36 In my opinion, a limitation fund established under Article 11 of the 1976 Convention is exclusive of any legal costs which may be incurred in establishing a claim against that fund. My reasons for this conclusion are as follows.
37 At the outset, I think that an Australian Court should be careful to resist the understandable inclination simply to construe the 1976 Convention against a background of its own law and procedure. The 1976 Convention and its precursors were the product of international maritime experience and their drafting had therefore to reflect the diversity of that experience. Each of the three Conventions recognised the distinction between substantive rights created or limited by the Convention on the one hand and, on the other, idiosyncratic rules of procedure which would be applicable in difference domestic courts and tribunals in proceedings invoking these substantive rights or limitations: see Article 14 of the 1924 Convention, Article 4 of the 1957 Convention, and Article 14 of the 1976 Convention.
38 Lawyers in the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand and Australia are conditioned to think that proving a disputed claim necessarily involves incurring legal costs and that the unsuccessful party will ordinarily be made liable for most, if not all, of the successful party's costs of that dispute. This way of thinking is so naturally ingrained in lawyers of those countries that it must be almost an automatic reflex for them to construe a limitation of liability "in respect of" a disputed claim as wide enough to encompass quite comfortably liability for the necessarily concomitant legal costs of proving that disputed claim. It may well have been this conditioned reflex which led the parties and the Court in Noferi v Smithers to an uncritical acceptance of the proposition that the limitation fund was inclusive of costs.
39 However, I think that the point is well made by Meeson (see paragraph 32 above) that this nexus between a liability and the legal costs of establishing it in a court or tribunal is not as self evident or as strong to lawyers in other countries which are parties to the 1976 Convention. In some countries legal costs do not "follow the event" with nearly the same degree of predictability or to the same extent as is the case in the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. For example, in Japan, which is a Party to the 1976 Convention, the recoverable costs of the winning party do not normally include the largest component of those costs, namely, the attorney's fees, so that it is rare for a Japanese litigant to enforce the relatively small costs order made in his or her favour: see generally "Australian Law Reform Commission Report No.75, 'Costs shifting - who pays for litigation, 1995', Appendix C" . Even in the United Kingdom, where the rule that costs normally follow the event is so strongly entrenched, Admiralty lawyers have long regarded the costs of establishing a claim against a limitation fund as separate and distinct from the claim itself: see paragraphs 21-29. If one bears this in mind, one approaches the construction of the words "claims in respect of" in Article 2.1 without a predisposition to be influenced by the nexus between liability for a claim and the legal costs of establishing that liability.
40 Approached in this way, phrases in Article 2 such as "claims in respect of loss of life" carry a literal meaning which goes no further than their express words: a claim "in respect of loss of life" simply means "a claim for compensation for loss of life". A claim for reimbursement of the legal expenses incurred in prosecuting a disputed claim for compensation for loss of life is not a "claim for compensation for loss of life" and is, therefore, outside the scope of Article 2.1(a). The same construction applies to the other claims identified in Article 2.1.
41 Consistently with this construction, "claims" referred to in Articles 6 and 7 for the purpose of calculating the limitation fund do not include claims for reimbursement of legal expenses and "claims in respect of which limitation of liability can be invoked" for the purpose of payment out of the limitation fund under Article 9 likewise do not include claims for reimbursement of legal expenses.
42 The construction of the phrase "claims in respect of" which I adopt allows a claimant's legal costs of prosecuting a disputed claim under Article 2.1 to be dealt with by the law of the forum in which the disputed claim is tried. This follows either because the 1976 Convention says nothing at all about the way in which legal costs of disputed claims are to be dealt with, or else because the establishment of a disputed claim is a necessary part of the process involved in the "distribution of a limitation fund" within the operation of Article 14, so that under that Article domestic law governs the procedure whereby the claim is established.
43 In short, to construe "claims" under Article 2.1 in this way produces the result that a claimant against a limitation fund who has not incurred legal costs in establishing the claim will not be disadvantaged because the claims of other claimants are swollen by the inclusion of their legal costs. Further, those claimants who establish their claims under domestic procedural rules which award full indemnity for legal costs to the successful party will retain the benefit of that procedure, while those claimants whose domestic procedural rules award little or no costs will be no worse off.
44 I do not think that the other matters raised by Mr McHugh militate against this conclusion. He says that it would be inconsistent with the purpose of the 1976 Convention to limit claims against shipowners for compensation while leaving at large their liabilities for legal costs arising from such claims.
45 The answer to this submission is, I think, that the Convention recognises in Article 14 that it can only go so far in limiting claims against shipowners: calculation of the limits of compensation payable to claimants can be made uniform no matter what national jurisdiction determines those claims, but the procedures for determining whether or not the claims are established and how they are to be dealt with could not be made uniform without invasion of domestic procedural law, which would be contentious, inconvenient and unnecessary.
46 As to Mr McHugh's submission that "any other claims" referred to in Article 6.1(b) includes claims for the legal costs of establishing claims under s.6.1(a), I am unable to agree. In my opinion, it is clear that Article 6.1(b) refers to claims identified in Article 2.1, other than claims for loss of life and personal injury, which are the subject matter of Article 6.1(a).
47 Finally, I do not think that I should follow the decision in Noferi v Smithers because, as I have observed, the question whether the limitation fund is exclusive or inclusive of legal costs does not appear to have been argued and his Honour therefore did not give reasons for his conclusion. On the other hand, after full argument from Counsel and careful deliberation I have come to a clear view about the matter.