As part of this argument, the applicants submit,
correctly I think, that the question or prejudice under
3.37(1)(a) is to be tested, not in any abstract fashion, but
by reterence to the particular circumstances of the
investigation in hand, since the words "ina particular
instance" in 3.37(1)(a) qualify each of the limbs of the
sub-section (see Murtagh v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation
(1984) 54 A.L.R. 313 at p.332). In support of this
submission, the appliants point to the legislative history
of s.37. In 1ts original form in the Freedom of information
Bill, clause 32(2)(a) contained a provision, subsequently
omitted, tor the exemption otf a document if its disclosure
would, or could reasonably be expected to "preiudice the
carrying on generally ot investigations concerning breaches
or evasions of the law". But this provision was omitted
from what became s.37(2) of the Act. FPurtner, the decisions
of the courts of the United States in this area relied on by
the respondent provide no assistance because of the use ot
the plural in this context in the American legislation (see
National Labour Relations Board v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co.
437 U.S. 214 (1978) at pp.223-4). This is not to say that
exemption may not be claimed under the Act in respect or a
document describing methods or procedures tor preventing,
detecting, investigating or dealing with matters arising out
of, breaches or evasions of the law. Section 37(2)(b)