Submissions of the respondent
35 Mr Ginters began his submissions by reference to the Australian Services Union Vs Sydney Water Full Bench decision relied upon by Mr Gibian, acknowledging that it provided a useful guidance for the exercise of power to grant interim orders under the Castlemaine Tooheys tests that it would be wrong to apply the decision strictly and inflexibly, having regard to the dynamic nature of industrial dispute proceedings.
36 Mr Ginters suggested that the Commission should bear in mind not only the interim relief sought, but the final relief sought in these proceedings.
37 Mr Gibian had concentrated upon the second order which would eventually be sought under Section 175 of the Industrial Relations Act (Exhibit 5 refers), claiming Mr Brown as a displaced employee for the purposes of the Premier's Memorandum No. 96/5. He has not drawn particular attention to the third substantive order which would be sought, for Mr Brown to be entitled to be considered before any other applicants for the newly created position of Catchment Co-ordinator, Education and Extension. Order 3 derives from Order 2 (Mr Brown being a "Displaced Employee) being sought, but it is Order 3 which fails at the outset because it impermissibly seeks to cut across what Section 22 of the PSEM Act prohibits in express and unequivocal terms. (i.e. as to the appointment or failure to appoint).
38 The Commission's jurisdiction under Section 175 to make determinations is premised on there being a need to make a determination. The language of Section 175 shows that as a matter of statutory construction and logic that the Commission cannot make a determination in a vacuum and needs to have a live judiciable matter to determine. Hence the words "in connection with a matter before it".
39 Similarly, in respect to interim relief under Section 136(1)(b), the Commission's power only arises if it is "authorised" to make an order. Again, it follows that there needs to be a jurisdictional foundation to make an interim order.
40 Bearing the above in mind, it can be readily seen that the proper characterisation of the orders sought is no more than an impermissible attempt to attack the appointment process for the vacant position of Catchment Co-ordinator, Education and Extension.
41 Again as to Orders 2 and 3 eventually sought under Section 175, Order 3 follows axiomatically from Order 2 (that Mr Brown is a displaced employee in terms of the Premier's Circular) and (Order 3) - to be considered before any other applicants. The dispute underlying those orders are nothing other than a dispute regarding "the appointment or failure to appoint", in terms of Section 22 of the PSEM.
42 The situation crystallises from the situation that Mr Brown held the position of a Catchment Co-ordinator, Soils and Land Use, prior to the re-organisation and that following the restructure there is no doubt he continues to occupy a substantive position of Catchment Co-ordinator in the Gwydir Rivers Catchment Management Authority (GRCMA). This can be seen from the staff structure attached to Ms Krynda's affidavit Exhibit 6 Annexures A and B.
43 The fact that some of the functions previously performed by him are in the restructure as the vacant position of Catchment Co-ordinator, Education and Extension, which he wishes to keep, boils down to the fact that Mr Brown desires to be directly appointed to the vacant position which has those farm management system employees in its reporting structure, previously under his auspices.
44 The Association cannot escape from the fact that Mr Brown continues to hold a substantive position within the Department of Environment & Climate Change (DECC).
45 His functions and duties are within the positions description for a Catchment Co-ordinator and when it comes to assess the issue of "serious questions to be tried" and "the balance of convenience" tests, the Association cannot get where it needs to get in respect of the Displaced Employees Policy. One cannot see the conclusion involving a serious question. The order seeking "an entitlement to be considered before other applicants" (Order 3) goes directly to being a matter, question or dispute relating to "an appointment or a failure to appoint" and there is no jurisdiction because of Section 22 of the PSEM Act, and neither is there jurisdiction to make an interim order because the Commission needs to be authorised or the order needs to be in connection with a matter before the Commission and under Section 136(1)(d) of the Industrial Relations Act, the capacity to grant an interim order only arises if the Commission is authorised to make an order. If there is no jurisdiction the Commission cannot be authorised.
46 Mr Ginters referred to the Fisheries case (Crown Employees (New South Wales Fisheries, Salaries and Conditions of Employment Award) (2003) 129 IR 369) and at paragraph 9 of that decision it is made clear from that Full Bench authority that Section 22 (or its predecessor) should be construed broadly, by reference to an earlier Full Bench decision of the Ombudsman's case.
47 Mr Gibian cannot separate the Section 22 matter on the basis that he is only seeking interim relief, because if the Commission has no jurisdiction to finally determine proceedings, because of what Mr Ginters described as the proper characterisation of the matter earlier, then the Commission has no jurisdiction to grant the interim relief. It is not a matter of a serious question to be tried, it is a question of jurisdiction to be authorised to make an order.
48 Mr Ginters referred the Commission to the Annexures to Ms Krynda's affidavit Exhibit 6, the first of which, Annexure A was a staff structure prior to the re-organisation in July this year, which shows Mr Brown's name at classification Grade 9/10. This showed a number of people reporting to Mr Brown. At Annexure B was the staff structure from the 27th July, 2007, also shows Mr Brown, but with the title of Catchment Co-ordinator, Soils and Land Use Grade 9/10, with other persons reporting to him.
49 He continues to remain at the Grade 9/10 level, continues to be employed by the DECC and continues to work with the GRCMA. Annexure B shows some of the people previously reporting to Mr Brown moved across to report under the vacant Catchment Co-ordinator, Education and Extension position. By the same token, Mr Brown now has other people replacing those persons under him - i.e. whilst still holding a substantive Catchment Co-ordinator position.
50 Annexure C to Ms Krynda's affidavit, Exhibit 6, shows a generic position profile for the position of Catchment Co-ordinator. What Mr Brown performed pre restructure and what he performs post restructure fall within that generic profile. He continues with a substantive position, which has generic key activities and results to be achieved and a selection criteria. The internal dynamics sitting below those activities may wax and wane and change, but the key activities identified in that Annexure do not change for Catchment Co-ordinators. Mr Ginters invited the Commission in his submissions to cross reference the selection criteria at Annexure C to Exhibit 6 for the generic position description, with the very selection criteria applying when Mr Brown applied for the position of Catchment Co-ordinator in 2004. He took the Commission to some nine items of the selection criteria to demonstrate that they were the same throughout. There are now four such positions in the GRCMA and there is a total of twelve throughout all the catchment management authorities throughout New South Wales - reflecting a generic position profile. Whilst there may be some key activities and selection criteria tweaked at the edges, that does not detract from the eleven key activities applying to all catchment authorities, whether it concerns a Catchment Co-ordinator, Soils and Land Use or Catchment Co-ordinator, Catchment and Extension, or any of the four GRCMA Co-ordinator positions. For that very reason Mr Gibian cannot demonstrate that Mr Brown's Co-ordinator position no longer exists, because it continues to exist.
51 Mr Ginters provided the analogy of the Commission itself where despite the generic functions of a Commissioner, the statutory position might have it's key activities in the way industries changed from time to time through the decision of the President and might change panels, resulting in a change of duties.
52 Starting with the proposition that the key activities or inherent requirements of the job of Catchment Co-ordinator are the same across Catchment Co-ordinator positions, other changes to duties or the mix of people reporting to the position might change, as a normal thing.
53 Mr Brown has been encouraged to apply for the vacant Catchment Co-ordinator, Education and Extension vacant position and has apparently applied by the closing date of 7th December, 2007. Mr Ginters asked the Commission to look at the situation that if the applicant was unsuccessful, he would continue in his substantive position of Catchment Co-ordinator, Soils and Land Use. The Commission would not be confronted with an excess or displaced employee.
54 The fact that Mr Brown is not a displaced employee in terms of the Premier's Memorandum, goes to the issue of the serious question to be tried and balance of convenience test. A displaced employee is actually defined in the Premier's Memorandum as "a person whose position or job no longer exists", - clearly not the situation here.
55 Under the policy for managing displaced employees, Exhibit 2, on the 5th page at the 4th paragraph is another significant criteria "redeployment is the principle means for managing displaced employees whose position/jobs have been deleted". Mr Brown's position always will continue to exist in the structure in accordance with Annexure B to Exhibit 6 - Ms Krynda's affidavit. He will continue to hold his substantive position.
56 The very language used in Order 3 under Section 175 at a final hearing has a condition precedent that the displaced employee must be excess. There is no ambiguity and this represents a fundamental flaw in Mr Gibian's argument, as Mr Brown is not an excess officer. As such, there is not a serious question to be tried and nor does the balance of convenience warrant the granting of the interim order sought as contained within Exhibit 5.
57 Even if the Commission was to find there was a serious question to be tried, the Balance of Convenience overwhelmingly favours the declining of interim relief in these proceedings. There is no contest that he can apply (and has applied). If he is unsuccessful he will continue in his substantive position. He repeated that the application is properly characterised as Mr Brown seeking the direct appointment to the vacant position, which is impermissible under Section 22. The statutory language of Section 22 is clear that you cannot elevate policy requirements of the Premier's Memorandum over the Act.
58 This dispute does not traverse an ambit broader than Mr Brown and the circumstances of the Gwydir Rivers CMA. It is an incorrect analysis to suggest that the case is about "redeployment" as per the Premier's circular and not "appointment". This is a case about the use of semantic language to subvert or avoid Section 22.
59 The Commission is not a rubber stamp for applications for interim relief like this one. A substantive case needs to be made out.
60 Mr Ginters dealt with the caselaw referred to by Mr Gibian and distinguished those circumstances applying such as the case of the police officer who resigned and was not reappointed on the basis that Section 136 and 137(1) of the IR Act allows for dispute orders in respect of reinstatement or re-employment - in contrast to the present circumstances. In respect of the Public Service Board case, Mr Ginters dealt with the decision of the Builders Licensing Board to direct the transfer of an officer, a function specifically dealt with under a separate section of the then Public Service Act, recognising a different subject matter than the operation of the equivalent of Section 22 of the PSEM Act.