This is an application for an adjournment of a three day possession matter that was listed to commence today. In the principal proceedings, the plaintiff sues a husband and wife as mortgagors of residential property. The principal amount advanced was approximately $330,000. It was advanced in the first half of 2013. The interest rate was very high, reflecting the reasonably precarious financial position of the borrowers, and the fact that it was proposed to only be a short term loan. In broad terms, the value of the subject property is around $750,000.
Applying the very high interest rates in the loan agreement, the amount of indebtedness now exceeds the value of the property. Of course, if lesser rates were applied, then the position would be different.
The matter has been set down for hearing for some time. The first inkling of an adjournment application came earlier today when the matter was called on. A solicitor in the employ of the first defendant's solicitors announced his appearance for both defendants. It was later clarified that the appearance was only being announced on behalf of the first defendant, who is the wife of the second defendant.
An affidavit in support of the adjournment application was read by one of the principals of the first defendant's solicitors, Mr Dib. In brief, he stated that the solicitor with carriage of the matter appears to have abruptly ceased work on 1 March 2015. He says that he only became aware that the matter was listed for hearing on 3 March 2015. He had assumed that counsel had been briefed as he had previously appeared in the matter. Mr Dib said he contacted counsel but was told that he was appearing in another matter for the same firm in this Court today. The affidavit includes the statement, "I cannot explain why my firm has not prepared the matter for hearing". The affidavit also includes a recounting of what appears to be an earlier conference with counsel who had been briefed to appear. Mr Dib states:
"In the end, the barrister refused the brief because I could not guarantee his fees and because [the barrister] drew to […] attention a letter from the Plaintiff to the effect, 'I cannot act as I have a conflict of interest'.
I had been of the view that my firm could act, particularly because the firm was acting without security of its fees because of my long association with the Borsellino Family."
The reference to a conflict of interest is to the fact that Mr Dib appears to have acted on behalf of the first defendant and her husband at the time they entered into the loan the subject of the proceedings. A significant aspect of the first defendant's defence concerns the circumstances in which she claims to have entered into that loan agreement including an alleged absence of knowledge on her part as to all the material terms of the loan and its commercial context. It seems that in June 2014, the plaintiff's solicitors, wanting to avoid an adjournment of a hearing, had written to the first defendant's solicitor adverting to this conflict of interest. Nevertheless Mr Dib decided to continue to act.
When the affidavit was read, counsel for the plaintiff indicated that he wished to cross-examine the deponent. I required Mr Dib to attend at this Court at 2 o'clock today. In the meantime, I was sent a medical certificate which stated that he was receiving medical treatment and was unfit to continue his usual occupation for the period 9 March to 11 March 2015. That statement is curious given he swore the affidavit in support of the adjournment application on 8 March 2015 and no mention was made of his ill health when the affidavit was read.
In the end result, I am confronted with an adjournment application in circumstances where it appears the first defendant's solicitors have totally abandoned her interests. The case has not been prepared properly. It does not even appear that she has been advised of the necessity for her to attend the hearing. Counsel has not been retained. Most importantly, the first defendant's solicitors have been told explicitly that they have a conflict of interest and nevertheless continued to act in the matter, notwithstanding that advice.
The end result is that if I am to refuse the adjournment, I have no doubt that it would occasion an injustice to the first defendant. There is no reason to believe that she has any personal responsibility for the conduct of the solicitors acting on her behalf.
However, there is, of course, the question of the prejudice occasioned to the plaintiff by reason of the granting of an adjournment.
The most obvious form of prejudice is costs. I consider that this can be addressed in the short term. As I am to adjourn the substantive hearing, I will shortly make directions for the return before me of an application on behalf of the plaintiff for the first defendant's solicitors to personally pay the costs thrown away, so that that can be addressed speedily.
Second, there is, however, the question of its ongoing indebtedness and the accumulation of interest. If it is ultimately determined that the plaintiff is entitled to receive interest at the very large rate stated in the loan agreement, then it will turn out that this delay has caused them a degree of prejudice that is unlikely to be addressed. Nevertheless, I consider that some protection is offered to their position by the fact that the value of the subject property is enough to secure their principal and interest that would accrue at rates even reasonably higher than normal commercial terms.
Accordingly, with considerable reluctance, I will shortly adjourn the hearing.
As I indicated, I will also make directions for the return this Wednesday of an application by the plaintiff for the first defendant's solicitors to pay the costs thrown away by reason of the adjournment or, failing that, for the first defendant to pay the costs thrown away by reason of the adjournment and to allow it, if the plaintiff so wishes, to bring in material for the immediate quantification of those costs. The necessity for the first defendant to attend would need to be made clear to her by her solicitors in terms that I will outline shortly.
I indicate for the sake of completeness that I had contemplated granting a shorter adjournment of the substantive hearing, thus giving the first defendant's solicitors the opportunity to retain counsel quickly. I do not think there is that much material that competent counsel could not comprehend it in a short period of time. The difficulty with that course, however, is that I have no doubt that, if any counsel of any reasonable level of experience and ability was retained, the first matter that they would point out would be that the first defendant's solicitors have the conflict that I have referred to and should not be acting. Indeed, the view might well be taken that the first defendant's solicitors should be a cross defendant. I make no further comment.
Accordingly, I order as follows:
1. On the application of the First Defendant, the hearing is adjourned to 11.03.15 at 10am before Beech-Jones J for directions and hearing as to who out of the First Defendant or her solicitor should bear the costs of the adjournment.
2. Direct the First Defendant's solicitors to send by courier, to arrive no later than 10am on Tuesday, 10.03.15 a letter to the First Defendant notifying the following:
1. that these proceedings were listed on 9 March for hearing (three days);
2. that on the application of the First Defendant's solicitor, the hearing was adjourned;
3. that the First Defendant's solicitors advised the Court that they had not prepared the matter for hearing;
4. that the First Defendant's solicitors advised the Court that they had been advised they had a conflict of interest in acting for the First Defendant;
5. that the First Defendant is required to attend Court on 11 March 2015 at 10am before Beech-Jones J, and if she does not attend orders may be made against her in her absence.
1. Direct the First Defendant to serve an affidavit on the Plaintiff's solicitors on or before 3pm on 10.03.15 as to their compliance with order 2.
2. Costs reserved
3. Direct the First Defendant to serve any schedule of the costs they seek by 4pm on 10 March 2015.
[2]
DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.
Decision last updated: 12 March 2015