The Argument
21 Mr Austin QC who appears for the applicant adopts the approach to the test for inconsistency between WLEP and SEPP 36 as that taken by Kirby P (as he then was) in Coffs Harbour Environment Centre Inc. v Minister for Planning and Coffs Harbour City Council (1994) 84 LGERA 324 at 331 as follows:
The resolution of this dispute requires only that the word "inconsistency" be given its ordinary and natural meaning without the gloss which has necessarily developed around the meaning of the word in a constitutional setting. Upon that basis, there will be an inconsistency if, in the provisions of one environmental planning instrument, there is "want of consistency or congruity"; "lack of accordance or harmony" or "incompatibility, contrariety, or opposition" with another environmental planning instrument.
22 He submits therefore that the appropriate test for determining whether there is inconsistency between SEPP 36 and Wyong LEP within the meaning of cl 4(1) of SEPP 36 is whether there is "actual contrariety" because cl 6, in terms, identifies its field of operation as the carrying out of development of a manufactured home estate "pursuant to this Policy". In this way, he says, SEPP 36 expressly recognises that other instruments may themselves authorise development for that purpose and, if so, those instruments are left to their own field of operation by cl 6.
23 Accordingly, the limit placed upon the operation of SEPP 36 by cl 6 in respect of any land which under any environmental planning instrument is within an area or zone identified by the description "scenic protection" does not limit the operation of any other environmental planning instrument. Thus, as explained in 5 above, WLEP makes the proposed development on the subject land permissible with development consent.
24 Mr Austin refers to cl 8(1) of SEPP36 for confirmation of the construction that he relies upon, particularly the phrase in brackets "(whether or not because of a development consent granted pursuant to this Policy)" which he says expressly recognises that other environmental planning instruments may permit, with consent, development of land for the purposes of a manufactured home estate. Moreover, according to Mr Austin, it is clear from other provisions of SEPP36 and in particular cl 9 that SEPP36 addresses only matters which are relevant to an application for development consent pursuant to that policy. The position of the applicant is summarised as follows:
(1) Development for the relevant purpose is permissible with consent under the Wyong LEP.
(2) Subject to clause 8(2) under clause 8(1) of SEPP 36, consent for subdivision of the land may be granted.
(3) Any prohibition or restriction on subdivision imposed by the Wyong LEP does not apply. As such, the restriction in clause 14(2)(b) of the Wyong LEP (the requirement that the subdivided lots have an area of not less than 20ha) does not apply.
25 If the applicant is right, therefore, the subdivisions proposed in the subject development applications may be approved pursuant to cl 8 without regard to the provisions of cl 14 (2)(b) of WLEP that impose a minimum area restriction of 20ha.
26 In oral submissions Mr Austin took the court to the aims and strategies in cl 2 of SEPP36 to demonstrate that the intention of making the instrument was to facilitate the establishment of manufactured home estates with development consent on any land within the Shire of Wyong where caravan parks are permitted (other than the categories of excluded land identified by Schedule 2) and on any other land where caravan parks are permitted under a local environmental plan prepared or maintained in accordance with the direction made under s117 of the EPA Act in conjunction with SEPP36.
27 Generally therefore the aim of SEPP36 is to broaden the opportunities for the establishment of manufactured home estates on land on which development for the purposes of a caravan park is permissible irrespective of constraints imposed by the zoning provisions of other instruments such as WLEP.
28 Mr Robertson SC, who appears for the council, takes a starkly different approach to Mr Austin. Relying upon s33 of the Interpretation Act 1987 (which applies to the construction of an environmental planning instrument pursuant to s5(6)) he also has regard to the purpose or object underlying SEPP36. However contrasting the facultative provisions of SEPP36 referred to by Mr Austin, he focuses on the constraints and restrictions contemplated in the following aims and strategies:
2(1)(a)…(b)…(c)…
(d) to ensure that manufactured home estates are situated only in suitable locations and not on land having important resources or having landscape, scenic or ecological qualities that should be preserved, and
(e) to ensure that manufactured home estates are adequately serviced and have access to essential community facilities and services, and
(f)…(g)…