2,3& 4 By a Transfer executed by them on 25 November 2009, stamped on 3 March 2010 and registered on 8 March 2010, Hazel and Fabre transferred Lot 171, Lot 9 and Lot 10 to Fabre alone. The space in the form of transfer providing for a statement of the "Consideration" was filled in: "pursuant to an oral agreement".
18 Relevant to Fabre's knowledge or reason to believe or suspect that the Misappropriated Funds had been misappropriated by Hazel is the fact that Hazel and Fabre are life partners. Paragraph 4 of the Amended Statement of Claim alleges that at all material times they were "in a de facto relationship". On 1 August 2005 Hazel filled in a "Commencement Form" for Norco identifying Fabre as her "partner" and the person to be contacted in case of emergency. She also gave as Fabre's address the same address as her own. I infer that Hazel and Fabre are life partners and have been at least since 1 August 2005.
19 Where money is misappropriated it is trust money in the hands of the person who has misappropriated it. It retains that character in the hands of a transferee unless that person took in good faith, for value and without notice: Black v S Freedman & Co (1910) 12 CLR 105 at 110 per O'Connor J.
20 Norco does not press for declaratory relief in relation to Lot 511: Mr Donahue appears to have been bona fide purchaser of a legal estate for value without notice.
21 In relation to the other three properties, Fabre does not, in my opinion, satisfy the description of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. The Misappropriated Funds were held by Hazel upon trust for Norco. Hazel and Fabre held the relevant parts of them in the accounts in trust for Norco. Hazel and Fabre paid those parts off the mortgages, thereby increasing the values of their equities in the three properties. Neither at the times when parts of the Misappropriated Funds were so paid nor on 8 March 2010 when Hazel and Fabre transferred the three properties to Fabre alone (nor at the earlier time when the parts were paid into the accounts), can it be said that Fabre provided valuable consideration in good faith and without notice of the defect touching Hazel's title to the moneys.
22 I infer from the facts referred to earlier, namely, the allegations of fact deemed to be admitted and the relationship between Hazel and Fabre, that Fabre knew or had reason to believe or suspect that the amounts that she and Hazel were paying off the mortgages were monies that Hazel had misappropriated from Norco. Fabre's state of knowledge, and reason for suspicion were the same when she subsequently took the apparently gratuitous transfer of the three properties from Hazel and herself.
23 In my opinion a charge in favour of Norco came into existence over each of the three properties now registered in Fabre's name, when the payment or payments were made off the mortgage over that property and that charge survived the transfer to Fabre. But the charge is only in respect of that part of the Misappropriated Funds that was paid off the mortgage over the particular property. Norco did not become entitled, as claimed by it, to a change over each property for the full amount of the Misappropriated Funds.
24 Does the charge extend to (a) pre-judgment interest; and (b) Norco's costs which Hazel and Fabre will be ordered to pay?
25 In each case the answer is "No". An award of damages in the sum of $316,657.98 is sought against Hazel alone. Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) provides that in proceedings for the recovery of money, the court may include interest in the amount for which judgment is given. Judgment will not be given for a money amount against Fabre against whom the only remedy sought is the declaration of the existence of the charge.
26 Hazel and Norco will be ordered to pay Norco's costs in accordance with the usual exercise of the discretion as to costs in favour of the successful party. The liability of Hazel and Fabre to pay costs arises upon and by reason of the making of the order for costs and there is no basis for adding the amount of the costs to the amounts of the charges.
27 Quantification of the amount paid in respect of each property is not essential for my declaration of the existence of the charges, but I will reserve liberty for Norco to apply in that respect. It is desirable, though no necessary, that there be a determination and declaration of the amount in this proceeding rather than further down the track, such as if and when Fabre might sell.
28 The orders of the Court will be: