(iii) general
27 While the issues raised by the Second Respondent are clearly of concern to it these must be considered in the whole context of these proceedings which concern a large development at 9 Nirimba Avenue. That is reflected in the 202 development consent conditions issued by the Commissioner. The adequacy of the Commissioner's consideration of relevant issues must be considered in that context.
28 In Rinaldo the plan of management in issue was acknowledged by the commissioner to be fundamental to his decision whether or not to grant consent. There was a draft plan in evidence and the commissioner addressed that draft in some detail and required specific amendments, on the basis of which development consent was granted although the plan was not finalised at the date of that decision but subsequently. This is to be contrasted with this situation where, while there are no draft plans of management provided, the issues raised by the Second Respondent were not considered by the Commissioner to be fundamental to the decision to approve the development. That finding is clearly open to him in this matter.
29 Given the consideration of pedestrian and construction traffic in the judgment and other conditions of consent imposed, as identified at par 19 - 26, no issue arises that the consent lacks finality based on the Mison principle. The impugned conditions do not leave open the possibility of a significantly different development, see Scott v Wollongong City Council (1992) 75 LGRA 112 at 118 per Samuels AP. Transport Action Group Against Motorways v Roads and Traffic Authority and Anor (1999) 46 NSWLR 598 considered the application of Mison in the context of a consent condition requiring a management plan to address an issue (at 122). Mason P (Sheller JA concurring) held that the requirement of finality and certainty referred to in Mison does not mean that every development consent with conditions leaving matters open for later decision is invalid. Mason P recognised at [122] that:
The mere fact that a proposed activity in its original or modified form contemplates plans of management as integers of or means of carrying out an activity cannot be a ground of invalidity.
30 The transcript of the evidence of Mr Coady, the Applicant's traffic expert, was referred to by the Second Respondent's counsel where he admits that he has no knowledge of the likely impacts of construction traffic on the Second Respondent's hotel next to the ROC. His evidence is that such plans of management are commonplace in projects of this nature. The Commissioner accepted his evidence in that regard and I do not consider there is any error of law demonstrated by his reasoning as set out in his judgment at [20] (see above).
31 In relation to the criticism that there is no obligation to comply with the plan of management once made, the conditions require that the plans be approved by the Director of Technical Services, suggesting that he or she would not approve an inadequate plan. I consider there are requirements specified for the contents of the plans of management in the conditions. Condition 86A requires that the plan of management measures must mitigate the impacts of vehicles associated with the construction on the ROC, including on the Second Respondent's land. Condition 86B requires that there be provision of a safe pedestrian path of movement between the Quakers Hill railway station and the subject land. A further criticism was that the Second Respondent was not provided with any relevant role in the finalisation of the plans of management because it was the Director's decision rather than the Commissioner's which was the final determinant of the content of the plans. That is a matter that the Commissioner had before him and chose not to adopt, as he is entitled to do.
32 There has been adequate consideration of relevant issues, as required by Weal. There is no deferral of essential environmental and planning matters to be addressed in plans of management. No legal error is disclosed in the Commissioner's judgment in relation to the issues raised in this appeal. This appeal should therefore be dismissed.
33 As the Second Respondent has been unsuccessful it should pay the Applicant's costs of this appeal.