12 On the basis of the foregoing scenario it was said that if the separate questions are decided in favour of the applicant, there will be a prolongation of the matter, the need for witnesses to give evidence and be cross‑examined twice, multiplication of interlocutory procedures, and the need for the parties to prepare for trial twice. Counsel for the applicant submitted that separate determination of the questions would only be a useful course if the Court could have some confidence that the answers would favour the respondents, thereby relieving it and the parties of any further need to consider infringement and validity. In the light of the Canadian Novartis, it was said that the Court could have no such confidence.
13 It is a powerful consideration in favour of ordering separate questions that if they are answered in favour of the respondents it will be determinative of the proceeding. However I do not understand the passage from Wik set out in [5] as indicating that in such a case the court must or should exercise its discretion under Order 29 rule 2(a) in favour of separate questions. Rather the position is, as stated in Reading, that that is a factor tending to support such an order. See Branson J's principle (f) quoted at [6]. The statement of Giles CJ in Comm D in Tallglen Pty Ltd v Pay TV Holdings Pty Ltd (1996) 22 ACSR 130 at 141 that
"separate decision of a question may be appropriate where, for example, the decision of the question is critical to the outcome of the proceedings and (at least if decided in one way) will bring the proceedings to an end"
supports this approach. Other authorities indicate that a stronger case for a separate question would exist if the answer would resolve the whole of the proceedings whichever way it was returned. See Dunstan v Simmie & Co Pty Ltd [1978] VR 669 at 671, cited with approval in Century Medical v THLD [2000] NSWSC 5 (unreported, Supreme Court of NSW, 3 February 2000 per Rolfe J) at [29]. Where the proceeding would only be brought to an end if the question were resolved in favour of one side, all relevant factors must be weighed in the balance, including the possibility that the questions may be answered in favour of the other side and the consequences that may flow therefrom. Each case must be treated on its own merits. There is no absolute rule: Century Medical at [31]. In my view, that possibility and those consequences outweigh the fact that answers in favour of the respondents will determine the proceeding.
14 A separate question hearing that is resolved in favour of the applicant may result in the need to determine contested factual issues at the separate questions hearing and again at trial. In Tallglen the Chief Judge observed that:
"It is often the case that the need to make findings of fact for a decision of the separate question, especially findings which may involve issues of credit, tells strongly against the making of an order because related facts, and renewed issues of credit, will or may arise at a later stage in the proceedings."
15 On the same assumption, an order for separate questions may result in an overlap between the evidence called at the two stages, with experts being cross‑examined twice, resulting in additional expense and inconvenience. This danger was recognised by Stone J when her Honour refused to order separate questions in EnergyAustralia v Australian Energy Limited [2001] FCA 1049 at [8]. As the Canadian Novartis case shows, the questions involved are neither short nor easy, and are likely to involve a considerable amount of expert evidence.
16 There is also a danger that the order may considerably prolong the litigation as a result of appeals and duplicated interlocutory steps. In Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2000]NSWSC 1215 at [7] Einstein J warned that
"(5) … the separate determination of an issue will rarely be an appropriate procedure where:
…
(c) there is a possibility that the resolution of the separate issue will not finally determine the issue but will merely result in an appeal from that decision in relation to that separate issue, creating a multiplicity of proceedings, interruption to the court and the undesirable fragmentation of the proceedings ….
(6) The experience of courts suggests that the separation of proceedings often does not result in the quicker and cheaper resolution of proceedings as anticipated, but often has the reverse effect, merely causing added delay and expense to the resolution of the litigation. Thus, before an issue is to be separately determined, it must be possible to clearly see that it will facilitate the quicker and cheaper resolution of the proceedings …."
See also Energy Australia at [6], and Century Medical at [31] where Rolfe J said that in his experience an order for separate issues "usually leads to a proliferation rather than a truncation of litigation".
17 The possibility referred to by Einstein J in Idoport exists here. Neither the applicant's solicitor's timetable set out in [10] nor its counsel's scenario set out in [11] is unrealistic.
18 I have recorded the applicant's submission that separate determinations would only be useful if the Court had some confidence that the answers would favour the respondents. I do not have any such confidence. I have not found the Canadian Novartis of assistance on this question. In an earlier proceeding between the same parties (2001 FTC 137) Tremblay-Lamer J rejected Novartis' argument that "pharmaceutical preparation" covered a hydrosol formed in situ. As I have said, in the later case Lemieux J accepted that argument. The judge said at [223] that the expert evidence before Tremblay‑Lamer J was "substantially different than the evidence I received and that difference justifies the opposite conclusion I have reached".
19 The ordinary course is that all issues in a proceeding should be dealt with at the one time: Tallglen at 141, Idoport at 7 and EnergyAustralia at [5]. That position should not be disturbed unless it can be clearly seen that determination of a separate question will facilitate the quicker and cheaper resolution of the proceedings: Tallglen at 142, Idoport at 7, EnergyAustralia at [6]. For the reasons indicated, the respondents have not satisfied me that that presumption should be displaced. In the exercise of the discretion conferred by Order 29, I decline to make the order they seek.
I certify that the preceding nineteen (19) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Sundberg.