WERE ANY CONTRACTS CONCLUDED?
74 The applicant contends that no contracts were ever concluded despite its execution of the Lease and Breeding Agreement, the Management Agreement and the Loan Agreement components of each of contracts T, U, V and W, X, Y. The applicant accordingly claims restitution of all the payments which the applicant made under these six contracts.
75 The applicant contends that no binding agreements were entered into in respect of contracts T, U and V because the offers to enter into each of the three Lease and Breeding Agreements made by the applicant by delivery to the sixth respondent of the forms of agreement executed by it, was made personally to the fifth respondent and only she could accept those offers. But because she had already disposed of her stud operations to Woburn Downs Pastoral Pty Ltd, she was incapable of performing her side of those Agreements and so was incapable of accepting the relevant offers by the applicant. In consequence, and because each was inter-dependent with the associated Lease and Breeding Agreement, it was not open to Woburn Downs Management Pty Ltd or to Heath Credits Pty Ltd to accept the offers constituted by delivery to them of the forms of Management Agreement and Loan Agreement already executed by the applicant. Secondly, the applicant alleges that its offers lapsed because they were not accepted prior to 30 June 1993, the last date upon which they could be accepted in the circumstances of the case.
76 The applicant here ignores, and the Woburn Downs respondents have not sought to rely upon the fact that from mid 1993 to at least October 1995, when it stopped monthly payments to Heath Credits, the applicant and all the Woburn Downs respondents conducted themselves on the basis that contractual arrangements were in force between them. Though the applicant did not receive contracts T, U and V back from the Woburn Downs respondents executed by them until sometime after August 1993, it made no complaint about that, nor any inquiry about when in fact they were executed. It was content to treat the contracts as in force from the date they bear, ie, 23 June 1993. It claimed tax deductions in respect of the 1993 financial year on that basis. The applicant's conduct included claiming and receiving the other tax deductions (including deductions for interest paid by it to Heath Credits from July 1993 to October 1995). They were an important benefit it bargained for when it entered into the arrangements. The Woburn Downs respondents' conduct includes the allocation to the applicant in purported compliance with its obligations under various of the Lease and Breeding Agreements and Management Agreements of recipient cows and their progeny and some of the progenies' own progeny, together with the management of those cattle; their conduct also includes telling the applicant of what they were doing in those respects. All parties treated contracts T, U and V as on foot until the applicant terminated them on 31 January 1996. It is difficult to say, in these circumstances, that contracts to the effect of T, U and V never came into effect at any time. (The same is true of contracts W, X and Y.)
77 But the first argument is founded on the now admitted fact that Mrs Suares ceased to carry on her stud business on her own account on 22 June 1993 - the day before the date ultimately inserted in contracts T, U and V by someone on behalf of the five Woburn Downs respondents. This was done as part of a restructure of her stud and embryo transfer operations which involved her, her husband, Heath Credits and Woburn Downs Management Pty Ltd entering into a joint venture agreement on 23 June 1993, effective from 1 July 1993, with a third party who undertook to inject substantial cash into those operations. The restructure involved the transfer to a new company as the joint venture vehicle, Woburn Downs Pastoral Pty Ltd, the first respondent, by Mrs Suares of her entire breeding operation and the giving of a covenant by Mr and Mrs Suares to contribute to the joint venture as from 1 July 1993 "all their respective skills, experience and expertise relating to the business of breeding of cattle and embryo implant".
78 When regard is had to the obligations that Mrs Suares assumed under the joint venture agreement also executed on 23 June 1993, it is apparent that she was herself, on that date and thereafter, incapable of performing any of the obligations in terms imposed on her by the three Lease and Breeding Agreements.
79 The first to fifth respondents' answer to this is that Mrs Suares executed the three Lease and Breeding Agreements in late July 1993 as agent for the joint venture company, Woburn Downs Pastoral Pty Ltd, as undisclosed principal. It can be inferred that, unbeknown to the applicant, Mrs Suares (who has little recollection of how she came to sign the relevant Lease and Breeding Agreements) executed those Agreements for contracts T, U and V with the applicant as agent for Woburn Downs Pastoral Pty Ltd: she signed the first three Agreements at the direction or request of Mr Suares acting as one of the two directors of Woburn Downs Pastoral Pty Ltd after Mr Suares had decided, in discussions with Mr Knight in late July 1993 that the company should commit itself to the three contracts.
80 It has long been established that, when a person makes a contract with another and the first person is the duly authorised agent of a principal, "the principal can sue or be sued on that contract although, when it was entered into, the first person did not disclose to the other party to the contract that he was entering into it in the capacity of agent for a principal and the other party entered into the contract in the belief that the person with whom he was contracting was contracting as a principal": Andrews v The Nominal Defendant (1968) 70 SR(NSW) 419 at 431. There are a number of exceptions that prevent this rule applying. The one of relevance here is the exception which arises when "from the nature and circumstances of the contract, the importance of the personality of the contracting party excludes any intention that an unknown principal shall acquire rights or liabilities thereunder": Andrews at 431 - 432.
81 In my opinion, the applicant fails to show that the case is within this exception to the general rule.
82 Apart from his ambiguous statement in par 46 of his affidavit, no evidence was led in the applicant's case to suggest that Mr Tighe himself regarded it as important that the applicant contract personally with Mrs Suares rather than with some company associated with her. His oral evidence was to the contrary. In so far as the evidence suggests that Mr Tighe had an interest in the project being well managed and run, that turned on it being under the control of the "Woburn Downs Stud". That the dominant motive for Mr Tighe's decision to commit the applicant to all six contracts was to obtain large tax benefits in the 1993 and 1994 financial years, is further reason for concluding that it was not so important to Mr Tighe that the applicant should enter into the Lease and Breeding Agreement components of the first three contracts only with Mrs Suares personally that the case should be regarded as within this exclusion to the undisclosed principal rule. Mrs Suares had a continuing involvement in what began as her business, which she transferred to Woburn Downs Pastoral Pty Ltd. Thereafter, she had just as much role in ensuring, so far as she could, that the desired tax and investment benefits were obtained from contractual arrangements between the applicant and Woburn Downs Pastoral Pty Ltd as if she were the principal in each of the first three Lease and Breeding Agreements.
83 The objective circumstances also indicate that just who it was the applicant was contracting with in respect of each of the Lease and Breeding Agreement components of the six contracts was a matter of no significance to the applicant, provided the parties to the Lease and Breeding Agreement and the Management Agreement were either Mrs Suares or companies with which she was associated.
84 By each Lease and Breeding Agreement, Mrs Suares undertook obligations to the applicant to provide the applicant in the first thirteen months of the project with six cows impregnated with Santa Gertrudis embryo which would each produce a calf capable of registration and classification. There is no basis, on the evidence, for thinking that these obligations were such that they could be performed only by Mrs Suares and by no one else. The evidence is that she ran a stud with veterinary and other assistance in the course of which operations impregnation of recipient cows and production of progeny was achieved and the animals cared for.
85 Moreover, the Lease and Breeding Agreement which Mrs Suares personally executed as lessor and breeder was but one component of a suite of three inter-dependent Agreements that constituted each of contracts T, U and V. Mrs Suares was named in the contract documents only as a party to the Lease and Breeding Agreement component of each of the first three contracts. A different entity (a company associated with her) was named as the Manager in the Management Agreement component of each of those contracts. Under the Management Agreement, that management company undertook similar breeding obligations to the applicant to those which, in terms, Mrs Suares undertook to the applicant under each Lease and Breeding Agreement. It is therefore difficult for the applicant to establish that it was of critical importance to it to have a contractual arrangement with Mrs Suares personally to breed six calves from the original leased herd, when it cannot suggest that it was equally important to the applicant for it to contract with her personally to breed the further eighteen offspring from the initial six progeny to which the applicant was entitled.
86 Though the Lease and Breeding Agreement component of each of contracts T, U and V was, unbeknown to the applicant, executed by Mrs Suares acting only as agent for Woburn Downs Pastoral Pty Ltd as her undisclosed principal, the contracts are legally binding and Woburn Downs Pastoral Pty Ltd was at all relevant times entitled to enforce them against the applicant (subject, of course, to the other challenges made by the applicant to the contracts which are yet to be determined).
87 The second attack on contracts T, U and V remains to be dealt with. Reflecting the importance that Mr Tighe attached to the tax benefits he believed the applicant would obtain by entering into contracts T, U and V, the applicant submitted that each of these agreements had to be in place by 30 June 1993; they were not because the offers it made, consisting of the executed forms of agreement which Mr Wells returned to the sixth respondent on 21 June 1993, lapsed because those offers were not accepted by the offerees until after 29 July 1993.
88 The evidence from Woburn Downs Pastoral Pty Ltd's records for 29 July 1993 and that of Mr Suares indicates that the decision made that day on behalf of that company to enter into these three contracts was no mere formality but instead, a considered one. The company was then facing difficulties in performing its obligations under contracts with existing investors because the drought had seriously disrupted the breeding program upon which Mrs Suares and then the joint venture company were relying to produce sufficient progeny from the breeding cows to fill the various investor contracts. The decision to contract was made only after Mr Suares, in consultation with Mr Knight, the respondents' accountant and secretary of the company, decided that the offer should be accepted in the expectation that Woburn Downs Pastoral Pty Ltd would be able to perform its obligations under these contracts. Until this decision was made, Mr Suares treated Woburn Downs Pastoral Pty Ltd as being free to refuse to enter into the Agreements, ie, he treated the executed Agreements proffered by the applicant as no more than offers which Woburn Downs Pastoral Pty Ltd could accept or reject as it chose.
89 The Woburn Downs respondents emphasised in their "Overview" document the availability to investors of large tax deductions in the 1993 year should an investor enter into the scheme by 30 June 1993. All parties regarded those deductions as a major attraction of investment in the scheme. The applicant would very likely not be entitled to any deductions in respect of its 1993 year income in relation to contracts T, U and V, including the large deductions under the Lease and Breeding Agreements which were so attractive to Mr Tighe, unless those contracts had become legally binding by no later than 30 June 1993. Federal Commissioner of Taxation v James Flood Pty Ltd (1953) 88 CLR 492 has been long accepted as authority for the proposition that a liability must presently exist in order for it to be "incurred" and thus deductible under s 51(1) ITAA 1936. There is also authority that an outgoing may be "incurred" notwithstanding that there is no legal liability to make payment if commercially, that amount is certain to be paid in the future. But an outgoing will not be incurred in the year of income if it is, at the end of that year, still no more than a contingent or expected liability: see, eg, Ogilvy and Mather Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1990) 90 ATC 4,836 at 4,865. The evidence as to the circumstances in which Mr Suares, in discussions with Mr Knight, decided on 29 July 1993 that Woburn Downs Pastoral Pty Ltd should itself execute the documentation comprising contracts T, U and V suggests that the applicant may well have difficulty in showing that it was by 30 June of that year sufficiently committed to the expenditures it claimed in its 1993 year return in respect of those three contracts to make them deductible under s 51(1).
90 I therefore accept that the applicant's offers, in relation to contracts T, U and V, constituted by delivery to the Woburn Downs respondents' agent on or about 23 June 1993 of the various forms of Agreement executed by it were only open to acceptance by the relevant Woburn Downs respondents until 30 June 1993 and they were not accepted in time.
91 Prima facie the applicant would therefore be entitled to a declaration in relation to all the agreements comprising contracts T, U and V that no enforceable Agreements were entered into before 30 June 1993. But there is no utility in making such a declaration. It is apparent that, by reason of their conduct between July 1993 and at least October 1995, the applicant and the relevant Woburn Downs respondents conducted themselves on the basis that there was in force between them contracts broadly to the effect of contracts T, U and V, with each apparently accepting the performance each tendered to the other. Any monetary award that the applicant might be entitled to because of the absence of any binding agreements in the form of contracts T, U and V by 30 June 1993 cannot, I think, be assessed in these circumstances unless the applicant undertakes the task of establishing just what is its restitutionary entitlement. This cannot be assessed without an evaluation of benefits it received under the contracts to the effect of contracts T, U and V that were probably in existence between the parties in the period July 1993 to at least October 1995. For example, if the relevant offers had been accepted by 30 June 1993, the applicant would have had a prospect (but not the certainty) of persuading the Commissioner of Taxation that, by entering into the relevant contracts by 30 June 1993, it had become, by that date, engaged in the business of cattle breeding so as to permit it to deduct relevant outgoings, including prepayment of outgoings from its 1993 year income. Though it may well not be entitled to any of the deductions allowed to date in respect of the 1993 year, because none of contracts T, U and V were in place by 30 June 1993, it may be entitled, even now, to have its 1994 assessment re-opened to give it the benefit of those particular deductions. This is dealt with later. Further, it appears some cattle were allocated by Woburn Downs to the applicant by reason of the contractual arrangements then in force during 1994 to 1995 and it further appears the applicant accepted those allocations even though it did not persist in its claim made in its cancellation letter of 31 January 1996 in respect of those cattle. It is not therefore possible to assess the amount of the restitutionary payment, if any, to which the applicant is entitled by reason of the fact that no binding contracts were in existence by 30 June 1993, though contracts to the same effect appear in all probability to have come into effect soon after that date and to have continued on foot until they were cancelled by the applicant in January 1996.
92 Contracts W, X and Y differ from contracts T, U and V because, in the Lease and Breeding Agreement component of each, the Lessor is named not as Mrs Suares but as Woburn Downs Pastoral Pty Ltd. Moreover, each of these agreements in respect of each of contracts W, X and Y was executed by that company. The applicant points out that, though the change I have referred to was made to the Lease and Breeding Agreement component of each of contracts W, X and Y, that change was not made in the accompanying Management Agreement and Loan Agreement: both, wherever they refer to the Lessor under the relevant Lease and Breeding Agreement, describe Mrs Suares, rather than Woburn Downs Pastoral Pty Ltd, as the Lessor under that particular agreement.
93 It is said that Mr Tighe, when he executed the Lease and Breeding Agreement component of each of contracts W, X and Y was unaware that the Lessor had been changed from Mrs Suares to the company. I doubt if his evidence goes that far. But, in any event, he executed three forms of Lease and Breeding Agreement on the same page that showed Woburn Downs Pastoral Pty Ltd as the other party to the particular agreement. Moreover, the covering sheet of each agreement describes it as one between Woburn Downs Pastoral Pty Ltd as Lessor and the applicant as Breeder. Though he may not have been told by any of the Woburn Downs respondents prior to his executing these forms of agreement that the Lessor had been changed from Mrs Suares to Woburn Downs Pastoral Pty Ltd, I am not prepared to accept, in the state of the evidence before me, that he was, in fact, unaware of that change at the time he executed the agreements on behalf of the applicant. I think it is more likely that it was a matter of no importance to Mr Tighe: he was content to commit the applicant to the second set of contracts without being concerned as to the exact identities of the particular parties on the other side.
94 The disconformity between the Lessor named in the Lease and Breeding Agreement component of each of contracts W, X and Y and the person described as that Lessor in each of the associated Management and Loan Agreements is, in these circumstances, the sort of disconformity readily correctable by the application of the principles of contractual interpretation discussed in Maddestra v Penfolds Wines Pty Ltd (1993) 44 FCR 303 at 306 and Fitzgerald v Masters (1956) 95 CLR 420 at 426 - 427.