23 Professor Lean observes that while most dairies feed cows during milking, the Wirong cows are not fed during milking. This is said to reduce milking time, albeit the cows spend a greater time than average on the feedpad. He says the milking time in a typical dairy is about 6 to 8 hours a day, whereas the Wirong cows are confined for 10.5 hours a day for milking, feeding and herd management. He concludes that the activity carried on by the respondents is not intensive agriculture, nor can the dairy be described as a feed lot establishment.
24 Irrespective of the divergent conclusions in regard to the description of the activity by the experts it is irrefutable that the pursuits undertaken by the respondents are a form of agriculture being husbandry and the keeping and breeding of livestock. These are all elements included in the definition of "agriculture" tipped into the LEP. There are elements of the operation that are intensive. They are not continuous.
25 The definition of "feedlot" in the Australian Oxford Dictionary is as follows:
an area in which cattle etc. are massed in order to fatten them by hand-feeding, esp. for the grain-fed beef market.
26 Standard Instrument (Local Environmental Plans) Order 2006 incorporates a definition of feedlot as follows:
Feedlot means a confined or restricted area used to rear and fatten cattle, sheep or other animals, for the purpose of meat production, fed (wholly or substantially) on prepared and manufactured feed, but does not include a poultry farm, dairy or piggery.
27 The experts nevertheless acknowledge that there is recognition of a feedlot dairy in the industry. The present argument centres on the expression "feed lot establishments".
28 The most common understanding of a feedlot is a place used for the fattening of beef livestock preparatory to slaughter. The concept of a dairy feedlot according to Professor Lean would necessarily exhibit the same characteristics of intense permanent penning of cattle within a confined area without resort to open areas within the property. The cows in such a case are wholly mechanically fed with prepared or manufactured feed.
29 It is the council's submission that the Court should adopt an interpretation of "feed lot establishments" which promotes the environmental protection objectives of the LEP and the legislation under which it is made. In each of the rural zones a distinction is said to be drawn in the Land Use Table between "Agriculture" in general and those types of agriculture having the potential for adverse environmental impacts such as "pig keeping establishments", "poultry farming establishments" and "feed lot establishments". In this way, so the argument goes, "feed lot establishment" must mean something other than a "feedlot", the end product of which is cattle for market. The council therefore submits that "feed lot establishments" consistently with the purpose and context of the LEP must mean an establishment in which:
a. a large number of animals are held in a confined space (with a hard surface) for most of the day;
b. the confinement in that space requires a sophisticated form of effluent management which would not be required in a traditional agricultural operation; and
c. the animals receive their food requirements either substantially or wholly from mechanical or hand-fed sources.
30 Mr Clay, who appears for the Nobles, identifies the following relevant applicable indicia for intensive livestock keeping that, he says, equally apply to characterise the use as a dairy feedlot:
a. reliance wholly or substantially on externally sourced food;
b. the cows being hand or mechanically fed;
c. confinement of a large number of animals within a relatively small area as part of the production process;
d. exceeding the threshold of the number of animals per unit area;
e. the significant nature of the impacts of the constrained and contained feeding regime - in particular the effects of the waste produced.
31 It is a stated objective for the LEP, and the Rural 1(a) Zone in particular, to encourage, preserve and provide greater security for all forms of agriculture and to preserve agricultural land for that purpose.
32 At Wirong the cattle are never confined to a single pen although there are significant periods when they are within the feedpad or the dairy. Although feed from elsewhere is fed to the cows significant feed is produced on the property and grazing is permitted according to the availability of pasture depending on the season. Taken in total context the effluent disposal system, dust suppression measure and artificial shading facilities common to cattle feedlots do not detract from the fundamental concept of the operation as a dairy. Accordingly the use in my opinion does not meet the description of a feedlot and is effectively and properly characterised as a dairy. The common elements with a feedlot facility do not change the fundamental character of the dairy operation conducted at Wirong.
33 Moreover even if some part of the operation could be correctly equated with a feedlot use that element is subsumed by the overall use for the purpose of a dairy. If the word "establishment" has any role to play the business conducted by the Thompsons is more accurately described comprehensively as a dairy establishment rather than a feed lot establishment. I agree with Mr McEwen that the term establishment is intended to refer to a dominant or primary use of the land rather than as in the present case a use, which facilitates the dairy operation and takes place on a minor part of the land.
34 I am unable to see any reason to change that view as a consequence of an alleged constraint or principle arising out of the objectives of the LEP of the zone. The applicant's argument that the objectives broaden the application of the expressed words in the Table is rejected.
Intensive Agriculture
35 It is my opinion that the separate definition of "intensive agriculture" was not intended to have the effect that it could be carried on only with consent. Notwithstanding argument put to the contrary by the respective applicants the conclusions reached by the Court of Appeal in Egan v Hawkesbury City Council (1993) 79 LGERA 321 are apposite.
36 In Egan the proposed development was a quarry with a crushing plant. The relevant Local Environmental Plan adopted the definitions of "industry" and "extractive industry". "Industry" was prohibited in the zone. Development permissible without consent was any purpose other than one included in items 2 or 4 of the land use table. The Court of Appeal held by majority that the development came within the meaning of "industry" and was therefore prohibited. Mahoney JA at 328 found that although a proscribed activity might fall within another definition, the intention was not that it could be carried on, or carried on with consent.
37 The decision of the Court of Appeal in Egan was applied by Bignold J in Friends of Pryor Park Inc v Ryde Council & Anor (unreported, 25 September 1995, Bignold J, 40100 of 1995). In that case a proposed development fell within the permissible purpose of "community facilities". The fact that the development also fell within another "purpose" namely "child care centre" was held to be legally irrelevant to the permissibility of the development. Bignold J held that "child care centre" is a species of the genus "community facilities" and construed the relevant provision of the LEP to give full effect to the stipulation that "community facilities" was a permissible purpose. He found such a construction consistent with the construction adopted by Mahoney JA in Egan.
38 Pearlman J followed the same line of reasoning in Berowra RSL Community and Bowling Club Ltd v Hornsby Shire Council (2001) 114 LGERA 345. In that case Her Honour held that there was no intention that a "registered club" could be carried on with development consent simply because that use of the site fell within the definition of "recreation centre".
39 Mr Clay argues that there is a distinction to be made between a nominated use that is prohibited and a use that is either permissible with or without consent. Ms Irish on behalf of the council makes a complementary submission. Mr Clay refers to the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Hawkesbury City Council v Sammut (2002) 119 LGERA 171 at 177:
In Elf Farm Supplies Pty Ltd v Hawkesbury City Council [1999] NSWLEC 261, Cowdroy J considered whether a mushroom substrate production plant was a prohibited use in land which (as in Egan ) was zoned 1(b) -- rural B. The applicant contended that the proposed use was properly categorised as a "rural industry" as defined in the Model Provisions. Cowdroy J followed Egan and held that it was sufficient that the use could be categorised as an "industry". It mattered not that it could also be categorised as a "rural industry": it was still prohibited. In my view Cowdroy J was correct to view Egan as not confined to its particular facts of an extractive industry in zone 1(b). The case stands for more than that. It establishes a more general interpretative template for construing "industries" where shown as prohibited uses in the various land use tables of the instrument; and it rejects the application of expressio unius [est exclusion alterius] reasoning in this context.
40 While Mr Clay correctly quotes the extract of the judgment of the President in Sammut, it must be read in its own context where the distinction being drawn was between a suggested finding based on the facts in Egan and an actual construction based in the provisions of the LEP. The passage does not set the outer limits of the decision of Egan, but negates an unduly narrow construction of it.
41 Egan cannot be distinguished on the basis that it was dealing with prohibited uses. The construction works both ways so that if the genus is prohibited so is the species and if the genus is permitted without consent so also is the species unless otherwise provided by means of an express nomination. There is no justification that I can perceive for drawing a distinction solely because of the permissibility of the development.
42 Moreover, I see no reason to distinguish or change the view expressed by Pearlman J in Pilley v Maitland City Council (unreported, 21 October 1996, Pearlman J, 20058 of 1996, 20088 of 1996) because of the decision of the Court of Appeal in Sammut. In Pilley Her Honour addressed the same issue as the issue that arises in this case in regard to intensive agriculture where the alternative description was "animal establishment". Her Honour made the following finding:
Here, Ms Duggan said, the development constituted by the proposed activities is categorised as 'agriculture', and that development is included in item 3. Therefore, the proposed development does not require council consent, and is permissible without consent. The fact that the proposed development also falls within a defined term in the LEP but which does not appear in item 3 or 5, namely, 'animal establishment', makes no difference to this conclusion because the proposed development falls within item 3 and hence is not development "other than development included in item 3 or 5".
I think Ms Duggan is correct. The interpretation of the zoning table which she urges upon the Court is consistent with the decisions in Egan and Friends of Pryor Park.
43 In my opinion the view expressed by Pearlman J is not inconsistent with Sammut.
44 I agree with Mr C McEwen SC that the definition of "agriculture" does not exclude any form of agriculture. Accordingly the definition of "intensive agriculture" takes the matter no further where it is not expressly specified in the table in circumstances where the development is within the definition of "agriculture", a use permitted without consent.