1 The first matter complained of.
18 This was the major issue argued on the defendant's application. The defendant seeks to have those parts of the statement of claim that plead the whole of the magazine as the first matter complained of, and therefore the pleading of the imputations as having been conveyed in the natural and ordinary meaning of the magazine as a whole, struck out.
19 The argument concerned the proper identification of a "matter complained of" for the purposes of a defamation action.
20 It is not always easy to identify the proper boundaries of a "matter complained of", and a plaintiff's initial pleading not infrequently gives rise to a complaint by the defendant that either too much, or too little, has been pleaded. The issue has arisen in different ways in a number of cases: see, for example, Dougherty v Nationwide News Pty Limited (1968) 88 WN (NSW) 146; Burrows v Knightley (1987) 10 NSWLR 651; Lucas v John Fairfax Publications Pty Limited [2000] NSWSC 950, unreported, 13 October 2000, per Levine J; Rakhimov v John Fairfax Publications Pty Limited [2001] NSWSC 11, unreported, 25 January 2001, per Levine J; Keating v Newcastle Newspapers Pty Limited [2000] NSWSC 726, unreported, 1 August 2000, per Kirby J; and my own decision in Phelps v Nationwide News Pty Limited & Anor [2001] NSWSC 130, unreported, 9 March 2001.
21 Here, the defendant claims that it is embarrassed by the pleading of the entire magazine. It argued, firstly, that on no view of the magazine could any of it (other than page 3) be said to be "of and concerning" the plaintiff. In my view this is a misapplication of the words "of and concerning" as they are commonly used in the law of defamation. It is not "the matter complained of" that must be "of and concerning" the plaintiff; it is any defamatory imputations conveyed by the matter complained of. It would be quite misleading to focus upon the whole of the matter complained of to determine whether it was "of and concerning" the plaintiff; very frequently, a defamatory imputation will be conveyed by a publication in which, at most, glancing reference is made to the plaintiff and which could not, properly, be said to be "of and concerning" the plaintiff. The fact that the bulk of the magazine does not directly refer to the plaintiff is beside the point. In saying this I am conscious that the editors of Tobin and Sexton; Australian Defamation Law and Practice, Butterworths, 1999, at para 3090, assert that "the matter complained of must be 'concerning' the plaintiff", but I do not believe that this was intended to suggest that the whole of the matter complained of must be "of and concerning" the plaintiff, and if it were so intended, I respectfully disagree with the statement. The authority cited as support for the proposition is Sungravure Pty Ltd v Middle East Airlines Airlibian S.A.L. (1975) 134 CLR1. That case was decided under the Defamation Act 1958, and turned substantially on the construction of that Act. Even in that context, however, I do not read the passage quoted as requiring that the whole of the matter complained of be "of and concerning" the plaintiff. The focus is on whether the matter complained of, firstly, is capable of, and, secondly does in fact, convey an imputation of and concerning the plaintiff that is defamatory of the plaintiff.
22 Senior counsel for the defendant relied upon a passage in the judgment of Lee J in Dougherty, which reads:
"In my view, if an article in a newspaper is sued upon and it appears clearly that part of the article relates, not to the plaintiff, but to another person or other persons and/or that part of the article has no bearing in any way upon the meaning which might be conveyed by the other part, then this would justify the irrelevant part being struck out."
23 In my opinion, for a number of reasons, this passage does not have the effect for which senior counsel contended. Firstly, it seems to me that the argument overlooked the important qualification contained within the passage. The passage was urged as justifying the striking out of a part of an article that relates not to the plaintiff but to another person or other persons. But that is only part of the test proposed by Lee J. Despite the use of the words "and/or", it seems to me that to be struck out of the pleading in accordance with Lee J's formulation, it is essential that that part of the article has no bearing in any way upon the meaning which might be conveyed by that part that does relate to the plaintiff. That is the very point of the way the plaintiff frames her case; it is that, whatever might be conveyed by the contents of page 3 alone, a different meaning was conveyed by page 3 when read in the context of, or in conjunction with, the other parts of the magazine identified - that is, that other parts of the magazine do have a bearing upon the meaning conveyed by the contents of page 3. An important part of each imputation pleaded is that the photographs were published in a pornographic magazine; that part of the imputation could not reasonably be derived from page 3 alone, but could very readily be derived from page 3 in the context of the whole of the magazine. In order to determine whether the magazine was pornographic, it will be necessary for the jury to have access to the whole of it. It would be quite wrong to limit the plaintiff to one page only of the magazine, when the centrepoint of her claim is derived from the nature of the magazine as a whole. In the context of this argument, senior counsel also relied upon such parts of the magazine as are not pornographic or sexually suggestive, but these are an insignificant proportion; the jury will be entitled to assess the magazine as a complete entity, including those parts that are innocuous. Those parts will, of course, be available should the defendant wish to challenge the plaintiff's characterisation of the magazine as pornographic.
24 The second reason that the judgment Dougherty does not achieve the result sought by the defendant is that the passage quoted does not fully represent what was said by Lee J. His Honour went on to say:
"But great care must be exercised not to strike out any part of the material sued upon which may in any way have a significance in determining the true defamatory meaning and import of other parts or of the whole material. In Gatley on Libel and Slander 6th ed, p 984, the following paragraph appears:
' Libellous passages only to be set out . If the plaintiff is suing in respect of certain libellous passages in an article or letter, he need not set out the whole article or letter; it is sufficient to set out the libellous passages only, provided their meaning be clear and distinct. But if the meaning of the passages taken singly is not clear, or if the 'complexion of the imputations' conveyed by the libellous passages is materially altered or qualified by other passages in the article or letter, the plaintiff must set out the whole article or letter in his statement of claim. If the libellous passages are contained in a book, the plaintiff should set them out as separate passages, indicating in each case the page at which it is to be found. If the libel takes the form of a picture or statue, the picture or statue must be described with the circumstances relied on to support the innuendo.'
The cases cited by the learned authors, in my opinion, support the statements in that paragraph and, whilst directed to the obligation which lies on the plaintiff to set out the words complained of in their true context, imply equally that the plaintiff is entitled to set out all that he can fairly claim goes to demonstrate the full force and extent of the imputations he relies on. In Kasic v The Australian Broadcasting Commission [[1964] VR 702, at p 706] Gowens J., after referring to the reference in Gatley to the 'complexion of the imputation' … said:
'Conversely, I consider that if the 'complexion of the imputation' conveyed by the alleged defamatory passages may reasonably be capable of being coloured by the other passages, the plaintiff is entitled to set them out as well, subject to considerations of embarrassment to the defendant.'
Where the words in their literal sense convey the defamatory imputation relied upon, it may in many cases not be difficult to separate off parts of the article which in no way add to or detract from that meaning, but where the plaintiff claims that the libellous imputations emerge in their full force and extent only by a reading of the whole article, and the court is not convinced that this claim is ill founded, then whether the defendant is embarrassed or not I would think that the court would be slow to interfere and tamper with the article. As it is for the jury to determine whether the words in fact are libellous, nothing should be struck out from the words complained of which may in any way reasonably affect the imputations relied upon.
…
In my opinion, except in the case where it is quite clear to the court that a section of the article is on any view irrelevant to any case of libel which the plaintiff may make out, the article containing the libellous imputations can be pleaded in full."
25 The passage which commences "… where the plaintiff claims that the libellous imputations emerge in their full force and extent …" was cited with approval by Hutley JA in Hepburn v TCN Channel Nine Pty Limited [1983] 2 NSWLR 682.
26 Finally, it is not to be overlooked that the decision in Dougherty was also made in relation to a claim governed by the provisions of the Defamation Act 1958. That is of some significance when an additional part of his Honour's reasoning is taken into account. He referred to the difficulties a defendant might encounter in mounting a defence of justification to the pleading in that case, which, under the 1958 legislation, would have required establishing the defence in relation to the whole publication. Since 1974 a defendant who seeks to defend a claim by justifying is obliged only to prove the substantial truth (together with public interest or qualified privilege) of any imputation the plaintiff has succeeded in establishing was conveyed.
27 I am satisfied that Dougherty does not stand for the proposition for which the defendant contends. Certainly, nothing in Dougherty stands in the way of the plaintiff in the present case pleading the magazine in its entirety.
28 Another argument advanced on behalf of the defendant was that the direction traditionally given to juries to the effect that the hypothetical ordinary reasonable reader is assumed to have read the whole of the matter complained of, would, even more than usually, be seen to be unrealistic. I agree that this is so. Despite senior counsel's assertion that the direction is "writ in stone", no authority was cited for the proposition that it is essential. So far as I can see, the direction, although representing something of a fiction (in that it is likely that many recipients of allegedly defamatory publications, whether written or broadcast, either skim read, flit from paragraph to paragraph, partly listen or watch, or otherwise fail to absorb the whole publication) is given out of fairness to the defendant so that a plaintiff cannot seize upon a defamatory meaning potentially conveyed by one part of the publication but negated or nullified or diluted in another. I agree that it is unlikely that any person who came into possession of this magazine would have read all of the printed material or examined all of its pictorial content. But an ordinary reasonable reader would be taken to have looked, or glanced, through it, and readily gained its flavour.
29 Directions are intended to be tailored to suit the needs of individual cases. I do not think an appropriate direction concerning what the ordinary recipient of this publication would have done with it would be beyond the wit or capacity of a judge with the assistance of counsel. Given that the purpose of the usual direction is, as I perceive it, to ensure that jurors focus upon any parts of the matter complained of that put the imputations contended for by the plaintiff in a different light, it will be open to the defendant to identify for the jury any parts of the magazine that it suggests affect the meaning. This very fact demonstrates the hollowness of the defendant's argument. There is no disadvantage to the defendant arising from the manner in which the jury will be directed.
30 Senior counsel also argued that:
"As a matter of law, a plaintiff cannot plead articles even within the one newspaper or magazine as part of the matter complained if those further articles do not relate to the plaintiff."
31 In my opinion this proposition is too broadly stated. It is very easy to envisage circumstances in which a combination of articles in the same publication, or in different publications, might make one or the other (or both) defamatory, even where one of them did not refer to the plaintiff at all. For example, a newspaper might, on one page, refer to the plaintiff as holding high office in a particular religious sect. If, in another part of the newspaper that did not refer to the plaintiff, that sect was described as being given to ritual torture, demonism and witchcraft, the plaintiff would be entitled to plead the two articles in combination as conveying a defamatory meaning. It would not, in my view, be open to the plaintiff only to plead that by way of true innuendo, (although that would also be available); the plaintiff could plead by reference to the whole of the newspaper.
32 Senior counsel further contended that the proper (and, by implication, the only proper) way for the plaintiff to plead her case is by pleading the material on page 3 as the matter complained of, with a true innuendo arising by reference to the other parts of the magazine - as, indeed, she has alternatively formulated her case. This argument can only succeed if that manner of pleading is the only means properly available - that is, that the plaintiff could not properly rely upon the whole magazine.
33 Generally speaking, it lies in the plaintiff's hands to select the manner in which the case is framed: Ron Hodgson (Trading) Pty Limited v Belvedere Motors (Hurstville) Pty Limited [1971] 1 NSWLR 472; Dougherty; Hepburn.
34 To limit the plaintiff to the material contained on page 3 would be to distort the case she seeks to make. Her primary claim is that the magazine, in its natural and ordinary meaning, conveyed the imputations alleged. A word (and perhaps a photograph) may take its colour from its context: Cairns v John Fairfax and Sons Limited [1983] 2 NSWLR 708. A photograph of a person may, alone, be entirely innocuous. If juxtaposed with a story about drug dealing it may lose its innocent character.
35 Here, the magazine as a whole provides the context in which the plaintiff claims the defamatory imputations were conveyed. The photographs of the plaintiff (even with the accompanying text) may not convey any imputations defamatory of the plaintiff, or may convey a defamatory imputations different from, perhaps of a lesser character than, those upon which the plaintiff wishes to rely. The photographs and the text, in the context of the whole magazine, take on a different flavour altogether.
36 In another argument, senior counsel referred to the pleadings in Ettingshausen v Australian Consolidated Press Limited (1991) 23 NSWLR 443, where a well known footballer claimed to have been defamed by the publication of a photograph that showed his genitals. Senior counsel argued that the pleading adopted in that case - where the imputation pleaded was:
"The plaintiff is a person whose genitals have been exposed to the readers of the defendant's magazine …"