Consideration
90 I accept the general thrust of the respondent's submission that, for the purposes of the present case, one should not engage in a painstaking analysis of the commercial for fear of losing sight of what it is likely to convey in the medium and in the settings in which it is intended to be viewed. My description of the commercial is no more than an attempt to record, for the purposes of these reasons, the major stages of the commercial and the more significant elements of those stages. I have not attempted to record all the visual details of the commercial that are capable of being discerned from a close and abstract study of it. Indeed, I do not believe that a number of those details would be perceptible to viewers of the commercial exercising reasonable, but undirected, attention in a domestic setting.
91 The cases speak of the need to take account of the fact that the in-court presentation of television commercials in cases such as the present provides a fundamentally different setting from the domestic setting in which they are intended to be viewed. In Gillette at [47] Lindgren J referred to some of those differences. His Honour said:
… apart from the difference between a one-off viewing and repeated viewings, the circumstances in which a judge attends to a television commercial for the purposes of a case are not those in which members of the public do so. First, members of the public watch a commercial after and before viewing other things, rather than in isolation. Secondly, unlike the judge, they do not carefully view the commercial with a special interest in noting and memorising its features. Thirdly, they view the commercial, not in the calm of chambers, but against a background of distractions, such as domestic activity, or simply a preoccupation with other more interesting or pressing concerns. Fourthly, usually they do not know in advance that the commercial is about to commence.
92 I accept that, when considering what the commercial is likely to convey to ordinary or reasonable members of the public, its true impact can only be appreciated by considering the setting in which the commercial is intended to be viewed. Here, however, the intended setting is not confined to casual television viewing. As I have noted, the respondent has taken steps to ensure that the commercial is also available on the Internet. It can be taken that, in that setting, there will be viewers who will have sought out the commercial for their own educative purposes, and who can be taken, therefore, to have a particular interest in what the commercial is saying. Accordingly, in that setting, those viewers, unlike casual television viewers, will, for example, view the commercial in isolation, without the commonplace domestic distractions of the kind to which Lindgren J alluded in Gillette. In order to fulfil their need, such viewers may also seek to view the commercial a number of times in the one sitting, or over several sittings.
93 Regardless of the different settings that must be considered in the present case, the ordinary or reasonable member of the relevant class of consumer, for presently relevant purposes, must be taken to be exercising reasonable care for the protection of his or her own interests: Campomar Sociedad, Limitada v Nike International Limited (2000) 202 CLR 45 at [102]; Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Proprietary Limited v Puxu Proprietary Limited (1982) 149 CLR 191 at 199. Thus, in the present case, even the casual television viewer must be taken to be acting with some interest in the subject matter of the commercial; otherwise the question of contravention would stand to be assessed by reference to the false standard of the arbitrary, frivolous or unthinking mind. There could be many different reasons for that interest. For example, the viewer may be a prospective purchaser of a lounge suite. On the other hand, the commercial itself may have simply engendered the viewers' interest, even if only by arousing the viewer's curiosity, without more. But, for whatever reason, the viewer's interest must be sufficient to cause him or her to attempt, reasonably, to comprehend what the commercial is saying.
94 I first viewed the commercial, uninstructed as to its features, during the course of the applicant's opening. I remember its impact on me at that time. The next occasion on which I viewed the commercial was during the course of closing submissions. It had the same impact on me. My consideration of what the commercial is likely to convey to ordinary or reasonable members of the public to whom it is addressed has been guided primarily by my viewing of the commercial on those two occasions.
95 One does not approach the task of assessing the likely effect of a commercial, such as the present one, on the ordinary or reasonable viewer, as if "construing a statue, will or contract": Country Road Clothing at 422. Rather, viewers will be expected to engage in a measure of "loose thinking": Siddons Pty Ltd v The Stanley Works Pty Ltd (1991) 29 FCR 14 at 18. In Country Road Clothing Heerey J at 422 cited the following observation of Lord Reid in Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 1239 at 1245 (dealing with the question of imputations in defamation law) as apposite when dealing with the question of representational conduct claimed to contravene the Trade Practices Act:
If we are to … take the ordinary man as our guide then we must accept a certain amount of loose thinking. The ordinary reader does not formulate reasons in his own mind: he gets a general impression and one can expect him to look again before coming to a conclusion and acting on it. But formulated reasons are very often an afterthought.
96 In my view it is likely (certainly, more likely than not) that the commercial would be understood by a significant number of viewers having the attributes of the "ordinary" or "reasonable" members of the class of prospective purchasers of lounge suites of the kind advertised, as conveying that the identified lounge suites are relevantly "the same", the only material difference between the applicant's retail offering and the respondent's retail offering being the respondent's much better price.
97 I do not accept the respondent's submission that the commercial conveys only the simple message that consumers do not need to spend more than the respondent's price for a lounge suite of the advertised configuration. This characterisation of the commercial ignores fundamental aspects of its structure and language. I also do not accept that the commercial merely invites the viewer to compare, by inspection, the applicant's lounge with the respondent's lounge, so that the viewer can come to his or her own conclusions about those lounge suites.
98 As I have noted, the dominating theme of the commercial is price. But the price is in respect of a particular article, which provides the centrepiece for the commercial. At the outset the viewer is challenged by the exhortation: "Don't pay more elsewhere for this leather recliner lounge". The words "this leather recliner lounge" immediately identify the article and imbue it with characteristics or qualities beyond being merely "any" leather recliner lounge. It is "this" leather recliner lounge. The image accompanying these words identifies "this leather recliner lounge" by giving it a physical embodiment. The word "elsewhere" conveys, unmistakeably, that "this leather recliner lounge" is, apart from the respondent, available "elsewhere". The slogan "Compare the product … Compare the price" is a lead-in to telling the viewer where "elsewhere" is. In this case, "elsewhere" is identified as the applicant. The applicant's product is identified in the same configuration and apparently in the same or a very similar colour as the respondent's product. By these devices the viewer is told that "this leather recliner lounge" is available from the applicant and the respondent. The ordinary or reasonable viewer would not be able to tell the two suites apart from the images of them shown in the course of the commercial. The only difference about "this leather recliner lounge", is that, if purchased from the applicant, it will cost the viewer more than twice the price for which it can be purchased from the respondent. That is why the viewer should purchase "this leather recliner lounge" from the respondent, who will not be beaten on price.
99 In this context, the slogan "Compare the product … Compare the price" is not an invitation to the viewer to compare the difference between an "over $7,000" leather recliner lounge from the applicant with an "under $3,000" leather recliner lounge from the respondent. Rather, the slogan is an assertive statement, with the words "Compare the product …" functioning as the respondent's emphatic affirmation that the applicant and the respondent both sell "this leather recliner lounge", and the words "… Compare the price" functioning as an affirmation that the respondent's price for "this leather recliner lounge" is much cheaper than the applicant's price. The viewer would appreciate that the respondent is engaging in head-on price competition with the applicant in respect of "this leather recliner lounge". What, then, is conveyed by the description "this leather recliner lounge"?
100 I have referred to the commercial as conveying to a significant number of viewers, as ordinary or reasonable members of the class of prospective purchasers, that the lounge suites are relevantly "the same". By this I mean that a significant number of viewers, acting reasonably, would understand the commercial to be conveying that the physical attributes of the applicant's and respondent's identified lounge suites - "this leather recliner lounge" - are, materially, the same. Having been told that the two products are "this leather recliner lounge", I would not expect the ordinary or reasonable viewer to dwell upon or think too deeply about that fact, if at all. In this case, the ordinary or reasonable viewer would be entitled to rely on the respondent's chosen description of the products as being "this leather recliner lounge". Of course, some members of the class may speculate or engage in a measure of "loose thinking" about the reason for the respondent's chosen description: some may think that the lounge suites are one and the same product, identical in every respect; some may think that they are standard design lounges made to the same or equivalent specifications, which the respondent has been able to procure at a cost which enables it to offer its product at a bargain price; some may think that the respondent's product is a legitimate copy of the applicant's, enabling it, through economical manufacturing costs or other skilful business practices, to offer the product at a much cheaper price. Some may engage in other forms of speculation or reasoning of this kind. Some will not give the matter any thought at all. However, the ordinary or reasonable viewer, no matter what speculation or loose thinking he or she might engage in about these matters, will understand from viewing the commercial that the lounge suites possess materially the same physical attributes - enabling the respondent to properly identify the products as "this leather recliner lounge".
101 In opening and in final submissions the respondent argued that the applicant had departed from its pleaded case by submitting that the commercial represented the lounge suites to be the "same". The applicant disputed that, by couching its submissions in that way, it had departed from its pleaded case. I do not find it necessary to resolve that debate. The applicant's pleading plainly identifies the substance of the representation on which it relies in this regard: the commercial represents, and will cause or be likely to cause members of the public who view it to think, that the two lounge suites referred to in the commercial are of the same or an equivalent "standard, quality, grade or composition". For the reasons I have given, I am satisfied that a significant number of viewers of the commercial, acting reasonably, would understand it to be making that representation. I am satisfied, therefore, that this part of the applicant's pleaded case has been established, regardless of any perceived difference in the way it elaborated its case.
102 As I have noted, the respondent drew particular attention to the decision in Country Road Clothing. In that case, the respondent retailer had caused a newspaper advertisement to be published showing three photographs of the same man wearing a navy blue double-breasted suit. In each photograph the man was wearing the same shirt and tie. Each photograph was accompanied by text describing the suit as a "Pure New Wool Gaberdine suit", stating in each case, the name of the "label" (respectively, COUNTRY ROAD, HUGO BOSS or NAJEE 9.2.5) and the price (respectively, $995, $795 and $349). The advertisement was accompanied by the words: WHY PAY MORE? It was also accompanied by the slogan: COMPARE SUITS, THEN COMPARE PRICES; and by other graphical matter to which it is not necessary to refer.
103 The applicant's case in that proceeding was that the advertisement misled consumers by creating the impression that each of the suits worn by the model was of the same quality, when in fact that was not the case. It was held by Heerey J that the advertisement did not make that representation. His Honour found that the slogan invited the consumer to compare the suits, and then to compare their prices. His Honour (at 423) found:
… The message of the advertisement in my opinion is all about value for money and the consumer is invited to go and make his own decision. The consumer, having done this, may think the Najee suit is equal in quality to the other two suits or he may think it is lesser quality but that the difference in quality is not worth the difference in price and that the Najee suit is a better buy. All this is a matter for the purchaser to make his mind up about, as he is expressly invited to do by the advertisement. The possibility that some readers may in fact read the advertisement and go and buy a Najee suit without looking at the other two does not to my mind alter the meaning which the advertisement conveys.
104 The respondent submits that the present case is relevantly indistinguishable from Country Road Clothing and that Heerey J's reasoning is "squarely applicable".
105 Although the advertisement in Country Road Clothing has elements, including its slogan, which are similar to the elements used in the commercial, there are, nonetheless, important differences between the two. Significantly, for present purposes, the commercial's focus is on "this leather recliner lounge", with the dominating price message that the viewer should not "pay more elsewhere for this leather recliner lounge". That feature is missing from the advertisement considered in Country Road Clothing. The "message" in the advertisement in Country Road Clothing is fundamentally different to the message of the commercial in the present case.
106 In light of the findings I have made concerning the differences between the Rajah suite and the Excellence suite, I am of the view that the two lounge suites in the commercial are not of the same or equivalent "standard, quality grade or composition". As I have found, there are a number of significant differences between them in their physical attributes. These differences are most appropriately captured by the words "quality" and "composition", as used in the applicant's pleading and in s 53(a) of the Trade Practices Act.
107 In my view, if alerted to these differences, the ordinary or reasonable viewer of the commercial would regard them as being material differences. Although questions of fact and degree are involved, I am satisfied that it is more likely than not that such persons would regard the Rajah suite and the Excellence suite to be sufficiently different that they could not, as products, answer the description in the commercial of "this leather recliner lounge". Rather, with knowledge of the differences to which I have referred (to which no reference is made in the commercial), the ordinary or reasonable viewer of the commercial would see that two broadly similar, but, in a number of important respects, quite different products, have been compared on price.
108 For these reasons I am satisfied that the respondent has, in trade or commerce, in connection with the supply or possible supply of goods (namely, the respondent's Excellence suite), and in connection with its promotion, falsely represented that the Excellence suite is of a particular "quality" or "composition" (namely, that it has the same qualities and composition - the same physical attributes - as the Rajah suite), contrary to s 53(a) of the Trade Practices Act. For the same reason, in making the price comparison in the way that it has, the respondent has also engaged in conduct, in trade or commerce, that is misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive, contrary to s 52 of the Trade Practice Act.
109 I am also satisfied that s 52 of the Trade Practices Act has been contravened in the two further respects which the applicant has pleaded: the respondent has represented in the commercial that the price of the Rajah suite is more than double the price of the Excellence suite, despite the two products being of the same quality; and the applicant offers to sell its Rajah suite at a retail price which is excessive given the retail price at which the respondent offers the Excellence suite. I am satisfied that the reasonable or ordinary viewer to which I have referred would see both representations as being made by the commercial. The first representation simply follows from the other findings I have made. As to the second representation, the stated price disparity between the two products is of such magnitude that the viewers to which I have referred are likely to reason that, all other things being relevantly equal (as the commercial does or is likely to lead them to believe), the price offered by the applicant for "this leather recliner lounge" would be, by comparison with the respondent's price, excessive in the circumstances. Given that the foundation for each representation is false (namely that the two products are of the same "quality" or "composition"), the making of each of these representation also constitutes conduct by the respondent in trade or commerce that is misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive.