But there is a special provision in sec. 6 of the Real Property Act
1886 which was much relied upon. It is as follows: No law, so
far as inconsistent with this Act, shall apply to land subject to the
provisions of this Act, nor shall any future law, so far as inconsistent
with this Act, so apply unless it shall be expressly enacted that it
shall so apply " notwithstanding the provisions of ' The Real Property
Act 1886." Legislation in this form was justified, so it was argued.
by the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865, sec. 5 (Attorney-General for
New South Wales vy. Trethowan (1) ). But sec. 5 has nothing to do
with ordinary legislation such as is the subject of sec. 6 of the Real
Property Act 1886 ; it deals with laws respecting the constitution.
powers and procedure of representative legislative bodies. The
argument, however, that sec. 6 of the Real Property Act 1886 is in
substance an interpretation section deserves consideration. " The
clause, so to speak, should be written into every statute" (In re
Silver Brothers Ltd. (2) ). Even so, if a subsequent Act chooses to
make it plain that the provision of sec. 6 is being ignored or
repealed to some extent, then effect must be given "to that
intention just because it is the will of the legislature " (Ellen Street
Estates Ltd. v. Minister of Health (3) ). In the present case, it is
plain, I think, that the South-Eastern Drainage Act creates a charge
upon all lands benefited by the construction and maintenance of the
works mentioned in the Act, whether the lands are subject to the
provisions of the Real Property Act 1886 or not and whether the
charge is registered under the Act or not. The Act is explicit, and
it must prevail. It was suggested that this view is in direct conflict
with the provisions of sec. 14 of the South-Eastern Drainage Amend-
ment Act of 1900 and sec. 66 of the Drainage Act of 1931 enabl
the statutory charge to be enforced by the board as if it were a
mortgagee under the Real Property Act 1886. But these Acts do not
constitute the board a mortgagee under the Real Property Act but
only confer on it the powers that a mortgagee has under the Real
Property Act 1886. Some difficulty may arise in applying the pro-
visions of sec. 135 of that Act, if first charges are created also by
various other statutes, as was said to be the case. Counsel for the
appellant suggested they would rank pari passu, but we are not called
upon to express any concluded opinion upon this matter in the
present case.