Basis for application for summary dismissal
17 The basis for the Commissioner's application for summary dismissal is a claim that by reason of his bankruptcy, Dr Nugawela lacked standing to proceed with the applications before the Tribunal and continues to lack standing to start and prosecute an appeal against the dismissal of those applications. Reliance is not placed upon the consequences of any deemed abandonment by operation of s 60(3) of the Bankruptcy Act.
18 Therefore, given the way the Commissioner presents the case on the application it is not necessary to consider the relevance of the statutory abandonment as a basis for the dismissal of the proceedings by the Tribunal. The Commissioner's application for summary dismissal rests upon the claim that Dr Nugawela lacks standing as a bankrupt to bring the appeal given its subject matter. In effect, it advances the same argument that it relied upon before the Tribunal being an argument that was accepted by the Tribunal as a separate basis upon which the applications before the Tribunal should be dismissed.
19 In reaching its conclusions as to standing, the Tribunal relied upon the decision in Robertson Jnr v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2004] FCAFC 46; (2004) 137 FCR 513 which applied the decisions in Cummings v Claremont Petroleum NL [1996] HCA 19; (1996) 185 CLR 124 and McCallum v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 75 FCR 458. The same decisions are relied upon by the Commissioner on the present application.
20 In Cummings, proceedings were brought against Mr Cummings and Mr Fuller by Claremont Petroleum NL. After judgment was reserved, Mr Cummings and Mr Fuller became bankrupts. Sometime later, judgment was pronounced in favour of Claremont Petroleum. Mr Cummings and Mr Fuller filed notices of appeal. The appeals were dismissed as incompetent. The High Court held that the bankrupts had no standing to institute the appeals.
21 Brennan CJ, Gaudron J and McHugh J observed that if the appeals had been commenced prior to their bankruptcy then they would have been stayed by operation of s 60(2) of the Bankruptcy Act: at 130. They noted that the effect of bankruptcy is to divest a bankrupt of his property and to vest the property in a trustee to be made available for the payment of provable debts: at 132. Further, the right of creditors to take a fresh step in legal proceedings against a bankrupt or enforce against the property of a bankrupt in respect of a provable debt is, in general, denied to creditors: at 132. They accepted that a right to appeal does not have the character of property: at 133-136. However, 'so far as a judgment entered in an action against a bankrupt creates or evidences a provable debt … the bankrupt has no financial interest which would confer locus standi to appeal in his own name against the judgment': at 137-138. This was because 'the bankrupt is divested of both his interest in his property and liability for his provable debts': at 138. This led to the conclusion that the bankrupt could not appeal and it was a matter for the trustee whether to appeal: at 138.
22 Their honours then dealt with the possible injustice that may arise where a bankrupt wished to pursue the appeal in order to vindicate the personal or professional character of the bankrupt (the judgment that had been entered against Mr Cummings and Mr Fuller was based upon findings of conspiracy and deceit). Reference was made to the ability of a bankrupt who objected to a decision made by a trustee to decline to sue or appeal to apply to the court in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction concerning administration in bankruptcy now expressed in s 178 of the Bankruptcy Act. However, that step had not been taken.
23 I note that before the Tribunal in the present case, the Commissioner referred to the fact that Dr Nugawela had commenced proceedings in the Federal Court (WAD 528 of 2017) to review the decision of the trustee to abandon the applications in the Tribunal. It does appear that Dr Nugawela relied upon that application as a reason why the application should be adjourned or held in abeyance while various other court proceedings are determined. The Tribunal did not consider that aspect in reaching its decision.
24 In McCallum, Lehane J (Whitlam J agreeing) found that a bankrupt was likely to lack standing to seek review of a decision by the Commissioner rejecting an objection because the subject matter of the objection would be a provable debt in the bankruptcy. However, as it may be that an objection decision in relation to a particular assessment may have consequences in relation to the years following discharge when there would be personal liability, the position did not pertain in all instances: at 475.
25 There is no suggestion that the nature of the assessments in this case had any consequence that might apply after the discharge of Dr Nugawela from bankruptcy. No proposition to that effect was advanced by Dr Nugawela in the submissions recorded by the Tribunal in its reasons.
26 In Robertson Jnr, the party seeking to bring the appeal applied to the Tribunal to review the objection decisions of the Commissioner, but became bankrupt before the review application was heard. The Commissioner then raised an objection and the Tribunal found that standing to proceed was lost upon bankruptcy: at [3]. The court upheld that decision applying Cummings and McCallum: at [22].