Sufficient doubt
26 In determining whether leave to appeal ought to be granted, there are principally two relevant factors. The first is whether the judgment of the Court below is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered by a Full Court. The second is whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, supposing the decision to be wrong: see Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397, 398.
27 On the hearing of the application, Mr Ogbonna again claimed that, in some way, the facts and documents referred to in the Notices to Admit were not disputed. That cannot be correct. By the Notice of Dispute issued by Link Workforce, the facts and documents were clearly disputed. Even though the document may have referred only to the Sealed Notice, as a matter of substance, the facts and documents which Link Workforce was asked to admit were contested.
28 A significant purpose of r 22 is to afford a party the opportunity to put the other on notice that if they dispute the specified facts or documents and the truth of the facts or the authenticity of the documents is later proved, they will be at risk of paying the costs of establishing them, regardless of the outcome of the hearing: r 22.03. The party seeking admissions is entitled to advance the facts or documents in respect of which an admission is sought and, by a relevant notice, the opposite party is entitled to dispute them. If, through this process, the admission of sufficient facts occurs, the party obtaining the admissions may seek to obtain judgment on them: r 22.07. Whilst the thrust of r 22 is to require one party to admit facts where appropriate, there is no doubt that where a party receiving a notice to admit denies the facts or authenticity of documents, it is for the party seeking the admissions to prove the facts or documents in the ordinary way. In this respect, the concern of the rule is whether the party receiving the notice has indicated their intention not to admit the matters put.
29 Here, as the primary judge found, it was pellucid that by its Notice of Dispute, Link Workforce made it clear that it disputed the facts and the authenticity of the documents specified in each of the identical Notices to Admit. That is unquestionably apparent from the terms of the Notice of Dispute and there is no reason to doubt the correctness of the learned primary judge's conclusion in this respect.
30 It follows that there can be no doubt about this aspect of the primary judge's reasons which might provide a basis on which leave could be granted.
31 The primary judge also concluded that, had the Notice to Admit served on 12 October 2022 been somehow efficacious in giving rise to a deemed admission, he would have ameliorated the impact of r 22.02 by dispensing with formal compliance with r 22.02 and the operation of r 22.04. He would further treat the Notice of Dispute as a notice given in accordance with r 22.02 such that none of the facts or documents would be taken to be admitted. In the alternative, he would have granted Link Workforce leave to withdraw any deemed admission. As his Honour said (at [24]), it is not in the interests of justice that form be permitted to rule over substance in the circumstances of this case. Though Mr Ogbonna seemed to cavil with this approach, it is indisputably correct. Such an approach is entirely consistent with the historical jurisprudential notion that the Rules of court are intended to be the handmaiden of justice, not its master. It would be asinine were the Court to close its eyes to the fact that Link Workforce had expressly and deliberately disputed the facts and documents in respect of which Mr Ogbonna had sought admissions.
32 Although Mr Ogbonna seemed to suggest that the actions of the primary judge were other than in accordance with the Rules, that is not so. Rule 1.34 gives the Court a plenary power to dispense with compliance with any of the Rules, either before or after the occasion for compliance arises. Further, r 1.35 permits the Court to make an order that is inconsistent with the Rules and, in that event, the order of the Court will prevail. The learned primary judge's recruitment of the broad powers of the Court was a matter of practice and procedure and a discretionary exercise of power. None of the usual requirements to satisfy a court that the discretion was wrongly exercised have been addressed in this case. Indeed, I am in total agreement with the learned primary judge's appropriately pragmatic use of the Rules in this case.
33 It follows that the learned primary judge was entirely correct in his decision and that no reason has been shown as to why it should be the subject of an appeal.
34 On the hearing of the application, Mr Ogbonna raised a new ground, being that the Notice of Dispute did not set out in terms each of the facts which were disputed.
35 Form 42 of the Federal Court Forms shows that the pro forma notice of dispute includes the following statement:
Disputed facts
The [role of party eg Respondent] disputes the truth of the following facts specified in the [role of party eg Applicant]'s notice to admit dated [eg 19 June 20..]:
1. [state each fact]
2.
36 Mr Ogbonna submitted that because the Notice of Dispute served by Link Workforce did not dispute each of the facts per seriatim, it was invalid and did not operate to negate the effect of the Notices to Admit. However, it is apparent that the Notice of Dispute was substantially in conformity with Form 42 and the omission to set out each of the alleged facts is an irrelevant non-compliance, if it is a non-compliance at all. Whilst on some occasions it might be appropriate to set out the facts which are not admitted, that is not a necessity for the efficacy of a notice of dispute under r 22.02. That is especially so where all of the facts and documents are contested.
37 Mr Ogbonna further submitted that Link Workforce was required to set out the reasons for the dispute of fact on oath and in an affidavit. There is no requirement in r 22.02 that a party who receives a notice to admit must provide an affidavit deposing to their belief about the facts which they are disputing.