PRESENT APPLICATION
17 The applicants say that the proposed action is not protected because there are two provisions in the Union's Proposed Enterprise Agreement that do not pertain to the relationship between employer and employee. These are cls 7 and 16.
18 Clause 7 is in the following terms:
"7. Application
7.1 This agreement shall prevail over any awards or certified agreements which bind Pacific National (to the extent that those awards or certified agreements are inconsistent with this Agreement.
7.2 Where local agreements, customs or practices or other arrangements have been reached at a location or locations, these will continue to apply. Where the parties to these agreements propose to alter such, they will give each of the other parties and affected employees reasonable notice of their intention to alter these arrangements and commence consultations in accordance with clause *** of this agreement."
19 The applicants say that this provision does not relate to the employer/employee relationship, or cannot be said to relate to the employer/employee relationship, because it makes applicable a whole range of local agreements, customs, and practices or arrangements which are unspecified in relation to a myriad of locations. Therefore, having regard to the vagueness and indeterminacy of the description of these unspecified agreements, cl 7 cannot be said to pertain to the employer/employee relationship. The applicants submit that there may be one or more provisions in the unspecified agreements that are invalidated, for example, by the decision in Electrolux. Accordingly, this non-pertaining reference to the continuance of local agreements must infect the whole of the Proposed Enterprise Agreement, with the consequence that, as a whole, the Proposed Enterprise Agreement cannot be said to pertain to the employee/employer relationship as such.
20 In this case, I do not have to decide whether the submission will succeed but only whether it raises a serious question for consideration at trial. The Union submits that there is no possibility of invalidity because it would be a simple matter to annex to the Proposed Enterprise Agreement all the local agreements that are intended to continue in operation. It is a matter of particularisation or a matter of mechanics. This would resolve any doubt. However, that course is not suggested as part of the Proposed Enterprise Agreement as presently framed.
21 The authorities indicate that the expression "serious question to be tried" incorporates concepts such as whether there is a sufficiently strong arguable case to warrant the matter forming a basis for relief, whether the argument is open or fanciful, and whether the intervention of the Court could be justified as raised on the facts and law before the Court.
22 In Finance Sector Union of Australia v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2005] FCA 796 at [74]-[80], Merkel J considered a provision in a proposed agreement which provided that, during the operation of the agreement, the employer and an employee may enter into an individual contract of employment which may exclude the operation of the principal agreement, so that, where such a contract was made, it would prevail over the terms of the principal agreement to the extent of any inconsistency. After considering the relevant provisions of the Act, his Honour concluded at [80]:
"In my view, subject to a probable exception in respect of facilitative provisions, it is an implicit requirement of the statutory provisions to which I have referred that the agreement being certified contain all of the terms that are to have effect as a result of the certification. That construction gives effect to the purpose of the relevant provisions, is reasonably open and should be adopted." (Emphasis added)
23 Counsel for the Union argues that this assertion is incorrect and is distinguishable from the present case. However, I am persuaded that the conclusion of Merkel J and the reasons given provide a sufficient basis for the submission of the applicants in the present case and therefore the threshold criterion of raising a serious question for trial is satisfied.
24 The second provision of the proposed agreement that the applicants say does not pertain to the employer/employee relationship is cl 16, which relates to the use of contract labour and labour hire agencies.
25 Clause 16 relevantly provides:
"16.1 Contract labour or labour hire agency employees shall not be used to displace full time employees or their positions, but as supplementary labour to cover peak demand, unplanned or extended leave, special programs, projects, identified skill shortages or wherever reasonably required by the needs of the business."
26 There are other provisions in cl 16 which impose a requirement of consultation where the employer proposes to contract out work currently performed by its own employees and there are also provisions to the effect that in using contract labour it is not the employer's intention to put in place arrangements where the employees of a contract or a labour hire agency receive less favourable terms and conditions. There is also a reference to understandings between the parties and a description of the circumstances in which the labour is to be regarded as "supplementary" to the employer's workforce. A further provision is that it is not the intention of the clause to restrict the employer's right to engage labour from contractors and labour hire agencies.
27 On the basis of a recent decision of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission in Re Rural City of Murray Bridge Nursing Employees, ANF (Aged Care) - Enterprise Agreement 2004, PR952449, 29 October 2004, at [71]-[83], the Union submits that there is reasoning to warrant the conclusion that there is no room for a serious question as to whether cl 16 of the Proposed Enterprise Agreement relates to the employment relationship as such. The Commission there decided that a clause requiring that the agreed maximum level of employees of labour hire agencies would be 20% of total weekly paid employees, pertained to the employer/employee relationship. The applicants submit that this decision is wrong, that it is distinguishable, and that, in any event, the reasoning of the Commission does not place the present submission beyond reasonable argument.
28 In Murray Bridge, the relevant clause stated that the employer and unions confirm a commitment to permanent direct employment but recognise that labour flexibility is an ongoing requirement to achieve job security and productivity requirements. Clause 17.2 provided that the agreed maximum level of employees of labour hire agencies will be 20% of the total weekly paid employees. If the percentage exceeds 20%, then the employer must consult with the shop stewards as to the reasons why the additional labour hire agency employees are required.
29 In the present case, cl 16.1 prohibits contract labour or labour hire agency employees to displace full time employees but permits them as supplementary labour. This clause is different in substance to that considered in Murray Bridge because it prohibits displacement of existing employees whereas the clause in Murray Bridge did not. Rather, the clause in Murray Bridge recognised a right to employ contract labour but only up to 20% of the total weekly paid employees. The decision in Murray Bridge is therefore distinguishable and by no means dictates the outcome of the present case or puts the submission of the applicants beyond reasonable argument.
30 It should be noted that, in Murray Bridge at [78], the Commission, after referring to the authorities, admitted to "some difficulty in characterising this provision, comprised as it is as of a series of sub-clauses with a number of legal effects". The Commission agreed that was a question of degree. The Commission continued at [78]:
"On the one hand, it may be accepted that Schefenacker's employees have a legitimate interest in the engagement of labour hire employees because of the effect of such engagement on their own employment. For that reason it may be that the engagement of labour hire employees is a matter pertaining to the relationship between Schefenacker and its own employees. On the other hand, the extent to which the agreement can regulate the contractual relationship between Schefenacker and labour hire agencies, yet still pertain to the relevant relationship, is obviously a question of degree."
31 As a matter of construction, in the present circumstances, there is a reasonable argument that a requirement that contract labour may only be "supplementary" labour and used in limited circumstances, is a matter which pertains more to a management decision than to the relationship between employer and employee as such. Insofar as Murray Bridge indicates a contrary view, it should be noted that the Commission had difficulty in characterising the provision and stated that the determination of the characterisation involved a question of degree, thereby implying that reasonable minds may well differ as to the conclusion to be reached. It does not provide a sufficient basis for a conclusion that the characterisation question is not seriously arguable in the present case.
32 In Wesfarmers Premier Coal Ltd v Automotive Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union (No. 2) (2004) 138 IR 362, French J decided that a clause in a proposed agreement imposing restrictions or qualifications on the use by the employer of independent contractors was a matter which did not pertain to the relationship between employer and employee in their capacities as such within the principles set out in Electrolux. His Honour cited and applied the decisions of the High Court in R v Commonwealth Industrial Court Judges; Ex parte Cocks (1968) 121 CLR 313 and R v Moore; Ex-parte Federated Miscellaneous Workers Union of Australia (1978) 140 CLR 470.
33 Having regard to the above, it is evident that the law is not clear in this area. Nor is the applicants' case beyond reasonable argument. In my opinion, reasonable arguments can be presented on either side in this grey area, which requires application of the principles endorsed in Electrolux.
34 On the limited material presently before me, I am inclined to find that the correct conclusion is that advanced for the applicants, however, the question is by no means free from doubt.
35 I am persuaded that the case advanced for the applicants raises a serious question that warrants the matter proceeding to trial.
36 These are the reasons for which I granted the relief and made the orders.
I certify that the preceding thirty-six (36) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Tamberlin J.