Error of law
18 This aspect of the applicant's argument depends upon the trust deed and three other documents supplied by the applicant at various stages of the review process: the minutes of meeting purportedly held on 1 February 1997, exhibit 1, being a letter signed by Tee Hian Ng, Tee Seng Ng, Siow Pei Ng, Kim Chwee Ng and Geok Yue Lim on 8 March 1997 and the application for review by the tribunal.
19 Exhibit 1 was purportedly "signed by the Ng family as directors of Entrence Pty Ltd as well as a personal agreement between the family". The five signatories are the five primary beneficiaries pursuant to the trust deed. Tee Hian Ng is also the principal. A company search conducted on 22 December 1998 shows that the directors of the trustee were then Alfred Alfredo Ng (who is not mentioned in the letter), Kim Chwee Ng, Siow Pei Ng, Tee Hian Ng and Tee Seng Ng. Alfred Alfredo Ng was apparently appointed on 9 July 1996 and was presumably a director as at the date of the letter of 8 March 1997. If so, the letter cannot reflect a resolution of the board. Further, Geok Yue Lim was not a director. The letter records that the family intended to apply for permanent residence using the structure of the trust and that Tee Hian Ng (described in the body of the letter as Michael Ng) had been made principal because he was the only Australian permanent resident and "for asset protection". The letter then recorded that:
Michael Ng and the family agree that each of the beneficiaries named in the Ng Metropolitan Trust who are also the directors of Entrence Pty Ltd, shall own the trust assets equally. Michael Ng agrees that he will not remove Entrence Pty Ltd as trustee without the consent of the other Ng family members and directors and must always act in the best interests of the Ng family.
20 I assume for the moment that the agreement evidenced by the letter would be enforceable by the parties inter se and that Michael Ng, as principal, was entitled to bind himself as to the future exercise of powers conferred upon him by the trust deed. Nonetheless the beneficiaries under the trust deed could not vary their respective entitlements under it or create new interests, at least in so far as the evidence discloses. Although the beneficiaries of a bare trust, if all are of full legal capacity, may unite to terminate the trust, that is not the case here. The trust is not a bare trust. In any event, the beneficiaries have not purported to so act. At most, their "agreement" means that they are obliged to share equally such funds as may be appointed to any of them by the trustee.
21 In his application to the tribunal for review of the earlier decision, the applicant claimed that the delegate had misunderstood the relevant regulations as they applied to his position. He submitted that:
® The role of an appointor of a trust has, in law, been misinterpreted by the decision maker.
® The appointor is a director of the trustee and is constrained at law from acting in a manner inconsistent with the best interests of the company and its members which include the applicant.
® There is an agreement between the members of the company that their ownership of trust assets is proportionate to their shareholding in the company and the appointor's power is only to be exercised with their consent.
® The single appointor was for asset protection purposes only.
® The applicant was general manager of the business.
22 As can be seen, the application reflected the contents of the letter of 8 March 1997 although it went a little further. Finally, the minutes of the meeting of 1 February 1997 record a meeting of directors of Entrence Pty Ltd attended by Tee Hian Ng, Alfred A Ng, Kim Chwee Ng, Siow Pei Ng and Tee Seng Ng. It was resolved that:
The Ng family provide capital funding towards the Inn on the Park project to the amount of $1.5 million. The contribution towards the $1.5 million are as follows:
Tee Seng Ng (Dixon) 30 per cent $450,000
Siow Pei Ng (Nancy) 30 per cent $450,000
Ng Family Group 40 per cent $600,000
It was further resolved that should further fundings be required additional fund to be contributed in the above ratio.
The balance was to be borrowed from the St George Bank.
23 Presumably, this resolution operated as authority for the trustee to borrow funds from the nominated lenders. Of course that says nothing about their respective interests in the trustee or its assets, let alone in the trust estate. They were to be creditors of the trustee. Had they sought to recover their debts by action, they would have sued it. It may, in turn, have been entitled to reimburse itself out of the assets of the trust. However the creditors would have acquired no interest in the trust assets as a result of the loan.
24 These dealings amongst the Ng family members appear to have acquired relevance because of certain references in the original decision to the Procedures Advice Manual issued by the Department. I have now had reference to Part 9.8 of the document which deals with trusts. This is not a policy document in the usual sense but rather an attempt to explain the law of trusts in a simple way. For present purposes, the relevant aspect concerns discretionary trusts and the requirements of the definition of "ownership interest" in subs 134(10). It states that there is some doubt as to the capacity of any party to a discretionary trust to demonstrate an ownership interest in trust assets. It then states at par 9.8.13:
However, under policy, ownership of all of the assets in a discretionary trust may be acceptable in certain circumstances, if:
® the applicant is the trustee and a beneficiary for the period of claimed ownership; and
® all the named beneficiaries of the trust are included in the visa application.
25 At par 9.8.14 the document advises:
Business Migration Section is conducting further research into the ownership of discretionary trusts. Officers are advised to contact the Section if they are proposing to accept ownership of discretionary trust assets that fall outside the above policy guidance.
26 As I understand it, the effect of this is that where all of the beneficiaries of a discretionary trust are included in the visa application, they should be treated as owning the property, provided that one of them is also trustee. In other circumstances, the matter should be referred to the Business Migration Section. Paragraph 9.8.15 deals with what are described as "unacceptable claims to ownership of trust assets". The word "unacceptable" presumably means that the arrangement in question should be treated as not satisfying the relevant statutory provision or regulation. The paragraph advises that an ownership claim will be unacceptable if it is by a person who is merely a trustee, beneficiary or appointor. Brief explanations are given. The only criticism which might be made of these explanations is that there is no express reference to the situation of a default beneficiary who, it might be argued, holds a share in the trust, subject only to divestiture by an exercise of the power to appoint. Paragraph 9.9 deals with the evidence required to establish beneficial ownership. It is not necessary to consider it further.
27 The following extract from the delegate's original decision must be understood in the context of the advice in the Procedures Advice Manual:
According to the Procedure Advice Manual (PAM) at 9.8, to have control of the assets of a trust, the applicant has to be the appointor/principal, trustee, and one of the beneficiaries. This is because the appointor/principal has total discretion as to whom will be the trustee, and can change the trustee at any time. The trustee has total control of the assets and income of the trust and can dispose of or withhold these at any time. The named beneficiaries are the only individuals who can receive income from the trust. As Tee Seng Ng is not the appointor/principal I do not accept that he has control of the assets of the business, and I therefore find that he does not need regulations 845.213 and 845.215.
28 Clause 845.213 speaks of an "ownership interest" rather than control. Clause 845.215 (which is not presently relevant) speaks of the value of assets "owned by the applicant, or by the applicant and the applicant's spouse together …". The delegate may have erred in considering questions of control. The real question ought to have been whether or not the applicant had an ownership interest in the relevant business. Alternatively, the delegate may simply have been using a shorthand form of expression. Whether this be so or not, there is no reason to believe that the tribunal made any similar error. In par 17 it referred to the various factual matters which are set out above (concerning alleged agreements between the various members of the family) and then observed:
No evidence of any such agreement has been provided.
29 In par 22 the tribunal stated:
In regard to the first nominated business, Entrence Pty Ltd trading as Inn on the Park, it appears that the assets are owned and controlled by the NG Metropolitan Trust. The visa applicant is not the appointor/principal of the said Trust. TheTtribunal is of the view that the visa applicant does not have an ownership or control of the nominated business sufficient to meet the requirement of ownership interest. This matter was put to the visa applicant and since he did not respond to enquiries made by officers of the Tribunal this matter was unable to be pursued further. On the evidence before it the Tribunal finds that the visa applicant does not have an ownership interest in the first of the businesses nominated by him.
30 As to the second business, the claim was also dismissed. I do not understand that matter to be pressed at the present time, no doubt because the company had no significant assets.
31 I have considerable doubts as to whether the applicant's interest in the Ng Metropolitan Trust could ever have satisfied the definition of "ownership interest" in subs 134(10). Leaving aside for the moment the question of his shareholding in the trustee, it is clear that he was not a partner in a partnership carrying on any business, nor was he the sole proprietor of any business. Even if one looks to interests "held indirectly through one or more interposed companies, partnerships or trusts" he still had no interest as a partner because there was no partnership. Similarly, on even the most extreme view of the facts, taking into account all trusts and all corporate entities, he could not be said to have been the sole proprietor of any business. Thus it seems to me that it was only if he could demonstrate that he was, either directly or indirectly, a shareholder in a company which carried on the business that he could have satisfied the requirements of the definition.
32 He was a shareholder in the trustee, but that share gave him an interest only in that company. The trustee had no interest in the trust business. Its own business may have been that of acting as trustee or of managing a business. In the event of a liquidation, the applicant's shareholding would have entitled him to participate in the distribution of any surplus of the trustee's own assets after payment of debts. However that would not have entitled him to participate in any distribution of the trust assets save to the extent that the trustee was entitled to any indemnity from them. It is therefore difficult to see how, as a shareholder in the trustee, he had any interest in the trust business. It is true that in a sense the company was "carrying on" that business, but I doubt whether that was the intention of the definition. The definition as a whole relevantly reads:
Ownership interest, in relation to a business, means an interest in the business as … a shareholder in a company that carries on the business … .
33 Clearly, the "interest" is an interest in a business and the business, in this case, was a trust asset, not an asset of the trustee. The better view is that the words "carries on the business" describe involvement as a proprietor rather than merely being employed in the administration of the business, which appears to have been the involvement of the trustee.
34 Whether or not I am correct in these views, it seems that the original decision-maker and the tribunal were willing to entertain the possibility that the applicant may, in some way, have derived an ownership interest from his entitlements under the trust deed. It is possible to take a wider view of the definition than I have suggested. In the end the tribunal was not satisfied on the evidence that the applicant had an ownership interest. I am unable to see that it erred in so concluding. Even if one were to accept that the default beneficiaries under the trust deed held some interest subject to the possibility of divestiture, it would, in my view, be impossible to bring such an interest within any of the three limbs of the definition of "ownership interest". Further, the notion of an "ownership interest" obviously implies something more than an interest which may be divested at the discretion of a third party, in this case the trustee.