Consideration
16 The Applicant is entitled to bring an application for determination of native title pursuant to s 61(1) of the Native Title Act. That section materially provides that a native title determination application can be brought on behalf of:
A person who holds a non - native title interest in relation to the whole of the area in relation to which the determination is sought…
17 Pursuant to s 225 of the Native Title Act:
A determination of native title is a determination whether or not native title exists in relation to a particular area (the determination area) of land or waters and, if it does exist, a determination of:
(a) who the persons, or each group of persons, holding the common or group rights comprising the native title are; and
(b) the nature and extent of the native title rights and interests in relation to the determination area; and
(c) the nature and extent of any other interests in relation to the determination area; and
(d) the relationship between the rights and interests in paragraphs (b) and (c) (taking into account the effect of this Act); and
(e) to the extent that the land or waters in the determination area are not covered by a non-exclusive agricultural lease or a non-exclusive pastoral lease--whether the native title rights and interests confer possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of that land or waters on the native title holders to the exclusion of all others.
Note: The determination may deal with the matters in paragraphs (c) and (d) by referring to a particular kind or particular kinds of non-native title interests.
(emphasis added)
18 Section 225 includes a negative determination of native title: CG (Deceased) on behalf of the Badimia People v State of Western Australia (2016) 240 FCR 466; [2016] FCAFC 67.
19 As I noted earlier, the Application is unopposed. In the present case there is no reason for me to doubt that that is the case in circumstances where the only party on record for the matter other than the Applicant is the State Minister for the State of Queensland, who did not oppose an order being made in, or consistent with, the terms sought by the Applicant in these proceedings. The State Minister for the State of Queensland has filed a notice to that effect.
20 In circumstances where an application under s 61 is unopposed, s 86G of the Native Title Act applies. Section 86G provides:
Unopposed applications
Federal Court may make order
(1) If, at any stage of a proceeding in relation to an application under section 61, but after the end of the period specified in the notice given under section 66:
(a) the application is unopposed; and
(b) the Federal Court is satisfied that an order in, or consistent with, the terms sought by the applicant is within the power of the Court;
the Court may, if it appears appropriate to do so, make such an order without holding a hearing or, if a hearing has started, without completing the hearing.
Note: If the application involves making a determination of native title, the Court's order would need to comply with section 94A (which deals with the requirements of native title determination orders).
Meaning of unopposed
(2) For the purpose of this section, an application is unopposed if the only party is the applicant or if each other party notifies the Federal Court in writing that he or she does not oppose an order in, or consistent with, the terms sought by the applicant.
21 It is not in dispute that the period specified in the notice in this case given under s 66 has expired, and further that the notification period ended on 31 January 2018.
22 The leading authority in relation to non-claimant applications is the decision of the Full Court in Mace v State of Queensland [2019] FCAFC 233; (2019) 375 ALR 717 (Mace). In that case the Full Court in its reasons observed that:
44. … The question for the Court remains the same whether the application is unopposed, or contested: has the applicant discharged its burden of proof that no native title exists in the claim area?
23 The principles in Mace were distilled by Jagot J in Wagonga Local Aboriginal Land Council v Attorney General of New South Wales [2020] FCA 1113, as follows:
10. The Full Court of the Federal Court recently considered non-claimant applications under the NTA in Mace v State of Queensland [2019] FCAFC 233; (2019) 375 ALR 717 (Mace). The following propositions are established in Mace, including principles established by an earlier decision of the Full Court in Worimi v Worimi Local Aboriginal Land Council [2010] FCAFC 3; (2010) 181 FCR 320 (Worimi):
(1) The special functions vested in an Aboriginal Land Council (ALC), such as WLALC, by the ALRA are not material to the question whether such a body, as a non-claimant applicant seeking a determination that there is no native title in relation to land, has discharged its onus of proof. As a non-claimant applicant, an ALC is in the same position as any other non-claimant applicant under the NTA: [12].
(2) The reason for a non-claimant application does not govern the Court's approach to the exercise of the power: [42].
(3) Whether there is a contradictor to a non-claimant application or not, the legal question remains the same: has the applicant discharged its burden of proof that no native title exists in the area the subject of the non-claimant application: [44].
(4) The overriding proposition is that each case must be assessed on its own particular facts: [47].
(5) Relevant considerations will include the nature of the land and the tenure involved, the presence or absence of any present or previous native title claims and the nature and content of those claims, and any particular evidence adduced by the parties: [48].
(6) The Court must act on evidence, direct or indirect, which can be weighed against the case brought by the non-claimant applicant: [52].
(7) All issues are to be assessed on the usual standard of proof in civil litigation - proof on the balance of probabilities. A non-claimant applicant will either meet this standard or will not: [54].
(8) A non-claimant application does not involve any general inquiry into what native title rights and interests may have existed at sovereignty or any general inquiry into how those rights or interests may or may not have continued: [55].
(9) The provisions of the NTA are intended to facilitate all persons with a proper interest in an area of land taking steps to ensure that their interest is taken into account when the Court is making a native title determination with respect to that land. However, it is not necessary to employ evidentiary or adversarial presumptions to the task which may have been developed by the common law in different contexts from native title determinations: [56]. A better approach is to focus on what the evidence before the Court does establish, whether before or against the determination sought by the non-claimant applicant: [56]. Similarly common law maxims developed in different contexts are also of limited utility to the determination of a non-claimant application: [57]-[60].
(10) In a non-claimant application the applicant seeks a negative determination in rem. In this context recourse to common law maxims developed in different contexts may not be useful: [61].
(11) In a non-claimant application it is inappropriate to impose a specific evidential burden on a respondent such as the respondent need only make out a "prima facie" position. This would involve a gloss on the application of the usual burden and standard of proof which applies equally to claimant and non-claimant applications: [63].
(12) The question whether native title does not exist (in a non-claimant application) or does exist (in a claimant application) is to be decided according to the balance of probabilities by reference to the circumstances of each case and on the evidence adduced without recourse to maxims or presumptions originating in different adversarial contexts: [64]. In this regard it may be noted that in Worimi at [74] the point was made that a respondent to a non-claimant application is not subject to any onus of proof. The onus remains at all times on the applicant for the non-claimant application, in this case, WLALC.
(13) In a non-claimant application account needs to be taken of the gravity of a negative determination and its permanency in terms of its effect on native title rights and interests which are otherwise sought to be protected by the NTA: [66].
(14) No hard and fast rules can be laid down about what evidence might be required or might suffice for a non-claimant applicant to meet the required standard of proof: [68]. Given what is at stake and the fact that any determination affects property rights as against the whole world no prescriptive approaches or glosses on the statute should be imposed. The Court has a wide discretion whether or not to make a negative determination and the potential combination of considerations which may arise in any particular application cannot be predicted or turned into any kind of checklist: [72].
(15) If the burden of proof on a non-claimant application has been discharged it may be a rare case in which the discretion is exercised not to make a negative determination but in principle the discretion exists and the Court should not foreclose consideration of the question whether it is appropriate to make the order in all of the circumstances of the case: [73].
(16) The Court's task is not to be more or less "stringent" depending on the kind of case before it but is to decide if the non-claimant applicant has discharged its burden of proof. In doing so the subject-matter of the non-claimant application and the consequences of a negative determination inform the requisite level of persuasion for a negative determination: [82].
(17) The principal evidence likely to impede the grant of a negative determination is evidence of an assertion of native title in the land the subject of the non-claimant application which is objectively arguable, not evidence of the potential for the assertion of native title. A representative body is best placed to assist Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples to provide such evidence. The quality of such evidence, rather than its extent, will be determinative: [97].
11. The non-claimant application in the present case is to be decided consistently with these propositions. Most importantly, the case is to be decided on the whole of the evidence which has been adduced. The question is whether, having regard to all of the evidence, WLALC has proved on the balance of probabilities that there is no native title in the land…
24 I am satisfied on the material before the Court that the Court has the power to make a negative determination of native title. It remains for me to consider whether the Applicant has discharged its burden of proof that no native title exists in the area the subject of the Application. As observed in Mace, each case must be assessed on its own particular facts, including the nature of the land and tenure involved, the presence or absence of any native title claims (including previous claims), and any evidence adduced by the parties.
25 Further, as the Full Court observed in Mace at [55], it is unnecessary for the Court to conduct any general inquiry into what native title rights and interests may have existed at sovereignty or any general inquiry into how those rights or interests may or may not have continued.
26 The Original Application was publicly notified on 18 October 2017. The only response to the public notification process in this case was that of the Wakaman People referable to the Wakaman #4 Claim. As I noted earlier, any issues arising in respect of this response have been resolved by the amendment of this claim. I further accept the submission of the State Minister for the State of Queensland that evidence before the Court is sufficient for the Court to be satisfied that the Wakaman People do not assert or hold native title rights and interests in the amended claim area. I further find that there was no requirement for notification of the Application as amended to any other person.
27 I now turn to the evidence before the Court in relation to the position of the Bar Barrum People.
28 While the respondent noted that the ILUA, and the Proposed Bar Barrum/O'Shea ILUA, suggested that historically the Bar Barrum People asserted the existence of native title over the amended claim area, on the evidence the Bar Barrum People have taken no steps to assert or pursue native title rights and interests over the amended claim area since the Original Application was filed in 2017. In circumstances where the Bar Barrum People have taken no action in relation to asserting native title rights or interests or contradicting the Applicant's claim in respect of the overlapping sections of the amended claim area, I accept the submission of the Applicant that no material weight should be given to the ILUA.
29 I note that NQLC contacted the Bar Barrum People, through Mbabaram, in October 2023, identifying the consequences of the potential determination that native title did not exist, and that if successful no further native title claim over the claim area would be possible. The evidence before the Court is that no communications from the Bar Barrum People in response were received. Insofar as appears from the material before the Court, the Bar Barrum People have expressed no interest in the present Application.
30 I further note that NQLC, as the representative body which would be expected to have information concerning prospective native title holders in respect of the claimed area, did not participate in these proceedings and did not seek to be a party.
31 As noted in Mace at [97], the principal evidence likely to impede the grant of a negative determination is evidence of an assertion of native title in the land the subject of the non-claimant application which is objectively arguable, not evidence of the potential for the assertion of native title. To this extent, I am not satisfied that the existence of the ILUA, which notably expired in 2011, or the Proposed Bar Barrum/O'Shea ILUA, which was never registered, constitute an assertion of native title which is objectively arguable.
32 Further, there was no evidence provided to the Court of any physical connection to the amended claim area by indigenous people, nor evidence adduced of the existence of any sites of significance to indigenous people in the amended claim area.
33 In the circumstances I am satisfied that the Applicant has discharged its onus of establishing, on the balance of probabilities, that native title does not exist over the amended claim area. Accordingly, I find that native title does not exist over the amended claim area, and consider that it is appropriate to make a negative determination in the terms sought by the applicant.
I certify that the preceding thirty-three (33) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Collier.