REASONING
38 The decision by the Minister to cancel the applicant's visa was a 'privative clause decision': Migration Act s 474(2), (3)(b). Accordingly, the applicant is entitled to the relief he claims, or some variation thereof, only if he can establish that the Minister has committed jurisdictional error: Migration Act s 474(1); Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476. In my opinion, none of the grounds identified by the applicant establishes jurisdictional error by the Minister in connection with the making of the visa cancellation decision.
39 The first ground merely asserts the existence of jurisdictional error, without providing particulars or any basis for the assertion.
40 The second ground seems to challenge the Minister's conclusion that the applicant had a substantial criminal record for the purposes of s 501(7) of the Migration Act. It is clear, however, that the applicant satisfied the definition. He was initially sentenced to life imprisonment following his conviction for murder and, subsequently, to a redetermined sentence of 21 years, with a minimum custodial term of 16 years.
41 The third ground identified by the applicant seems to suggest that the Minister was bound to afford the applicant an oral hearing before cancelling his visa. The Migration Act expressly excludes the 'rules of natural justice' in relation to visa cancellation decisions made personally by the Minister pursuant to s 501(3) of the Migration Act: s 501(5). However, the rules are not excluded in relation to a visa cancellation decision made pursuant to s 501(2), even if made by the Minister personally.
42 While the rules of natural justice (or procedural fairness) apply to the decision in this case, they do not necessarily mean that the Minister was bound to afford the appellant an oral hearing: Heatley v Tasmanian Racing and Gaming Commission (1977) 137 CLR 487, at 516, per Aickin J; Chen v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 48 FCR 591, at 597, per curiam. Whether there is such an obligation will depend on the circumstances including the terms of the legislation, the nature of the decision, the characteristics of the decision-maker and the factual matters, if any, in dispute: cf M Aronson, B Dyer and M Groves, Judicial Review of Administrative Actions (3rd ed 2004), at 493-494.
43 Section 501(2) of the Migration Act does not impose any express obligation on the Minister to afford a visa holder an oral hearing. By contrast, other provisions in the Migration Act do impose such an express obligation on a decision-maker: see, for example, s 425(1). Although not determinative, the contrast suggests that an oral hearing is not required before the Minister can exercise the power to cancel a visa under s 501(2) of the Migration Act.
44 In M238/2002 v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 936, Kenny J made some helpful observations on the requirements of procedural fairness in relation to a Ministerial visa cancellation decision under s 501(2). Her Honour noted (at [41]) that:
'Procedural fairness required that, before any decision was made, the Minister afford the applicant a fair opportunity to present information and argument against the cancellation of his visa. Precisely what constituted a fair opportunity depended on all the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the statutory power in question and the interests promoted by it, the interests of persons affected by the decision, and what was relevantly known by the decision-maker at the time the decision was made.'
45 Kenny J acknowledged (at [43]) that any visa cancellation decision made by the Minister has great importance to the person affected. However, her Honour also pointed out that:
the power is conferred in order that the Minister can act in the public interest to protect of the Australian community. Under this provision, the legislature has entrusted to the Minister the responsibility for deciding whether the public interest should prevail over the private interest of a visa holder.'
As Gleeson CJ and Gummow J stated in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia (2000) 205 CLR 507, at 539, the statutory power in s 501 is reposed in a political official, who is a member of the Executive and accountable to Parliament and the electorate. It is therefore unlikely that Parliament contemplated that every visa cancellation decision would require the Minister, as a pre-condition to the exercise of his or her powers, to afford an oral hearing to the visa holder.
46 Of course, the requirements of procedural fairness may be onerous, even without an obligation to provide an oral hearing. Procedural fairness requires the visa holder to be given an opportunity to:
'rebut or qualify by further information, and comment by way of submission, upon adverse material from other sources which is put before the decision-maker. It also extends to require the decision-maker to identify to the person affected any issue critical to the decision which is not apparent from its nature or the terms of the statute under which it is made. The decision-maker is required to advise of any adverse conclusion which has been arrived at which would not obviously be open on the known material.'
Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576, at 592, per curiam, cited by Kenny J in M238/2002 v Minister, at [44].
47 It is not necessary to decide whether there might be some circumstances in which the Minister is obliged to afford a visa holder an oral hearing before deciding to cancel that person's visa. In the circumstances of the present case, there was no such obligation. The applicant was given an opportunity to make submissions in writing and to draw relevant material to the Minister's attention. He took full advantage of that opportunity by engaging solicitors to prepare a well-presented submission on his behalf. The Minister, through his representatives, made known to the applicant the matters he needed to address. There were no substantial factual issues in dispute. The question before the Minister was whether he should exercise his discretion to cancel the applicant's visa, having regard to the uncontentious factual material before him. This was no doubt a difficult and important decision, but it was not one requiring an oral hearing. Indeed, the applicant's representatives never suggested that such a hearing was necessary or desirable.
48 The fourth ground advanced by the applicant is without substance. The Minister clearly took into account the applicant's relationship (or hoped for relationship) with his two adult children, but decided that this consideration was outweighed by others. Since the applicant's children are adults, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child is of no relevance to this case.