczema and chronic asthma and the treatment for those conditions, could be a pertinent stressor sufficient to cause PTSD. 135Dr Peter Snowdon was the doctor initially qualified by the defendant. Dr Snowdon interviewed the plaintiff on 20 January 2010. His initial report is 33 pages long. There is a subsequent supplementary report dated 18 March 2010 which is of 12 pages, and a further supplementary report of 5 November 2010 which is three pages long. Dr Snowdon was not called by the defendant but by the plaintiff. In his primary report, Dr Snowdon expressed the view that the plaintiff did develop PTSD as a result of the Strathfield massacre on 17 August 1991. 136However, Dr Snowdon was of the view that the plaintiff had no symptoms of PTSD after 6 January 1997; essentially Dr Snowdon thought the plaintiff had recovered. However, in his oral evidence he made it clear that the only possible stressor was the Strathfield massacre. However, he did make concessions that it was possible that the plaintiff's childhood experiences might cause PTSD. 137The next medical report is from Professor Alexander McFarlane. Professor McFarlane interviewed the plaintiff on 19 July 2011 for four hours. Professor McFarlane's report is a mere 43 pages long. His curriculum vitae is a mere 61 pages long. The length of a doctor's report does not make that the opinion expressed by that doctor of any greater utility than one expressed in a shorter report. Indeed, busy judges would prefer all reports to be shorter rather than prolix. However, it must be acknowledged that Professor McFarlane was a very impressive witness, impressive not only because of his demeanour in giving evidence and of his ability to answer questions without any hint of advocacy, but also impressive because of his erudition and qualifications. 138As I said, his full curriculum vitae is 61 pages long. At the commencement of his report there is a "Brief CV". The "Brief CV" itself is hardly "brief", but I will quote it to show the calibre of the witness: "I am currently Head of the University of Adelaide Node of the Centre of Traumatic Stress Studies, having previously been Head of the Department of Psychiatry. I qualified in Medicine in 1976 with Honours, receiving the top distinction in the final three years of the course. I completed my specialist in Psychiatry in 1980. Since 1983, my area of particular speciality has been the effects of traumatic stress. I was awarded the degree of Doctor of Medicine in 1990, based on longitudinal research into the aftermath of the Ash Wednesday Bushfires in South Australia. Subsequently I became an international expert in the field of the impact of disasters and post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). My research has focused on the epidemiology and longitudinal course of PTSD as well as the neuro-imaging of the cognitive deficits in this disorder. I have a particular interest in the impact of childhood trauma and its impact on adult adjustment. I have published over 250 articles and chapters in various refereed journals and has [sic] co-edited three books. In the medico-legal arena I have longstanding experience, including writing a report for the United Nations about the Compensation Commission for the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. I have also been engaged by the Ministry of Defence in the United Kingdom in the matters relating to the Falkland Island, Gulf War and Northern Ireland Veterans. I was also an expert witness for the plaintiffs in a class action by officers of the Royal Ulster Constabulary relating to the duty of care during the Northern Ireland Troubles. I have acted as a specific adviser to the Department of Veterans' Affairs, including the Scientific Advisory committee examining the health and psychological status of Gulf War Veterans. I am a Past President of both the International Society for Traumatic Stress Studies and the Australasian Society for Traumatic Stress Studies. I am the recipient of the Robert Laufer Award for outstanding scientific achievement in the field of traumatic stress. In 2008, I was awarded the Organon Senior Research Award of the RANZCP for the most outstanding contribution to psychiatric research in the last five years. I am also the recipient of the Founders Medal of the Australasian Society for Psychiatric Research awarded to individuals who have made a contribution of significance to psychiatric research over their entire career. I hold the rank of Group Captain in the RAAF Specialist Reserve and have acted as an advisor to many groups in post disaster situations, including the Kuwait Government, and the United Nations. I have lectured and run workshops in Europe, United States of America, Asia and South Africa. My main duties in the Centre of Military and Veterans' Health are as the chief investigator of the Middle East Area of Operations Deployment Health Surveillance Program. This $11 million defence funded project is assessing the physical and psychological health of all of the 25,000 Australian Defence Force members who have been deployed to the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. The project will also use a prospective methodology to study troops prior to and after deployment in the next 3 years. Conjointly with this project I am the principal investigator of principal [sic] also hold an NHMRC Program Grant from 2010-2014 worth $7.5 million investigating the aetiology, course and treatment of posttraumatic psychopathology with Professors Bryant, Silove and Creamer. In 2011, I received the Officer of the Order of Australia award in the Australia Day Honours List. The award recognises outstanding contribution to medical research in the field of psychiatry, particularly posttraumatic stress disorders, to veterans' mental health management, and as an author." 139In his lengthy report, Professor McFarlane diagnoses PTSD and assigns that condition to the plaintiff's experiences at the Strathfield massacre. Indeed, Professor McFarlane, who also gave oral evidence, made it clear that there was no history to him of anything else that could have caused the plaintiff's PTSD, and he included in that all the assumptions that were put to him concerning the plaintiff's treatment as a child for chronic asthma and chronic eczema, as well as the event the plaintiff thought might have been an attempt by a dentist to strangle him when masking the plaintiff's face with a mask to administer an aesthetic. The evidence as I said is all one way. 140Not only did the plaintiff retain a further expert, so did the defendant. The defendant qualified on this occasion Dr Alex Apler. Dr Apler's primary report is 18 pages long and a supplementary report is three pages long. Essentially Dr Apler did not believe the plaintiff had PTSD or was incapacitated by it; that he was not incapable of performing the duties of a police officer at the time of his discharge by reason of a PTSD. However, in his primary report he expressed the view that the plaintiff's PTSD was caused by the Strathfield massacre on 17 August 1991 and that it was not caused by the proposed transfer from the PCYC to general duties in November 1996, nor by the termination of the plaintiff's services on 19 March 1997, nor was it caused or materially contributed to by the plaintiff's childhood experiences. 141He also expressed the view that the infirmity was not aggravated, accelerated, exacerbated or caused to be made worse as a result of the work that the plaintiff performed as a police officer. He confirmed that it was not caused by any non work-related factors, and that was attributable to the plaintiff's involvement in the Strathfield massacre. The extent of the doctor's evidence can be summed-up in a pithy cross-examination. That cross-examination was not conducted by Mr Naylor but by me, because I had a raging desire to bring this litigation to an end, rather than any bias. That examination is this: "Q. Doctor, as a matter of law I am faced with an irrefragable fact. I have to accept that the plaintiff did develop PTSD. The law requires me to because of statute. Now, in your view is the Strathfield massacre the sort of stressor which could cause a PTSD? A. Potentially it could, your Honour. Q. On the history you obtained was any other stressor to which Mr Page exposed in the course of his life prior to 1997 capable of causing PTSD? ... A. Your Honour, I did not identify any other stressor that could have caused PTSD in Mr Page's case." 142The material which I excluded from that quotation is Mr Hutchings's objecting to my question and of my allowing it. 143As I said yesterday, the evidence in this matter is really all one way. The only stressor which everyone can accept might cause PTSD is the plaintiff's experience at the Strathfield massacre. Dr Snowdon raised as a possibility that the plaintiff's childhood experiences might be a cause of the PTSD. That has now been thoroughly explored and for the reasons that I gave yesterday afternoon, when I recited what is likely to happen to the plaintiff between his 13th year and the time of the Strathfield massacre, it appears to me to be extremely unlikely, implausible or improbable that the plaintiff had any illness during that lengthy period of time. 144Therefore, no conclusion is open to me other than to find that the irrefragable fact, the existence of PTSD, was caused by the plaintiff's exposure to the Strathfield massacre. 145I understand entirely why the defendant has contested these proceedings. It would appear that each time the plaintiff sought care from Dr Streimer it was because of some event which could be described as "industrial", such as a transfer initially from Highway Patrol to general duties, then of "cooking the books", then of acting contrary to instructions in taking forbidden second employment, and then being transferred from the PCYC back to general duties. The plaintiff was then removed from the Police Force pursuant to s 181D on 19 March 1997 and made no application for a pension until 2008. The defendant was certainly entitled to approach this case cynically. 146Alternative findings might be available to the Court if the diagnosis had not been PTSD but as I have said that is an irrefragable fact which cannot be overcome by anything that I might find or, if I so found, I would fall into legal error. 147However the defendant's cynicism is not reflected when one considers all the evidence. The medical evidence explains why the plaintiff could react adversely to a transfer back to general duties, as happened in January 1992 and November 1996, and as to why he "cooked the books" in late 1994: these may be the consequences of PTSD, as I have earlier pointed out. Furthermore, the evidence of Mrs Page negated any suggestion of the plaintiff's using his symptoms manipulatively: his symptoms have deeply affected his relationships with his wife, his children, extended family and friends. Her evidence about that is this: "10. From the early 1970s onwards Ron and I and our children had a group of friends who we regularly socialised with. We spent a lot of time together. We went away together on holidays at Christmas. In about 1993 one of the women from the group came to see me and said words to the effect, "I have been elected to tell you that we would prefer you didn't come on our next holiday together. Ron's behaviour is become more erratic and it is hard to enjoy yourself when you are worried about the next time he will lose his temper? I was very upset because I enjoyed our holidays together and it was good for our children and I thought that I had been covering for Ron so that people didn't notice that he wasn't the man that he once had been. 11. Increasingly after the end of 1991 my family became more socially isolated because people stopped inviting us to social occasions. Ron withdrew from social activities and he told me he did not want me to get involved in social activities. 12. In or about 1996 I went back to Ireland for a holiday with my children for an extended period of time. I wanted my family in Ireland to see my children but also I welcomed the break away from Ron for a little while. It had been getting increasingly difficult to cope with living with him and protecting the children from his behaviour. I felt the boys and I were walking on egg shells trying not to upset Ron. He had outbursts of temper and would become enraged when little things in his life or the life of our children went wrong. He was very strict with the boys and would stress about their welfare. He would wait up until they came home at night and would only go to sleep after they returned, even [though] they were young adults. To this day, he will become angry about minor things such as when a shopping trolley is left in his way in a supermarket aisle or because the children haven't parked their cars where he considers they should be placed outside our home. 13. I observed that after the Strathfield massacre in 1991 Ron's sleep became disturbed. He would sometimes wake me during the night and complain of tiredness in the morning. I have observed him to wake up in a sweat and change the singlet he has been sleeping in. Ron did not appear to have any sleeping problems before the Strathfield massacre." 148I have inquired of the representatives of the parties and whether any further reasons for judgment are required. I am told none is so required. For those reasons I set aside the decision of the Commissioner of Police of 4 March 2009 and I determine that the infirmity of "post traumatic stress disorder" certified by the Police Superannuation Advisory Committee on 26 February 2009 was caused by the plaintiff's having been hurt on duty on 17 August 1991. 149I order the defendant to pay the plaintiff's costs. 150Costs reserved on 14 November 2011 are costs in the cause.

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