On 13 April 2017, Hatzistergos DCJ transferred these proceedings to the Supreme Court pursuant to s 144(2) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) ("CPA") on the basis that the District Court may lack jurisdiction to grant certain equitable relief sought by the plaintiff. When the matter came before me in my capacity as Duty Judge on 15 May 2017, both of the parties sought orders by consent that I remit the matter to the District Court under s 144(3)(b) of the CPA and that costs be in the cause.
Although the orders were sought by consent, I indicated that I proposed to reserve my decision in order to consider whether it is appropriate for this Court simply to remit a matter that had been transferred to this Court without further consideration. I indicated at that time that I would deliver my decision today and I excused both parties from further attendance.
Having considered the matter further, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to make the orders sought. My reasons for being so satisfied are as follows.
Section 144 of the CPA is in these terms:
"(1) This section applies to proceedings under Subdivision 2 of Division 8 of Part 3 of the District Court Act 1973.
(2) If, during proceedings to which this section applies, the District Court decides that it lacks, or may lack, jurisdiction to hear and dispose of the proceedings, the District Court must order that the proceedings be transferred to the Supreme Court.
(3) Proceedings that are transferred to the Supreme Court under subsection (2):
(a) are to be continued in the Supreme Court:
(i) as if the proceedings had been duly commenced in the Supreme Court on the date on which they were commenced in the District Court, and
(ii) as if any cross-claim in the proceedings had been duly made in the Supreme Court on the date on which it was made in the District Court, or
(b) if the Supreme Court so orders, are to be remitted to the District Court and continued in the District Court as if they had not been transferred.
(4) The District Court has, and may exercise, jurisdiction to hear and dispose of proceedings the subject of an order by the Supreme Court under subsection (3) (b), including such jurisdiction as is necessary to determine any question arising in any such proceedings.
(5) If, during proceedings to which this section applies, the District Court decides that it is appropriate to do so for any reason other than the reason referred to in subsection (2), the District Court may order that the proceedings be transferred to the Supreme Court.
(6) Proceedings that are transferred to the Supreme Court under subsection (5), are to be continued in the Supreme Court:
(a) as if the proceedings had been duly commenced in the Supreme Court on the date on which they were commenced in the District Court, and
(b) as if any cross-claim in the proceedings had been duly made in the Supreme Court on the date on which it was made in the District Court.
(7) Subject to the rules of court applicable in the Supreme Court, the power of the Supreme Court to make orders as to costs includes a power to make orders with respect to the costs of:
(a) the application for, and the making of, an order under subsection (2) or (5), and
(b) any step taken in the proceedings before an order under subsection (2) or (5) was made.
(8) The making of an order under subsection (2) or (5) does not invalidate any order previously made by the District Court in the proceedings."
The proceedings in the District Court concern a dispute between two strata plans over payments to be made to the Business Management Committee constituted to manage the building in which both strata plans are located. The plaintiff is the strata plan pertaining to the residential occupancies, whereas the defendant is the strata plan pertaining to the retail occupancies in the same building. The plaintiff sought specific performance of the defendant's obligations under the relevant strata management scheme to pay the sums of $98,706 and $14,649.57. In the alternative, the plaintiff seeks an order for equitable contribution.
The District Court hearing proceeded before Hatzistergos DCJ on 4, 5, 6, and 7 July 2016, 26 August 2016, 21 October 2016 and 3 November 2016. The parties lodged further written submissions on 17 and 28 November 2016. His Honour has reserved his decision. One of the issues in dispute was whether the District Court had jurisdiction to make an order for equitable contribution in that matter.
On 3 April 2017, whilst his Honour was still reserved, the decision of the Court of Appeal in Mahommed v Unicomb [2017] NSWCA 65 was delivered. In that decision the Court (Ward JA, with whom Macfarlan JA and McDougall J agreed) held (at [52]) that if a District Court judge is of the view that he or she does not have jurisdiction in a particular matter, then he or she is bound to transfer the proceedings to the Supreme Court. Ward JA went on to observe at [52]:
"Section 144(2) is mandatory in its terms. Moreover, it encompasses the situation not only where the District Court reaches a decision that it lacks jurisdiction to deal with claims in its equitable jurisdiction but also where there is a doubt as to that matter…"
Following that decision, Hatzistergos DCJ relisted the matter on 7 April 2017 to ascertain the position of the parties. Counsel for the plaintiff conceded that the matter should be referred to the Supreme Court and counsel for the defendant did not oppose that course. On 13 April 2017, Hatzistergos DCJ delivered his reasons and ordered that the proceedings be transferred to the Supreme Court pursuant to s 144(2) of the CPA.
When the matter came before me on 15 May 2017, I was provided with consent orders to remit the matter to the District Court. When I inquired as to whether I first needed to be satisfied that the District Court did in fact have jurisdiction to determine the issue before it in this matter, both Mr Purdy of counsel for the plaintiff and Mr Brown, solicitor for the defendant, submitted that I did not. Mr Purdy indicated that to do so would require days of argument, which have already been heard in the District Court. He submitted that, on any reading of s 144(3)(b) of the CPA, the Court's discretion to remit the matter is unfettered and that, once such a remittal occurs, the District Court is held to have the requisite jurisdiction by virtue of s 144(4) of the CPA.
Although I accept that s 144(3)(b) of the CPA in its terms does not require any particular findings be made before a matter is remitted to the District Court, I nonetheless must be satisfied that it is appropriate to make the order sought. I am now satisfied that it is appropriate to do so in this matter for a number of reasons.
First, this matter has already proceeded over seven hearing days in the District Court. It would not be consistent with the overriding purpose of civil litigation in New South Wales to "facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings" and the other case management principles in ss 56 - 58 of the CPA to require any further hearing in this Court. Second, the amount claimed is well within the jurisdictional limit of the District Court. Third, I have had regard to the court file transferred to this Court and it is clear that detailed written submissions of some length have already been directed to the question of jurisdiction. It would place a costs burden on the parties that is disproportionate to the size of the claim to have to argue the question of jurisdiction again in this Court.
In being satisfied that it is appropriate to make the orders sought, I have made no finding as to whether the District Court has the relevant equitable jurisdiction in this matter. It would not be appropriate for me to do so in circumstances where the parties expressly stated that they did not wish me to and made no submissions on that issue.
[3]
ORders
I make orders in the form of the consent orders as follows:
1. Pursuant to s 144(3)(b) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), remit the proceedings to the District Court.
2. All costs of and incidental to the said transfer and the original transfer of the matter to the Supreme Court abide the outcome of the proceedings as determined in the District Court.
[4]
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Decision last updated: 19 May 2017