12 This submission is misconceived, as the only one to which the evidence of Dr La Grange's note could have been put was by way of prior inconsistent statement of the respondent. The note was not, and could not be, evidence of the fact that the floor was dry. In any event, the learned Judge did make reference to the question of what it was that the respondent had told Dr La Grange. His Honour recited in his reasons the fact that the respondent had not told any of the doctors (including Dr La Grange) of water at the base of the door, nor had he stated this fact in a claim form signed in January 1997. It is true that no conclusion was reached by the learned Judge in relation to this aspect of the matter, but no conclusion was called for. The trial Judge found for a number of reasons that he did not accept in its entirety the evidence of the respondent. Further, his Honour independently concluded from the evidence of the respondent and from the witness Allan that the floor of the room inside the door was indeed wet on the day in question. By necessary inference, his Honour concluded that the note of Dr La Grange was not determinative of the issue one way or the other. There were indeed a number of reasons why the learned Judge may have taken this view. The first was that the note was not evidence. The second was he may simply have been unable to resolve the difference between the testimony of the respondent and that of Dr La Grange as to exactly what it was that was said. The third was that it may have been that there was some confusion on Dr La Grange's part about the particular area which the respondent was saying was dry. The appellant misapprehends the effect of cases cited by its counsel about the need for a trial Judge to have regard to "a strong body of evidence" and not to put it aside without explanation. Sun Alliance Insurance v Massoud [1989] VicRp 2; (1989) VR 8 at 18 was a case in which the trial Judge failed to reveal his reasoning process, relied on at least one irrelevant matter, and generally failed to give adequate reasons. Here, the only issue was whether the respondent's credibility was shaken by the different description of the state of the floor inside the door recorded by Dr La Grange in his notes taken about one month after the accident. As it was, the learned Judge was dissatisfied with various aspects of the respondent's testimony. He did not find him to be accurate in his recollection about the amount of water on the floor, but independently found that there was sufficient evidence to establish that the floor was wet. A finding against the respondent in relation to the description he gave of the quantity of water on the floor was not fatal to the respondent's case. The trial Judge was entitled to accept the evidence of Allan that the floor was wet. It was he who saw the witnesses and he who thereby had true advantages in fact finding (State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Earthline Constructions Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 3; (1999) 73 ALJR 306 per Kirby J at 330). True it is that conclusions of the trial Judge on the credibility of witnesses does not represent an end to the matter. In many appeals credibility findings are far from conclusive of the proper outcome of the entire trial and hence the appeal, numerous examples of which are given in State Rail Authority of New South Wales (supra) per Kirby J at 331. However, in this case the trial Judge was entitled to conclude that on all the evidence the floor of the room within and behind the sea door was wet. The fact that Dr La Grange may have made a note that the respondent told him a month after the accident that it was dry (whether that was the particular spot in question or not) was not evidence as to the fact, and was not fatal to the learned Judge's conclusion in that respect.