Duty of Care: An Alternative Analysis
67 The Court was informed that the case was fought as a misfeasance case, i.e. the negligent exercise of a statutory power to form an opinion. It was not fought as a nonfeasance case, i.e. the failure to give a notice. However, her Honour appeared to decide the case on the latter basis. To repeat her Honour's finding, the relevant duty was "to take reasonable steps to ensure that its decision took into account any objection lodged by the plaintiffs". That refers to the ultimate decision-making process rather than the formation of the s114(1) opinion, upon which the Respondents' submissions focused both at trial and in this Court. This Court should approach the appeal on the basis on which it was put, i.e. the negligent formation of an opinion under s114 of the Act.
68 The Respondents were awarded damages on two bases. First, for diminution in the value of the property, a form of pure economic loss. Secondly, for loss of enjoyment of the dwelling on the basis of loss of views and of privacy, to which I will refer as loss of amenity. This is a distinctive category of harm. The Court was not referred to any authority which has acknowledged a duty to avoid harm of this second character. As I will outline below, there is a well-established doctrine that no such kind of damage is available in nuisance.
69 With respect to pure economic loss it is necessary to proceed in accordance with the guidance for cases of this character set out in the respective judgments in Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180. With respect to the particular kind of economic loss, and the cognate loss of amenity, this is a case in which it is appropriate to identify the interests which are said to require the protection of the law. (See Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil (2000) 205 CLR 254 at [14]; Perre v Apand, supra at [191]: Reynolds v Katoomba RSL All Services Club Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 43 at [9]-[18].)
70 Those interests were not said to be to prevent diminution of property values or loss of amenity. The interests to be protected are the preservation of an opportunity to make submissions to the Council or to negotiate with the neighbour in order to secure some advantage.
71 This is not a case involving a category recognised by the authorities as attracting a duty of care, the scope of which is settled. (Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman, supra at 441-442 per Gibbs CJ, Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330 at [126] per Gummow J.)
72 Her Honour repeated, as adopted in this Court by the Respondents, a sentence from each of Caledonian Collieries and Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman. They were not statements capable of being applied in the manner they were applied by her Honour. They do not stand for the proposition that the exercise of any statutory power necessarily gives rise to a common law duty of care. As Mason J went on to say in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman at 459:
"… it has generally been accepted that, unless the statute manifests a contrary intention, a public authority which enters upon an exercise of statutory power may place itself in a relationship to members of the public which imports a common law duty to take dare." [Emphasis added]
73 As noted above, McHugh J accepted that there was a "settled category" of the character referred to by her Honour in Crimmins at [62]. However, his Honour clearly distinguished, without purporting to be comprehensive, two other situations which were not within the "settled category". First, a claim that a public authority was under an affirmative obligation to prevent harm. (See e.g. Crimmins at [70] and [79].) Secondly, a distinctly different approach is adopted with respect to a claim for pure economic loss. (See Crimmins at [78] and [93] at point 6.)
74 In each case, the statutory regime and the circumstances of the exercise, or failure to exercise, a power must be analysed to determine whether a duty of care has arisen. In the case of conduct leading to personal injury, it can be said that there is a broad range of statutory powers which gave rise to a duty of care of settled scope. That is not so with respect to the harm alleged in the present case.
75 For the purposes of the present case, I have found particular assistance in the following passage from the judgment of Gummow and Hayne JJ , with which Gaudron J agreed, in Graham Barclay Oysters, supra:
"[146] The existence or otherwise of a common law duty of care allegedly owed by a statutory authority turns on a close examination of the terms, scope and purpose of the relevant statutory regime. The question is whether that regime erects or facilitates a relationship between the authority and a class of persons that, in all the circumstances, displays sufficient characteristics answering the criteria for intervention by the tort of negligence.
[147] Where the question posed above is answered in the affirmative, the common law imposes a duty in tort which operates alongside the rights, duties and liabilities created by statute. In some instances, a statutory regime may itself, in express terms or by necessary implication, exclude the concurrent operation of a duty at common law. …
[148] However, contrary to submissions put on behalf of the Attorney-General for Western Australia (as an intervener in this Court), the discernment of an affirmative legislative intent that a common law duty exists, is not, and has never been, a necessary pre-condition to the recognition of such a duty. This may be contrasted with the action for breach of statutory duty, the doctrinal basis of which is identified as legislative intention.
[149] An evaluation of whether a relationship between a statutory authority and a class of persons imports a common law duty of care is necessarily a multi-faceted inquiry. Each of the salient features of the relationship must be considered. The focus of analysis is the relevant legislation and the positions occupied by the parties on the facts as found at trial. It ordinarily will be necessary to consider the degree and nature of control exercised by the authority of the risk of harm that eventuated; the degree of vulnerability of those who depend on the proper exercise by the authority of its powers; and the consistency or otherwise of the asserted duty of care with the terms, scope and purpose of the relevant statute. In particular categories of cases, some features will be of increased significance. For example, in cases of negligent misstatement, such as Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board, reasonable reliance by the plaintiff on the defendant authority ordinarily will be a significant factor in ascertaining any relevant duty of care.
[150] The factor of control is of fundamental importance in discerning a common law duty of care on the part of a public authority. It assumes particular significance in this appeal. This is because a form of control over the relevant risk of harm, which, as exemplified by Agar v Hyde , is remote, in a legal and practical sense, does not suffice to found a duty of care."
76 Of the factors identified in recent case law as pertinent to determining whether a duty exists, a number support the existence of a duty in the present case. Foremost amongst these is the element of control and correlative vulnerability. Although a neighbour may advise another of his or her intentions with respect to development of a property, or another neighbour, who is in fact notified by Council, may discuss the proposal with other neighbours, the Council has a high degree of control over the situation.
77 In the normal case, it is notification by Council which alerts an adjoining owner to a proposal. Furthermore, it appears that the Council is only obliged to consider submissions from a person who has been notified under the statute. An informal notification may not trigger the obligation to consider in s118(2).
78 The next factor supporting a duty is that the legislative provision is specifically designed to protect an adjoining owner. The scheme creates a statutory right to make a submission, which submission must be considered by the Council.
79 In my above analysis of whether the statute intended to exclude a common law duty, I have emphasised the significance of the subjective test in s114. That is also a critical factor to be considered in determining whether, assuming away any such statutory exclusion, a duty of care can be said to arise. The formation of an opinion for purpose of notification - as distinct from an opinion which will be conveyed to another for purposes of actual reliance - is not a matter to which a standard of reasonableness can readily apply.
80 In the present case, the scope and subject matter of the matter about which the opinion must be formed is not such as can be judged on a standard of reasonable care, as distinct from Wednesbury unreasonableness. Whether the "enjoyment of land" is or is not "detrimentally affected" is a matter on which the views of reasonable people will differ and those differences can cover a wide range.
81 This difficulty is highlighted by the issue of breach which has arisen in this case. Mr Ball said he could form an opinion on the effect of the Blakemores' proposal by standing on their property and looking at the Respondents' property, observing their extensive west facing fenestration. The Respondents' case was that inspection from their property was mandatory. Issues which turn on a person's capacity for imagination are not such as fall for assessment by a test of reasonable care.
82 In my opinion, the subjective nature of the test and the subject matter about which the relevant opinion is to be formed strongly indicate that no common law duty should be found to exist with respect to the formation of the opinion.
83 It is of significance on the issue of duty that the risk of harm said to be protected by the law is the loss of an ability to make a submission to the Council and/or to negotiate with the neighbour. The ultimate harm, for which damages were sought and awarded, arose from the final approval and the construction of the building. This raised issues of causation and remoteness which it is not necessary to consider. However, neither the Council approval, nor the neighbour's conduct is the direct focus of the alleged duty.
84 Although the law will, in appropriate circumstances, compensate for the loss of a chance, the indirect and, in large part, speculative nature of the actual economic loss and/or loss of amenity, is of significance. If the step leading to actual harm does not involve a duty of care, why should the loss of an opportunity to avert that step being taken give rise to a duty?
85 There is no duty to avoid the risk of harm constituted by the approval or by the actual construction of the building.
86 It is now well established that coherence in the law is a factor to be considered in determining whether a duty of care arises in the context of a particular relationship. By reason of the focus upon negligence in the formation of a statutory opinion there does not appear to be an issue of coherence between the statute and a common law duty of care. Further, no question of incompatibility or inconsistency appears to arise, but the issue of coherence is not limited to such a situation. (See State of New South Wales v Paige (2002) 115 IR 283 at [93].)
87 An issue of coherence with other common law doctrines may arise. (See e.g. Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562 at [50].) As Gummow J put it in Perre v Apand, supra at [197], it is pertinent to ask whether:
"… to allow recovery in negligence for economic loss would cut across a well developed body of doctrine which already applied, with its own checks and balances, to the situation in question. The wisdom of encouraging the further march of negligence across such fields remains a matter of debate."
88 Coherence was also emphasised in several judgments in Tame v New South Wales (2002) 76 ALJR 1348 where liability in negligence would "intersect" with the law of defamation, which resolves the competing interests of the parties in a different manner and according to a coherent body of doctrine. (See at [28], [58], [123] and [323].)
89 There is a pertinent "intersection" of particular relevance to the claim for loss of amenity, but which is also relevant to the claim for economic loss. Traditionally, it is the tort of nuisance rather than the tort of negligence that protects an occupier's interest in the beneficial use and enjoyment of land. Nuisance offers recovery for unreasonable interference with an occupier's amenity in the form of an unaffronted sense of smell (e.g. noxious fumes) and of hearing (e.g. excessive noise). However, the amenity of a view has never been accepted.
90 As long ago as William Aldred's Case (1610) 9 Co Rep 57b, where the relevant view was of a hog sty, Wray CJ noted "… for prospect, which is only a matter of delight, and not of necessity, no action lies for stopping thereof … The law does not give an action for such things of delight." This has been consistently applied over the centuries. (See e.g. Attorney General v Doughty (1752) 2 Ves. Sen 453; Dalton v Angus (1881) 6 App Cas 740 at 824; Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479 at 504, 507; Phipps v Pears [1965] 1 QB 76 at 83; Kent v Johnson (1973) 21 FLR 177 at 212-213; Bathurst City Council v Saban (No 2) (1986) 58 LGRA 201 at 206; St Pierre v Ontario [1987] 1 SCR 906 at [12]-[13].) The same principle has been applied to interference with television reception by the erection of a tower. (See Hunter v Canary Wharf Limited [1997] AC 655.)
91 The common law has long recognised that protecting rights of this character would unduly interfere with the development of urban centres. The tort of nuisance has balanced these rights in a particular manner, which should not be disturbed by the tort of negligence.
92 The same kinds of concerns are apparent when courts have considered the similar issues which arise when issues of amenity are required to be taken into account pursuant to statutory planning schemes. For the same reasons as motivated the common law to reject inhibition on development, one can perceive in the case law a distinct reluctance to acknowledge a right to a view or give significant, let alone determinative, weight to interference with a view. (See e.g. Idonz Pty Ltd v National Capital Development Commission (1986) 13 FCR 70; Rapid Transport Pty Ltd v Sutherland Shire Council (1987) 62 LGRA 88.)
93 In the present case, as the focus of attention is not on the grant of approval but upon the formation of an opinion about detrimental effect, one cannot say that the tort of nuisance would "apply … to the situation in question", to employ the words of Gummow J in Perre v Apand at [197]. Nevertheless there remains an intersection between the tort of nuisance and the tort of negligence in the circumstances of this case.
94 No duty to prevent building, e.g. by way of refusing approval, can be said to exist. If the ultimate conduct does not give rise to a common law duty, I do not see why a procedural step should do so.
95 The legislative scheme under consideration involves the formation of subjective opinions by councils in numerous contexts. These opinions often lead to decisions which have effects on the value of property. In such a context the hesitation of the law in allowing recovery for pure economic loss is particularly appropriate.
96 When identifying the considerations that may be said to constitute a relationship of sufficient "proximity", in accordance with his Honour's approach to the tort of negligence, Deane J said in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman, supra at 511:
"… protection of the owner of land from the mere economic loss which might be sustained by reason of a defect in the building erected upon his or her land is no part of the purpose for which the relevant legislative powers and functions were conferred upon the Council. The provisions of the Act and Ordinances have traditionally never been seen as intended to place upon a local government council the duty or burden of protecting an owner of premises from mere economic loss sustained by reason of the negligent erection, by someone other than the council, of a building upon his or her land. Nor is there any readily discernible reason in principle, policy or justice why the general body of ratepayers within an area should bear the economic loss sustained by such an owner of land."
97 This reasoning is applicable to the proposed recognition of a duty to recover for economic loss, as well as loss of amenity, from the negligent failure to give notice under s114. These are public duties to be enforced by public sanctions.
98 Although her Honour made no pertinent findings of fact, it is difficult to see what rational basis there could have been for the Appellant reaching a conclusion that the proposed building had no detrimental affect on the enjoyment of the Respondents' land. Indeed, the Wednesbury unreasonableness test may well have been satisfied. (I do not intend to suggest that this public law test is pertinent for purposes of tort law. See McHugh J in Crimmins at [82] and other authorities I have set out in Paige, supra at [125]-[127].) What had occurred in this case was an assessment of the degree of detriment likely to be caused. This is not the kind of process to which a common law duty should attach.
99 The position would not be different if Mr Ball had formed an opinion that notice should be given but, by reason of negligent conduct by another Council officer, the notice was not posted. The statute would be contravened, but no common law duty to notify exists. (See e.g. Revesz v The Commonwealth (1951) 51 SR (NSW) 63).
100 Balancing the relevant considerations leads to the conclusion, in my opinion, that a council does not owe a duty of care at common law, to exercise reasonable care in and about forming an opinion under s114(1) of the Act. It is, accordingly, unnecessary to consider the other grounds of appeal.