INFRINGEMENT
26 In a number of respects the infringement questions which arise on appeal require a construction of the claims in suit, which will also provide a basis for our consideration of the matters of validity to which we shall turn later. Although not, as a matter of principle at least, controversial as between the parties, we should commence by referring to the approach which the court takes to such questions. It is useful to do this by reference to the summary provided by the Full Court in Pfizer Overseas Pharmaceuticals v Eli Lilly & Co (2005) 225 ALR 416, 467-469.
27 The Full Court noted, apparently with approval, the ten principles of construction set out by Sheppard J in Decor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1988) 13 IPR 385, 400; 225 ALR at 468 [249]:
(1) The claims define the invention which is the subject of the patent. These must be construed according to their terms upon ordinary principles. Any purely verbal or grammatical question that can be answered according to ordinary rules for the construction of written documents is to be resolved accordingly.
(2) It is not legitimate to confine the scope of the claims by reference to limitations which may be found in the body of the specification but are not expressly or by proper inference reproduced in the claims themselves. To put it another way, it is not legitimate to narrow or expand the boundaries of monopoly as fixed by the words of a claim by adding to those words glosses drawn from other parts of the specification.
(3) Nevertheless, in approaching the task of construction, one must read the specification as a whole.
(4) In some cases the meaning of the words used in the claims may be qualified or defined by what is said in the body of the specification.
(5) If a claim be clear, it is not to be made obscure because obscurities can be found in particular sentences in other parts of the document. But if an expression is not clear or is ambiguous, it is permissible to resort to the body of the specification to define or clarify the meaning of words used in the claim.
(6) A patent specification should be given a purposive construction rather than a purely literal one.
(7) In construing the specification, the court is not construing a written instrument operating inter partes, but a public instrument which must define a monopoly in such a way that it is not reasonably capable of being misunderstood.
(8) The body, apart from the preamble, is there to instruct those skilled in the art concerned in the carrying out of the invention; provided it is comprehensible to, and does not mislead, a skilled reader, the language used is seldom of importance.
(9) Nevertheless, the claims, since they define the monopoly, will be scrutinised with as much care as is used in construing other documents defining a legal right.
(10) If it is impossible to ascertain what the invention is from a fair reading of the specification as a whole, it will be invalid. But the specification must be construed in the light of the common knowledge in the art before the priority date.
As will appear, Nos. (1) - (6) and (9) on Sheppard J's list have the potential to be important in the present appeal.
28 In Pfizer, the Full Court also noted that the "clear words of a claim are not to be distorted by importing passages from the specification" and that "when a claim is clear it is not to be glossed or obscured by reference to the specification" (225 ALR at 467 [247]). In this respect their Honours referred to the words of Barwick CJ and Mason J in Interlego AG v Toltoys Pty Ltd (1973) 130 CLR 461, 478 that "it is not permissible to vary or qualify the plain and unambiguous meaning of the claim by reference to the body of the specification" (225 ALR at 467 [247]). However, as their Honours in Interlego also pointed out, where an expression is not clear "it is…permissible to resort to the body of the specification to define or clarify the meaning of words used in the claim…" (225 ALR at 468 [248]).
29 The correct approach to the construction of claims has been referred to in two recent judgments of the Full Court. In Insta Image Pty Ltd v KD Kanopy Australasia Pty Ltd [2008] FCAFC 139, [82] the Full Court said:
Construction of claims is a matter for the Court: Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co v Tyco Electronics Pty Ltd (2002) 53 IPR 32 at [92]; Fresenius Medical Care Australia Pty Ltd v Gambro Pty Ltd (2005) 67 IPR 230 at [34], and other authorities. When claims are being construed, the specification is to be read as a whole in order that the necessary background to the invention may be known and words or expressions used in the claims may be understood: British Thomson-Houston Co Ltd v Corona Lamp Works Ltd (1922) 39 RPC 49 at 67; Rosedale Associated Manufacturers Ltd v Carlton Tyre Saving Co Ltd [1960] RPC 59 at 60, cited with approval by Sheppard J in Decor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1988) 13 IPR 385 at 399. However, where a claim is clear and unambiguous, it is not permissible to resort to the specification in order to qualify it: Welch Perrin & Co Pty Ltd v Worrel (1961) 196 CLR 588 at 610; Interlego AG v Toltoys Pty Ltd (1973) 130 CLR 461 (Interlego) at 478; Atlantis Corp Pty Ltd v Schindler (1997) 39 IPR 29 at 35, 48; Kimberly-Clark Australia Pty Ltd v Arico Trading International Pty Ltd (2001) 207 CLR 1 (Kimberly-Clark)at [15]. It may, however, be possible to resolve any ambiguity or lack of clarity by reference to the body of the specification; cf Interlego at 479; Kimberly-Clark at [15].
In Kinabalu Investments Pty Ltd v Barron and Rawson Pty Ltd [2008] FCAFC 178, [44]-[45] the Full Court said:
The principles of construction applicable were not in dispute. When determining the nature and extent of the monopoly claimed, the specification must be read as a whole. But as a whole it is made up of several parts which have different functions. The claims mark out the legal limits of the monopoly granted. The specification describes how to carry out the process claimed and the best method known to the patentee of doing that. Although the claims are construed in the context of the specification as a whole, it is not legitimate to narrow or expand the boundaries of monopoly as fixed by the words of a claim, by adding to those words glosses drawn from other parts of the specification. If a claim is clear and unambiguous, it is not to be varied, qualified or made obscure by statements found in other parts of the document. It is legitimate, however, to refer to the rest of the specification to explain the background of the claims, to ascertain the meaning of technical terms and resolve ambiguities in the construction of the claims. See Flexible Steel Lacing Co v Beltreco Ltd (2000) 49 IPR 331 at [73]‑[75] (Hely J).
Other more specific principles of construction collected in Flexible Steel at [81] are:
· a specification should be given a purposive construction rather than a purely literal one;
· the hypothetical addressee of the specification is the non‑inventive person skilled in the art before the priority date;
· the words used in a specification are to be given the meaning the hypothetical addressee would attach to them, both in the light of the addressee's own general knowledge and in the light of what is disclosed in the body of the specification;
· as a general rule, the terms of the specification should be accorded their ordinary English meaning;
· evidence can be given by experts on the meaning those skilled in the art would give to technical or scientific terms and phrases, and on unusual or special meanings given by such persons to words which might otherwise bear their ordinary meaning;
· however, the construction of the specification is for the court, not for the expert. In so far as a view expressed by an expert depends upon a reading of the patent, it cannot carry the day unless the court reads the patent in the same way.
30 Turning to the infringement issues which are controversial in the present appeal, we commence with so much of the appellants' notice of contention in the cross-appeal as is concerned with the term "digging edge" when used in claims 1 and 51 of Jones II. The appellants submitted that the digging edge was the very front extremity of the face of the bucket, like the cutting edge of a knife, for example. They then pointed to the circumstance that the boss in their T-bolt and J-bolt assemblies is fixed (eg by welding) onto the flat surface of the excavator bucket, a small distance back from the edge as so understood. No part of the boss is attached to, or fixed to, the edge as such. The respondents submitted that the digging edge was the front portion of the digging face of the bucket, including the extremity thereof, but extending also a short distance back therefrom. They submitted that the appellants' construction would make a nonsense of the claims, since (and this was common ground) an apparatus subjected to the kind of stresses to which components made in accordance with the claims would inevitably be subject could never have worked if fixed or attached on the extremity only. In the respondents' submission, therefore, the appellants' boss was "fixed to the digging edge" notwithstanding that it was located some short distance back from the extremity and that no part of it was in contact with the extremity. The primary Judge upheld that submission, and held that the appellants' assemblies fell within these words in claims 1 and 51 of Jones II.
31 On appeal, the appellants submitted that his Honour had misunderstood the position for which they contended. They did not contend that claims 1 and 51 should be construed so as to imply an attachment on the extremity of the flat surface of the bucket only, but contended rather that the claims required at least that the boss be fixed, in the sense of secured, to that extremity notwithstanding that it would, for the sake of strength and stability (and quite obviously so, in the submission of the appellants) also be fixed further back along the flat surface. They submitted that this interpretation of the expression "digging edge" found support, including diagrammatic support, in the detailed description of the invention contained in the complete specification. Here the appellants were referring to a design and configuration of the boss which is given pre-eminence in the detailed description, and which fits over the leading extremity of the bucket, having a leg extending back along each of the upper and lower faces of the flat surface of the bucket. Being held in place by weld beads or similar, the boss is, according to the appellants, adapted to be fixed to the digging edge.
32 Quite apart from the considerations of structural strength to which his Honour referred, however, there are clear indications in the claims in Jones II that the expression "digging edge" includes a reference to the flat surface of the bucket somewhat to the rear of the extremity as such. A number of claims (6, 10, 20, 26, 34, 40) refer to "the digging edge having an inside face and an outside face". A number of claims refer to a leg of the wear member extending "rearwardly over the digging edge" (10, 20, 26). Claims 5 and 9, in referring to the "deflector", requires it to be fixed "to the digging edge rearward of the said boss". Claim 34 refers to a boss with a surface which has "a clamping section adapted to wrap around the digging edge and engage front portions of the inside face and the outside face". It is as clear as may be from these uses of the expression "digging edge" in various claims that the expression is to be understood as including a general reference to the flat structural portion of the bucket lying immediately to the rear of, and not being confined to, the front extremity thereof.
33 That conclusion is not contradicted by a consideration of other provisions of the complete specification. The appellants' construction of claim 1 is, it seems, influenced by what the complete specification refers to as "the preferred construction", that is, one in which "a clamp section is formed along the first surface to wrap about the front digging edge of the excavator". Such a construction is the subject of much, but not all, of the detailed description and, as the appellants pointed out, of many of the accompanying diagrams. However, as counsel for the respondents pointed out, the detailed description also provides an example of the invention in which the adapter (ie the wear assembly itself) wraps around the leading edge of the bucket, but the boss does not. Rather, the boss is fixed only to the flat surface of the bucket, a little distance to the rear of the front extremity thereof.
34 For those reasons, we reject the appellants' proposition that the "digging edge" referred to in claims 1 and 51 of Jones II is a reference to the front extremity of the bucket. It follows that we do not accept that a configuration in which the boss is placed somewhat to the rear of the front extremity, and does not wrap around it, lies outside those claims.
35 We turn next to the point arising on the cross-appeal as such, namely, whether either of the appellants' shroud assemblies incorporates an opening extending "through" the rearwardly extending leg of the wear member, as required by claims 1 and 51 of Jones II. The primary Judge held that it was common ground that neither the T-bolt assembly nor the J-bolt assembly incorporated an opening which passed the whole way through the body thereof. On the cross-appeal, the appellants conceded that his Honour had been mistaken in saying that it was common ground that the opening in the J-bolt assembly did not pass the whole of the way through the body thereof. Indeed, the appellants conceded that it did. This point, therefore, was controversial only with respect to the T-bolt assembly, in relation to which it was, and it remains, common ground that the opening does not pass the whole way through. That is because the groove in the shroud which contains the bolt terminates, at one end thereof, in the form of a cavity adapted to receive the head of the bolt. There is, therefore, no "opening" at that end.
36 The point on the cross-appeal with respect to the T-bolt assembly is, therefore, as it was before his Honour: should claims 1 and 51 of Jones II be construed so as to require that the opening there referred to pass the whole way through the body of the assembly - in the sense of having an opening at each end joined by a continuous open passage - or will it be sufficient if the opening passes some distance only through the body? The Oxford English Dictionary (2nd Ed) gives the signification of "through" as "the preposition expressing the relation of transition or direction within something from one limit of it to the other: primarily in reference to motion in space …." The sense most relevant to the present context is "from one end, side, or surface to the other or opposite end, side or surface of (a body or a space) by passing within it; usually implying into, at one end, side etc and out at the other." In the context of, say, a person or object in motion, passage "through" a body or space does usually imply an entry into, and an exit from, that body or space (such as, for example, a train passing through a tunnel). However, where the context is not one of motion, but involves the definition of a space by reference to an object by which it is generally enclosed, it makes little sense to envisage the actions of entry and exit. In such a context, to say that the opening extends "through" the body is, in our opinion, clearly to say that it commences at one side, end or extremity, and ends at another.
37 This understanding of "through" in the present context is confirmed by the sense conveyed by the word "extending". That word implies that the opening passes wholly through the object referred to. It is confirmed also by the concept of an "opening" as such. When used with respect to an otherwise generally solid object, an "opening" connotes a gap, hole, passage or aperture. On the respondents' construction of "through", there would be such an opening at one end only. The other end of the cavity referred to would not be "open". For an opening to extend through an object requires, in our view, that each end be open.
38 For those reasons we uphold the respondents' point that the appellants' J-bolt assembly incorporates an opening which extends through it as required by claims 1 and 51 of Jones II; but we reject their like point with respect to the T-bolt assembly.
39 That leaves what is probably the most difficult aspect of the respondents' infringement claims, namely, the question whether the appellants' shroud assemblies incorporate a lock with the features required (in the case of the J-bolt assembly) by claims 1 and 51 of Jones II and/or (in the case of both assemblies) by claim 1 of Jones III. We shall commence with the question whether the J-bolt assembly falls within the terms of claim 1 of Jones II, in the course of which we shall resolve the constructional issues which are effectively common to all these questions. We shall then turn to the remaining questions.
40 The respondents say that the J-bolt itself, together with its washers and nuts, is the lock referred to in claim 1 of Jones II. They say that, when tightened and ready for operation, the bolt is properly described as "rigid". They say that the bolt is received into the opening in the shroud, in the sense of lying substantially within the confines of the semi-circular longitudinal groove contained therein. They say that the first face of the lock is constituted by the inside surface of the washer on the threaded end of the bolt, which face bears against (ie, in the words of the claim, opposes or engages) the rear end (ie the bearing face) of the boss. They say that the second face of the lock is the underside of the head of the J-bolt, which face is drawn (by tightening the nut) into (ie, in the words of the claim, opposes and engages) the corresponding recess in the body of the shroud (ie a wall of the opening referred to in the claim). They say that the nut on the threaded shaft of the J-bolt is an adjustment assembly which may be tightened as the occasion demands to eliminate any looseness which may arise.
41 In par 16 above, we have identified the respects in which the appellants contended at trial that their shroud assemblies (including the J-bolt assembly) did not infringe this aspect of claim 1 of Jones II. We have also identified how the primary Judge dealt with the appellants' points. On appeal, the appellants submitted that his Honour's analysis did not "reflect a commonsense and practical approach to the interpretation of the claim" and was "based upon an over-meticulous and fragmentary analysis of language used in the claim". In our respectful view, there is some justification in these criticisms. To an extent, his Honour's approach was influenced by the way the appellants arranged their submissions before him. In their closing outline dated 14 December 2007, the appellants dealt with the "lock" aspects of the case in the following way. They had a section headed "A rigid lock received into said opening", in which they commenced by setting out the summary referred to by his Honour in the passage we have set out at par 16 above. They proceeded to deal with each of the characteristics there referred to in the some detail. As the wording implies, those aspects were concerned with Jones II. The next main section of the appellants' outline was headed "A lock 'received into the opening between the first and second bearing surfaces'" - a reference to Jones III. The final section of the outline was headed "Further includes an adjustment assembly" - a reference in terms to Jones II, but the text of the outline dealt also with corresponding provisions of Jones III.
42 As appears from what we have set out in pars 17-18 above, the primary Judge dealt with these aspects of the appellants' case as though they involved pure questions of construction, and even then his Honour appears not to have dealt with so much of that case as characterised the lock as one which acted as a shear member or, in the case of Jones III, as involved the requirement that the lock be set between the two bearing faces referred to. We shall return to Jones III, but, in the context of the present discussion (ie Jones II and the J-bolt), it does appear that his Honour did not come to grips with a central aspect of the appellants' case that required an identification of the basic mechanical principles involved in Jones II namely, the means of operation of the lock, and specifically the fact that the claim, properly understood in a practical and not merely a grammatical sense, is concerned with a lock which is set between slightly offset faces which would otherwise move towards each other, thereby operating as a shear member. As noted elsewhere in these reasons, when dealing with the question whether the opening had to extend "through" the wear member claimed in Jones II, his Honour was alive to what he described as the "geometric logic" of the claims, and the "engineering logic behind the design" of the wear assembly. However, his Honour did not, at least apparently, carry that logic forward into his consideration of the "lock" aspects of the claim.
43 It is, in our opinion, almost impossible to render a practical meaning to this aspect of claim 1 of Jones II without bringing to the task at least a general understanding of the invention as a whole and of the field of engineering in which it is said to be useful. The meaning of the word "lock" (relevantly to the present matter, ie excluding such things as a lock of hair) is based upon function rather than upon appearance or attributes. That is to say, a device or apparatus is a lock because it locks. Use of the word "lock" in the claim, therefore, reveals little about the essence of the invention, and invites further inquiry. The word is then qualified by the requirement that it be "rigid", but, out of context, that requirement may go no further than to exclude devices which are flexible or pliable in some sense. It is really the further characteristics of the lock, and how they operate in co-operation with the boss and the wear member to achieve locking, that illuminate what it is the inventors had in mind and thus the true scope of the claim in relevant respects. In other words, to know what is here claimed by the inventors, one needs to understand how it is proposed that the lock should work.
44 This brings us to the expert evidence in the proceeding below. What the words of a claim convey to an experienced professional in the relevant art is, of course, most relevant to the present question, although, as has frequently been stressed, the construction of a claim is ultimately a matter for the court to be done according to conventional legal principles. In the present case, each of Mr Alden and Prof Wightley expressed his understanding of what was conveyed by the claims in the patents in suit. They did not agree. They were extensively cross-examined, in the course of which reference was made to the complete specifications, particularly to the consistory clauses, and to the detailed descriptions of the inventions. In his reasons for judgment, the primary Judge said that, "[g]enerally, Mr Alden's evidence was not significantly shaken on cross-examination". His Honour also said that Prof Wightley's evidence "was tested but…not materially undermined".
45 In order to understand the point of departure as between the evidence of Mr Alden and that of Prof Wightley, it is useful to refer first to their affidavits in the order in which they were filed, as this illuminates the way the argument developed. In his affidavit of 15 May 2007, Mr Alden said that he had read the specifications in each of the patents in suit. From that, he understood that the inventions (ie Jones II and Jones III) had three main features, namely:
(a) a boss (or mount) which is fixed to the lip or digging edge of the excavator, having an external, or male, structural shape for attachment of a wear member and a prevention of movement of the wear member upwards and away from the inside surface of the bucket;
(b) a wear member having a complementary internal, or female, structural shape that attaches to the boss (or mount) by sliding over the male structural shape of the boss, and which by encompassing the boss, protects it from wear; and
(c) a lock that is received into an opening in the wear member, that acts against both the boss (or mount) and the wear member, preventing (longitudinal) removal of the wear member from the boss. The lock has facility for adjustment which enables tightening of the wear member onto the boss and/or digging edge.
Mr Alden reached that understanding without any knowledge of the infringements alleged by the respondents. He then considered the appellants' shroud assemblies, and expressed the view, with respect to the "lock" aspects with which we are presently concerned, that they fell within the claims in suit. In relation to the J-bolt assembly in the context of claim 1 of Jones II, Mr Alden's view was substantially as set out in par 40 above. He expressed like views with respect to the other claims in suit, and with respect to the T-bolt assembly under all three claims in suit (a matter to which we shall turn later).
46 In an affidavit sworn on 25 May 2007, Prof Wightley referred first to Jones I. In that patent, the disadvantages of the then prior art were referred to, and a summary of the invention was provided (as set out in the extract from Jones I in par 21 above). Referring to the lock in Jones I as a "key", Prof Wightley said:
A key is received into a cavity in the wear member extending at right angles to the centre line of the wear member. The key bears against the vertical bearing surface of the cavity in the wear member at the top half of the key. The bottom half of the key bears against the rear vertical bearing surface of the boss.
In this assembly, the key acts as a shear member preventing forward movement of the wear member which, if permitted, would allow the wear member to slide off and detach from the boss. I refer to the key as a "shear member" because it is subjected to shearing forces from the bearing surfaces of the wear member and the boss in that:
(a) the bearing surface of the boss exerts a force on the lower half of the front surface of the key; and
(b) the bearing surface of the wear member exerts a force on the top half of the rear surface of the key in the opposite direction.
47 In a further affidavit sworn on 16 August 2007, Prof Wightley turned his attention to Jones II and Jones III. He referred to his earlier affidavit and continued:
I consider that the "rigid lock" referred to in claims 1 and 51 of Jones II and the "lock" referred to in claim 1 of Jones III perform the same function as the key (or "lock") in Jones I. Both are shear members and are subjected to shear forces of the kind I have described in paragraphs 16 and 17 of my First Affidavit.
The language used in the claims to describe the function of the lock and the use of the word "boss", make it clear to me that the lock is a shear member. In particular, I refer to those words: "…said lock having a first face adapted to oppose and engage said bearing face of said boss and a second face adapted to oppose and engage a wall of said opening whereby said lock secures said wear member to said boss". In my opinion, these words describe the function of a shear member.
Other examples of shear members familiar to a mechanical engineer include lock plates, dowels, and key and keyways. In all these cases, they prevent one member sliding sideways relative to the adjacent member. If sliding occurs, the bearing faces in the members set up shear stresses in the shear members in a scissor-like action. In most cases, the fit of the shear member in the grooves in the adjacent member is not a tight fit and some form of tightening arrangement is also required.
Shear (or compressive) forces may be contrasted to tension (or elongation) forces. A member is subjected to tension forces when it is subjected to equal forces acting in opposite directions away from each other down the axis of the member. Examples of tension members are tie rods, bolts, friction grip joints and steel cables and rope.
Prof Wightley referred to Mr Alden's affidavit of 15 May 2007 and made four points in opposition to Mr Alden's opinion that the appellants' assemblies were covered by the claims in suit. First, he said that the claims required the lock to be "a single member and not a collection of component parts". Secondly, he said that the lock described in the claims was "in the nature of a rigid block which functions as a shear member", whereas the "so-called lock" in the appellants' assemblies "is only rigid when all of the identified constituent parts are assembled and tightened". Thirdly, he said that the forces applied (in the appellants' assemblies) when those components were assembled and tightened were "tensile forces, rather than shear forces", as required by the claims. Fourthly, he said that the adjustment assembly described in the claims was "an addition to the lock", not part of the lock itself.
48 In an affidavit sworn on 18 October 2007, Mr Alden referred to Prof Wightley's affidavit of 16 August 2007, and said that he did not agree with Prof Wightley's comments about shear forces and shear members. He said that it was "too simplistic and somewhat misleading to simply refer to components such as lock plates as 'shear members'." He said that shear members were "typically installed with a reasonably tight fit". He did not agree that shear forces and compression forces were the same. He exhibited to his affidavit a report in which he explained, with illustrations, the differences between the various forces of tension, compression, shear, bending and torsion. He provided, by reference to a diagram, an explanation of the various forces and stresses that would transfer through the lock assembly described in the preferred embodiment of the inventions in Jones II and Jones III. That diagram demonstrated that the lock, when installed in accordance with the preferred embodiment, would carry tension, compression and shear forces at different points.
49 It is necessary to refer further to Mr Alden's diagram, as it was the focus of much of the cross-examination at trial. The diagram was as follows:
Mr Alden's point was that it was compression forces, not shear forces, that operated at the interface between the rear of the boss and the front of the adjustment plug that was threaded into the lock. The tendency of the lock to bend as this compression force was applied induced tensile forces across the rear face of the lock and compression forces across the front face of the lock. The only place at which shear forces arose was through the threaded interface between the lock and its adjustment plug. As we understand the respondents' case, Mr Alden's evidence demonstrates that it cannot be by reference to the absence of tensile forces, or to reliance wholly upon shear forces, that the limits of the claims in suit are defined.
50 Under cross-examination, Prof Wightley was taken to Mr Alden's diagram, but adhered to his view that the forces at work upon a lock constructed in accordance with the claims in suit would, at least very substantially, be shear forces. He pointed out that Mr Alden's diagram had been dimensioned so as to show a fairly narrow plug-head relative to the width of the rear of the boss. Such a representation, according to Prof Wightley, emphasised the tendency of the lock to bend under compression. He said:
The rigid lock in Jones 2 and Jones 3 can and will function as a shear member under certain circumstances, and they are either that the adjustment assessment is not screwed up such that it bears against the back of the boss, and then the key - the lock - behaves in the same fashion as a Jones 1-type lock. And under those circumstances, it can fairly be described as a shear member.
More than that, the proportions of the bearing area of the bolt or the adjusting assembly, where it pressed on the back of the boss, is very important, because it tells us the clearance between the outside limit of the boss and the inside of the opening in the wear member. That particular area is where shear takes place. If the diameter of the bolt is large, relative to that gap, there will be almost no bending. It would be almost entirely of shear. If it's very narrow, as is shown by Mr Alden's analysis or diagram, then more bending takes place. But whatever happens, whether there's bending or no bending, same amount of shear is always present, and I believe that it's valid to depict - to call a member a shear member by the function it performs and the majority of the stresses that are likely to occur most of the time, during its service life.
Mr Alden accepted that, if there were no forwardly-protruding threaded plug in the lock, and the whole of the front face of the lock were in contact with the boss, the forces operating upon the lock would be shear forces.
51 It was no part of the claims in suit that the lock referred to must operate as a shear member. However, the debate between Prof Wightley and Mr Alden as to the engineering concepts was relevant to a practical understanding of the claims in suit. In the passage which we have set out in par 47 above, Prof Wightley quoted from the terms of claim 1 in Jones II. From those words it was clear to him that the claim referred to a lock which operated as a shear member. In contesting that proposition, Mr Alden demonstrated that a lock made in accordance with the claim would be subject, to an extent, to a range of forces including tension forces. However, he did so by reference to a diagram which showed a lock operating substantially in the way to which, in the submission of the appellants, the claim was confined, that is to say, a lock constituted by a block which received pressures from either side. Because the faces upon which the lock bore were offset to a degree, as Prof Wightley pointed out, shear forces were involved. The extent to which other forces were also involved depended upon the extent of bending forces arising from the action of the boss upon the lock, which in turn depended upon the width of the front end of the threaded plug relative to the width of the clearance, or gap, between the outside limit of the boss and the inside of the opening in the wear member.
52 Ultimately, the debate between Mr Alden and Prof Wightley was not to be resolved by determining that one was right and the other was wrong. Each recognised the validity of the position of the other with respect to particular conditions. We can understand why the primary Judge concluded that the evidence of neither was relevantly undermined in cross-examination. However, what his Honour's reasons do not disclose, with respect, is an appreciation that the whole debate was conducted in the context of a lock which sat between faces to be held apart. Relevantly to the present point, his Honour approached the problem as though it required a construction of the phrase "a rigid lock received into said opening" in Jones II and of the phrase "a lock received into the opening" in Jones III. He dealt with the problem as so identified in two stages, namely, the "rigid lock" point and the "received into the opening point". He held that there was no requirement for the lock to be rigid at the point of insertion into the opening, and that a lock could be "received" into the opening notwithstanding that it did not sit wholly therewithin. By dividing the problem up in this way, and by treating it substantially as a grammatical one, his Honour failed to read the relevant paragraphs of the claims as a whole and in practical way with a view to identifying, as a matter of engineering rather than merely of wording, the limits of the invention there claimed.
53 Informed by the practical understandings of Mr Alden and Prof Wightley in the way we have described, we return to words of claim 1 of Jones II. The claim requires that the lock be received into the opening in the leg of the wear member, that is to say, that it be positioned inside the opening. For present purposes, we regard it as immaterial whether the lock is wholly or only partly received into the opening. With the lock in that position (ie in the opening), it is required that the second face of the lock be adapted to oppose and engage a wall of the opening. This suggests that it should be an internal wall of the opening that the face of the lock opposes and engages. At the same time, it is required that the first face of the lock be adapted to oppose and engage the bearing face of the boss. Thus we have a component with two faces sitting inside an opening, where one of the faces opposes and engages an inside wall of the opening and the other opposes and engages the bearing face of a boss. It is the placement of the lock in that position which, of itself, "secures said wear member to said boss" (in which respect we note the use of the word "whereby"). In our view, the most natural thing which the words of the claim convey is a component whose function is to keep things apart.
54 A consideration of the complete specification in Jones II confirms the construction of claim 1 proffered above. The relevant statement in the summary of the invention is, "[t]he body of the lock sets between the rear end of the boss and the rear wall of the cross portion in order to prevent removal of the wear member from the boss". In the detailed description of the invention, various characteristics and intended functions of the lock in the preferred embodiments are provided as follows:
· the rear end of the boss "functions to abut lock member …";
· the opening in the adapter "is positioned near rear end … of leg … and rearward of rear bearing face…of boss … when adapter … is assembled on the boss …";
· the lock member "has a rigid block-shaped body … defined by a front wall …, a rear wall …, a first end wall …, and a second end wall …. Body … of lock … is received into cross portion … of opening … such that its front wall … opposes rear wall … of boss …, and its rear wall … opposes rear wall … of adapter .... This engagement structure effectively prevents the adapter from being moved forwardly along the boss.";
· if no adjustment assembly is incorporated, the adapter "can be amply secured to boss … by a rigid lock without an adjustment assembly … that simply prevents forward movement of the adapter. Under these conditions, the lock member and corresponding opening would be essentially the same as discussed in [Jones I] …".
The specification makes clear that these are the preferred embodiments only, and that other embodiments might be employed. However, every embodiment of the invention described involves the opening being - as stated in the second point above - rearward of the rear bearing face of the boss, and the lock as being received into the opening. It is the rear wall of the lock member that opposes the rear wall of the adapter. This describes a lock that operates by resistance, ie by being set between the faces that would otherwise moves towards each other.
55 We return now to the reasons of the primary Judge as to the "lock" aspects of claim 1 of Jones II. Two of the relevant integers were the requirements that the lock be "rigid" and that it include an adjustment assembly. Clearly the latter was an essential integer of the claim in the sense that a lock without an adjustment assembly would not infringe. To that extent we agree with his Honour. However, the appellants' point was rather different. It at least involved the proposition that the condition of rigidity was different from, and should exist before, any final condition brought about by the process of adjustment. His Honour did not accept the position for which the appellants contended. He took the view that the condition of rigidity was to be determined after the lock had been adjusted. That is to say, a lock which was non-rigid at the point of being placed in position would still be covered by the claim if it were rendered rigid by adjustment. It followed that the nut on the J-bolt served two relevant functions: by being tightened, it made the bolt rigid, and by being (or being able to be) adjusted, it constituted an adjustment assembly. For reasons which follow, we consider that his Honour was in error in these respects.
56 In our view, a critical passage in claim 1 of Jones II is that which states "whereby said lock secures said wear member to said boss". It means that, by reason of the matters stated previously in the relevant paragraph, the lock secures the wear member to the boss. The previously-stated matters are the rigidity of the lock, the fact that the lock has faces as described and the placement of the lock in the described orientation apropos the boss and the wall of the opening in the wear member. The clear sense of the claim is that this combination of matters provides a secure fitting of the wear member to the boss. The appellants' point that claim 1 of Jones II required the lock to be "rigid" at the point of being received into the opening must be correct, since it is that state of rigidity, together with the faces on, and the orientation of, the lock that causes it to secure the wear member to the boss. His Honour's conclusion that the point at which the claim required the lock to be rigid was when it was "assembled, inserted, adjusted and ready for use" was, in our view, only three parts correct. The fourth part is significant. As we have explained, the claim refers to a lock which operates as such when it is assembled and inserted: it is then "ready for use". It may be adjusted as required, but is operational without adjustment. In other words, the state of rigidity claimed for the lock does not come about only by the process of adjustment.
57 The wording of the claim then moves to the adjustment assembly. Here again it is clear that that assembly is not intended to be a component of the lock which is essential to enable it to function as such (ie to secure the wear member to the boss). The lock "further" includes such an assembly; the purpose of the assembly is to "eliminate looseness"; and that looseness is such as "may exist". The clear sense of the relevant paragraph read as a whole is that the lock should work as such whether loose or tight, but that the elimination of looseness - a step which, it is implied, might be desirable in practice - can be done by means of the adjustment assembly.
58 As noted above, an aspect of the appellants' defence to the respondents' infringement case below was that claim 1 of Jones II required the lock to be received (ie located) wholly, or at least very substantially, within the opening referred to. The appellants so contended because important parts of the J-bolt were not, in their submission, within any "opening" when the bolt was assembled, tightened and ready for use. His Honour rejected that contention as a matter of construction of the claim, holding that a lock which was only partly in an opening was nonetheless "received into said opening". He gave the example of a door lock which, in his view, could be said to be received into an opening notwithstanding that its latches, handle and shaft remained outside the opening. In our view, this was, with respect, an inapt analogy. As will be apparent from our reasons set out above, the contribution which the phrase "received into said opening" makes to the construction of claim 1 of Jones II is to inform the reader where the rigid lock should be located and thus (in combination with the references to the faces which it must oppose) to define the way the lock is intended to work. The question whether the lock was wholly or only partly received into the opening was something of a side-issue, although, in defence of his Honour, that matter was squarely put to him by the appellants.
59 The appellants' J-bolt assembly does not incorporate a lock with the characteristics of that claimed in claim 1 of Jones II as we have identified them. The function of the bolt is to hold things together. It sits (to an extent) in an opening in the sense that it must be somewhere, but it does not have the characteristics or the function apropos the opening that are required by the claim (ie to maintain separation generally within the confines of the opening). Further, the J-bolt assembly is not such as could be described as rigid without the nut having been secured tight: indeed, as we read the primary Judge's reasons in relevant aspects, his Honour accepted that proposition. Our point of departure from his Honour is that we consider that the claim is concerned with a lock which operates as such by reason of its initial rigidity and its placement in the opening there referred to, at which point no question of tightening or adjustment arises. Neither do we accept that the nut on the threaded tail of the J-bolt falls within the meaning of an "adjustment assembly" as claimed. Without the nut, the J-bolt itself would not act as a lock in any sense. We cannot imagine a circumstance in which the assembly might be used without the nut - or with the nut being in place but not being secured home - and, in such a condition, being regarded as a lock which "secured" the wear member to the boss, albeit loosely. Rather, the tightening of the nut in the J-bolt assembly is itself what brings about a state of rigidity and provides the secure attachment. Without that, the bolt could not be regarded as a lock at all. It is not merely a matter of adjustment.
60 For the above reasons, we would uphold so much of the appellants' notice of contention in the cross-appeal as relates to the respondents' allegation that the appellants' J-bolt assembly infringes claim 1 of Jones II.
61 To deal with claim 51 of Jones II it is sufficient to adopt what we have said above in relation to claim 1, subject only to the following modifications. Under claim 51, it is what is described as the "first face" of the lock which is engaged with the bearing face of the opening in the wear member and the "second face" of the lock which is engaged with the bearing face of the boss. Thus the first face of the lock is the underside of the head of the J-bolt and the second face of the lock is the inside washer on the threaded end of the bolt. Other than by interchanging the designation of the first and second faces of the lock, claim 51 is, as we read it, indistinguishable from claim 1. Claim 51 does not refer to the bearing and lock faces as "opposing" each other, but in point of substance it is referring to the same locking principle as is claim 1. We would reach the same conclusions with respect to the matter of infringement as we have above in the case of claim 1.
62 Before leaving Jones II, we should say something briefly about the appellants' T-bolt assembly. We have indicated that we propose to dismiss the cross-appeal in this respect because we agree with the primary Judge that the assembly does not include an opening extending through the shroud. However, were it otherwise, it will be clear from what appears above that we would find that the assembly does not infringe claims 1 or 51 of Jones II. The reasoning provided above in relation to the J-bolt would apply likewise to the T-bolt.
63 We turn next to the requirements of claim 1 of Jones III, and shall commence with a consideration of the appellants' T-bolt assembly. The respondents say that the T-bolt itself, together with its washers and nuts, is the lock referred to. They say that the bolt is received into the opening in the shroud in the same way as described above in relation to claim 1 of Jones II. They say that the "first bearing surface" described in claim 1 of Jones III is the rear face of the mount secured to the surface of the bucket (which is the member described in Jones II as the "boss"). They say that the cavity in which the head of the T-bolt is set is part of the opening referred to, and that the internal shoulders of that cavity, in contact with the underside of the head of the bolt, is the second bearing surface mentioned in the claim. Thus the opening is said to be "equipped with a second bearing surface". They say that the first and second bearing surfaces face in opposite directions in the sense that the first bearing surface (on the mount) faces to the rear and the second bearing surface (in the cavity in the shroud) faces to the front. The respondents say that the T-bolt is received into the opening between the first and second bearing surfaces because the shaft of the bolt lies between the rear face of the mount and the cavity in the shroud. They say that the "first lock surface" of the bolt is constituted by the inside surface of the washer on the threaded end of the bolt which bears against (ie "opposes") the rear face of the mount, and that the "second lock surface" of the bolt is the underside of the head of the bolt which bears against (again, "opposes") the internal shoulders of the cavity to which we have referred. As in the case of claim 1 of Jones II, they say that the nut on the threaded shaft of the T-bolt is the adjustment assembly, but here (ie in the context of claim 1 of Jones III) they also point out that the nut may, and will normally, be used to "apply forces to the wear member and the mount that tend to tighten the mounting of the wear member on the mount".
64 Claim 1 of Jones III differs from claim 1 of Jones II in a number of respects, but there are important similarities. Jones III claims what is described as a "mount", but it is clear that this component performs the same function as the "boss" in Jones II. The mount has a "first bearing surface". The wear member has an opening with a "second bearing surface". When the first and second "shoulders" are engaged (ie when the wear member is in position), "the first and second bearing surfaces face in opposite directions". The lock is then received into the opening "between the first and second bearing surfaces". The orientation of the lock apropos the two bearing surfaces is put beyond doubt with the words "the lock having a first lock surface to oppose the second bearing surface [and] a second lock surface to oppose the second bearing surface". The position of the lock in the opening is of itself sufficient for the lock to function as such, as to which we note the expression "…therebyretain the wear member on the mount…" (emphasis added).
65 It is, in our view, central to the scope of claim 1 of Jones III that the lock be received into the opening in the wear member between the first and second bearing surfaces referred to, and that the first and second lock surfaces of the lock oppose those bearing surfaces respectively. In other words, the lock surfaces must necessarily be located internally with respect to the bearing surfaces which they respectively oppose. Inescapably, it seems to us, the operation of the lock must be one which inhibits the bearing surfaces from moving closer towards each other than they otherwise might: they are locked apart, as it were. This understanding of the claim is confirmed by the terms of the complete specification which are, as we have said, the same as those of Jones II. We refer to, and adopt in the present context, what we have said in par 54 above.
66 By contrast with the requirements of claim 1 of Jones III, the surfaces in the appellants' T-bolt assembly which the respondents identify as the lock surfaces (the internal face of the washer and the underside of the head of the bolt) are located outside the bearing surfaces which they presumptively oppose. They are not between them. And neither could they be as a matter of function, as their purpose is not to keep those bearing surfaces apart - it is to hold them together. The same conclusion applies in the case of the J-bolt assembly. Here the second bearing surface of the wear member is the recess in the top of the shroud (at the forward termination of the opening which extends through the shroud) and the second lock surface of the bolt is the underside of the head of the bolt which sits in that recess. Otherwise, and relevantly to the present question, the assembly is indistinguishable from the T-bolt assembly.
67 The "adjustment assembly" provisions of claim 1 of Jones III differ from the corresponding provisions of claim 1 of Jones II in respects which may be important. The provisions are not introduced by the adverb "further". The faces which are, by adjustment, varied in their relative positions are the bearing surfaces of the mount and of the opening, rather than (as in Jones II) different faces of the lock. The action of the adjustment assembly is such as would "tend to tighten the mounting of the wear member on the mount" rather than (as in Jones II) to eliminate looseness which may exist. Particularly with respect to the first and third of these differences, the case for regarding the adjustment assembly as an essential part of the locking action is somewhat stronger in Jones III than in Jones II.
68 It is to be recalled that because of the primary Judge's findings as to the need for the "opening" to extend the whole way "through" the wear member (which effectively led to the rejection of the respondents' case in relation to Jones II), the only sense in which his Honour's reasons for concluding that the adjustment assembly was an essential part of the lock, set out in par 18 above, was part of the ratio decidendi of the judgment below was in relation to Jones III. Yet, in a number of respects at least, the terminology used by his Honour is that of Jones II, not of Jones III. Only the reference to the selective movability of the first and second bearing faces appears to have been taken from Jones III. To the extent that his Honour was here construing Jones III, he appears to have been working from the wrong text, or at least from a text which was a kind of admixture of the wording of the different patents.
69 We shall say nothing further on this aspect, since it was the subject neither of a ground of appeal nor of any submission made on behalf of the appellants. We consider that the consistency of the appellants' assemblies with claim 1 of Jones III may be determined without reference to the "adjustment assembly" aspects of the debate.
70 For reasons stated in pars 63-67 above, we would uphold so much of the appellants' appeal as relates to the respondents' allegation that the appellants' T-bolt and J-bolt assemblies infringe claim 1 of Jones III.